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Abstract 
 
 Title of Dissertation: Virtual Aids to Navigation 
 
 Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
There are many examples of master, bridge crew and pilot errors in navigation causing 
grounding under adverse circumstances that were known and published in official 
notices and records. Also dangerous are hazards to navigation resulting from dynamic 
changes within the marine environment, inadequate surveys and charts. This research 
attempts to reduce grounding and allision incidents and increase safety of navigation by 
expanding mariner situational awareness at and below the waterline using new 
technology and developing methods for the creation, implementation and display of 
Virtual Aids to Navigation (AtoN) and related navigation information. This approach 
has widespread significance beyond commonly encountered navigation situations. 
Increased vessel navigation activity in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions engenders risk 
due, in part, to the inability to place navigational aids and buoys in constantly changing 
ice conditions. Similar conditions exist in tropical regions where sinker placement to 
moor buoys in sensitive environmental areas with coral reefs is problematic. 
Underdeveloped regions also lack assets and infrastructure needed to provide adequate 
navigation services, and infrastructure can also rapidly perish in developed regions 
during times of war and natural disaster.  
This research exploits rapidly developing advances in environmental sensing 
technology, evolving capabilities and improved methods for reporting real time 
environmental data that can substantially expand electronic navigation aid availability 
and improve knowledge of undersea terrain and imminent hazards to navigation that 
may adversely affect ship operations. This is most needed in areas where physical aids 
to navigation are scarce or non-existent as well as in areas where vessel traffic is 
congested. Research to expand related vessel capabilities is accomplished to overcome 
limitations in existing and planned electronic aids, expanding global capabilities and 
resources at relatively low-cost. New methods for sensor fusion are also explored to 
vi 
 
reduce overall complexity and improve integration with other navigation systems with 
the goal of simplifying navigation tasks. An additional goal is to supplement training 
program content by expanding technical resources and capabilities within the confines 
of existing International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements, while improving safety by providing 
new techniques to enhance situational awareness. 
Key Words: Aid to Navigation, AtoN, 3-dimensional Forward-looking Sonar, 3D-FLS, 
Hydrographic Survey, Virtual AtoN 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
This chapter describes Virtual Aids to Navigation (AtoN) that comprise the domain of 
the research embodied within this dissertation. The subjects of hydrographic survey and 
the Arctic are also discussed as they form elements essential to the placement of AtoN 
and their operating environment.  
1.1 Background 
There exist various landmarks, markers, devices and other natural features, manmade 
signs and apparatuses to aid travelers in determining their location and direction of 
travel and to identify routes between destinations, warn of dangers and obstructions to 
travel, and to assess the rate of progress being made in their transit. In the maritime and 
aviation communities such features, signs and apparatuses are referred to as aids to 
navigation that are found both within the physical environment as well as on navigation 
charts that depict their geographic positions and characteristics by which their purpose 
and function may be recognized. Long range AtoN include Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS) such as the United States Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), the European Union’s Galileo, 
China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the low frequency Long Range 
Navigation (eLORAN) radio systems. Short range maritime AtoN include various 
lighted and unlighted beacons and buoys, ranges, lighthouses, leading lights and 
associated sound signals.  
The Virtual AtoN concept of a charted aid to navigation having no physical presence at 
the charted location is relatively new to maritime use. However, this concept is now 
becoming more widespread and accepted with the adoption of Automated Identification 
System (AIS) radio-based technology that can project a virtual AtoN to a specific 
position for display on AIS monitors and AIS-capable Radar and Electronic Chart 
Display and Information System (ECDIS) monitors. This is accomplished using a Very 
High Frequency (VHF) radio transmitter augmented with AIS capabilities located 
within the line of sight of the specific position at which an AIS virtual AtoN is 
deployed. A similar approach has been implemented in the aviation community for 
many decades beginning in the middle of 20th century in the form of VHF Omni-
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directional Radio Ranges (VOR). Virtual navigation fixes are defined by the 
intersection of radials from two different VOR stations, and bearings to and from these 
stations are also provided facilitating navigation along traffic routes and corridors. 
VOR technology in aviation is gradually being replaced with GNSS enabling direct 
routing between origins and destinations. Universal adoption of GNSS provides equally 
useful utility to mariners for navigation. 
1.2 Virtual aids to navigation  
The results of this research embody a new and unique approach for Virtual AtoN 
implementation through a modern realization of piloting as a commonly recognized 
method of marine navigation defined in Bowditch (2002) as, “navigating in restricted 
waters with frequent determination of position relative to geographic and hydrographic 
features”. The approach recognizes the limitations of modern satellite and radio-based 
navigation systems due to atmospheric phenomena, spoofing, aliasing and denial of 
service resulting from natural events and manmade actions and activities. This results 
in a “ship-centric” orientation providing the watchstander with the tools necessary to 
perform successful navigation using ship’s own resources without overreliance upon 
external sources and systems such as GNSS and AIS. The described Virtual AtoN may 
be static in terms of their characteristics not changing over long periods of time, or 
dynamic as their characteristics may change in both the time and space domains in 
accordance with the specifications of the vessel itself by providing a capability to 
discern hazards to navigation based upon operating requirements in terms of draft, 
speed and other factors rather than using a static AtoN model. Virtual AtoN may also 
be permanent, temporary or momentary in duration reflecting the indication of a hazard 
to navigation detected using 3-dimenstional forward looking navigation sonar (3D-
FLS) and displayed on ECDIS in real time having significant relevance to the vessel 
while making way. 
The Virtual AtoN concept resulting from this research is enhanced beyond existing AIS 
virtual AtoN technology from several perspectives. First, the results reflect a truly 
Virtual AtoN described by International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and 
Lighthouse Authorities - IALA (1081) as, 
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“A virtual aid to navigation (Virtual AtoN) does not physically exist but is a 
digital information object promulgated by an authorised service provider 
that can be presented on navigational systems”, 
where the described Virtual AtoN is computer-generated and exists entirely as a digital 
data object with no corresponding presence in the physical environment such as a VHF 
transmitter, sinkers or piles required for implementation. Virtual AtoN also include 
expanded functional elements beyond AIS virtual AtoN to support static and dynamic 
characteristics with permanent, temporary and momentary durations that are only 
possible using a ship-centric approach on a vessel equipped with modern environmental 
sensors. The result is a highly versatile Virtual AtoN capable of providing 
comprehensive and timely information to mariners about hazards to navigation, safe 
waterways, caution and avoidance areas. 
Second, the Virtual AtoN digital information object contains the complete set of 
functional and operational characteristics in addition to a high resolution 3-dimensional 
topological model of the physical environment at and adjacent to the position at which 
the Virtual AtoN is deployed. Such enhancement to the traditional characteristics of an 
AtoN provides an inherent capability for self-verification that the AtoN is on station 
and watching properly defined as, “an aid to navigation on its assigned position 
exhibiting the advertised characteristics in all respects” and “the state of an aid to 
navigation on charted position and exhibiting its proper characteristics” (USCG, 
M16500.7A; Bowditch, 2002a). The act of watching properly is closely related to AtoN 
availability described by IALA (1035) as, “the probability that an aid to navigation or a 
system of aids to navigation, as designed by the Competent Authority, is performing its 
specified function at any randomly chosen time”. This concept may also be applied to 
verification of both traditional, physical and AIS AtoN, and represents advancement in 
technology that can significantly expand and enhance the capabilities of scarce national 
resources presently dedicated to perform this task.  
The concepts of ship-centricity, dynamic and momentary AtoN and the new capabilities 
they provide as advanced by this research are contrary to the present static 
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functionalities, methods and procedures used by competent national authorities and 
authorized service providers in provisioning charting and AtoN services. For example, 
rather than having to rely on navigation charts that are blank and contain no soundings, 
a ship-centric approach places the tools necessary to complete a safe passage directly 
into the hands of the mariner. This is accomplished by using 3D-FLS data to provide 
soundings information and create Virtual AtoN of momentary duration representing 
detected hazards to navigation existing within the water column but not attached to the 
bottom for immediate display using existing symbology on ECDIS. Indeed, the time 
frames currently required to properly establish such Virtual AtoN using existing 
practices would nullify many of their benefits.   
The approach followed for Virtual AtoN introduction includes examination and 
approval by responsible authorities of the methods and processes for their creation and 
to take best advantage of their static and dynamic characteristics. Their initial 
deployment should only be to areas where existing AtoN services are deficient or non-
existent due to environmental and logistical challenges, such as in the Arctic where ice 
movement can destroy physical AtoN, and in tropical locations where the potential to 
damage sensitive coral reefs prevents the placement of sinkers for physical AtoN. 
1.3 Hydrographic survey  
The impetus for initiating research into Virtual AtoN lies in a perceived need for such 
services in the Arctic and other remote places where existing AtoN services are 
inadequate or do not exist at all. A key factor is the availability of hydrographic survey 
results adequate to determine where AtoN are most needed. Existing limitations in the 
present AtoN system and inadequate resources to perform hydrographic surveys 
impede expansion to geographic regions experiencing significant growth in marine 
traffic yet are highly remote and ecologically fragile. This is a problem worldwide, with 
large gaps along major international shipping routes in the Indian Ocean, South China 
Sea, Western Pacific and adjacent waters. This problem also exists in the Caribbean, 
some coastal waters of Africa, Australasia, Oceania and the Antarctic where modern 
surveys, metrication and datum shift to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84) are all 
urgent requirements in locations which are now frequented by cruise liners (IHO C-55).  
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In the United States this includes thousands of square miles in the Arctic and sub-Arctic 
encompassing the northern slope of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and tropical regions 
spanning the Hawaiian Islands to Midway Atoll and other US territories. Many of these 
areas are poorly charted, if they are charted at all. The US National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) states that the Arctic is severely deficient in 
many capabilities extended to the rest of the Nation and large gaps exist in the 
information they do have as illustrated by empty white space on navigation charts of 
the region (NOAA, 2011; 2013).  
In areas where surveys have not been conducted to modern standards and charts are 
blank or contain sparse information, a ship-centric approach involves acquiring live 
soundings information ahead of the vessel using 3D-FLS and displaying this in real 
time as soundings on ECDIS and for the creation of Virtual AtoN of momentary 
duration. This depth information can also be stored for subsequent use by national 
hydrographic and AtoN authorities for chartmaking and the placement of static and 
dynamic Virtual AtoN in these areas in the future. Although 3D-FLS is not intended to 
replace multibeam sonar in performing hydrographic surveys, its use by vessels of 
opportunity can enhance safety of navigation and supplement national hydrographic 
authority survey vessel assets by providing an independent source of high-resolution 
3D bottom topography data and expanding geographic coverage to new areas. 
1.4 Aid to Navigation establishment 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires Governments to provide AtoN 
as the volume of traffic dictates and the degree of risk requires (SOLAS 74/78). 
According to the U.S. Coast Guard, a situation to be avoided unless specifically 
warranted by unusual circumstances is the establishment of AtoN in areas not properly 
charted or where they would invite the inexperienced to attempt a passage which would 
still be dangerous in spite of the AtoN (USCG, M16500.7A(a)). The increasing traffic 
in the Arctic region would in itself qualify as unusual circumstances in terms of the 
establishment of AtoN. Given the inadequacy of Arctic surveys and navigation charting 
and the increasing level of traffic in the region, the requirements of this research 
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identified a need to accomplish adequate hydrographic surveys and the establishment of 
AtoN through extraordinary means. Fulfillment of this need was investigated through 
the examination of potential technological solutions. 
1.5 Enabling technologies 
An analysis of environmental sensing technologies was performed to determine which, 
if any, sensors were sufficiently capable, suitable and able to supplement existing 
sensor suites to aid mariners in safely navigating poorly surveyed and unsurveyed 
waters. Due to the remoteness of the Arctic the scope of this analysis was limited to 
vessels that are most likely to be involved in transits of the region and for which the 
consequences of grounding and other incidents would be most significant. This 
includes vessels subject to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) convention and the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(the Polar Code) but excludes many small vessels whose transits tend to be local using 
local knowledge, have minimal instrumentation and sensor suites, and generally 
provide low environmental risk (SOLAS 74/78a; MSC.385(94)). The basic sensor suite 
presently mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as carriage 
requirements on SOLAS vessels includes radar, AIS, ECDIS and echosounder in 
addition to various communication devices and GNSS. With the exception of the 
echosounder, all other sensors and equipment are designed for use with respect to the 
physical environment above the waterline. The single-beam echosounder is the sole 
sensor capable of providing visibility into the underwater environment, and this is only 
to the extent of determining water depth directly below the hull and nowhere else. The 
availability of a more advanced multi-beam echosounder on the bridge would not 
provide significant advantage over the single-beam echosounder as this would yield 
depth information along a swath of the bottom athwartships, and nowhere else.  
The analysis concluded that the only sensor capable of assisting vessels in safely 
navigating poorly surveyed and unsurveyed waters by providing insight into the 
underwater topography ahead of the bow of a vessel making way is an echosounder 
with 3-dimensional forward-looking capabilities that encompasses 3D-FLS. This 
dissertation reports results and findings obtained from different experiments performed 
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at diverse geographical locations using various 3D-FLS types and manufacturers’ 
models examined during the course of this research. Its use, along with a single beam 
echo sounder, in verifying AtoN as watching properly and as a means to perform 
hydrographic survey in accordance with International Hydrographic Organization 
(IHO) standards and requirements is also discussed. 
1.6 Frames of reference 
A comprehensive treatise of Virtual AtoN research must cover a broad range of subject 
matter spanning multiple areas of responsibility. Five frames of reference have been 
considered in conducting this research and in the performance of investigations that 
include: 
• Applications – Where the results of this research may be applied, 
• Sensors – Environmental sensors needed to accomplish the research objectives, 
• Engineering – Resources needed to build the systems resulting from the research, 
• Regulatory – Authorities accountable for research adoption and implementation, and 
• Training – Instruction on the use of the research results. 
A graphic that attempts to depict the scope and nature of these subjects and the frames 
of reference these represent is illustrated in Figure 1.1.   
Efforts have been made to interact with several different maritime communities to 
explore the implications of Virtual AtoN research. This includes diverse areas of 
application, technical authorities both in sensor development and in the engineering of 
AtoN systems, educators involved in the training of mariners, and regulatory authorities 
at the national and international levels.  
Application – Geographic areas where the use of Virtual AtoN is most appropriate 
include those where existing AtoN systems and their infrastructure are not in place 
and/or cannot rapidly be put in place to support essential operations. Such areas include 
the Arctic where ice movement can move or destroy physical AtoN rendering them 
ineffective and logistical and maintenance support is hampered by the large distances 
involved, harsh weather conditions and lack of personnel. Virtual AtoN can also benefit 
tropical regions in  which  the  placement  of sinkers to moor physical AtoN or to place 
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HF transmitters to support AIS AtoN can harm coral reefs or other sensitive 
environmental features, and to provide guidance to mariners where such services would 
not otherwise be available. Additional locations include those ravaged by the effects of 
war or natural disaster where existing infrastructure has been destroyed. The ability to 
rapidly deploy Virtual AtoN in such locations may assist in providing logistical support 
for reinforcement of manpower and materiel and the provisioning of food and building 
materials for relief efforts. 
 
Figure 1.1: Frames of reference for Virtual AtoN research 
Sensors – The transit of poorly charted waters where Virtual AtoN have been deployed 
requires the use of the complete sensor suite on the bridge of a vessel subject to SOLAS 
requirements. Additional sensor requirements in the form of 3D-FLS are needed in such 
areas when prior surveys are inadequate resulting in poor charting and Virtual AtoN are 
not present.  
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Engineering – Engineering efforts are accomplished in the analysis of 3D-FLS 
capabilities to assist in detecting hazards to navigation and to acquire information for 
hydrographic survey and chart making. Multi-sensor integration involving the use of 
Virtual AtoN combined with 3D-FLS, ECDIS, single beam echo sounder, AIS, radar, 
GNSS and other sensors is also considered as the basis for automating much of the data 
acquisition aspects of this research whereby crowd sourcing of hydrographic data and 
Virtual AtoN system design may be accomplished. However, this scope of this research 
has presently been limited to the use of 3D-FLS in combination with the single beam 
echo sounder for the purposes of assisting in the verification of Virtual AtoN as being 
in the correct position and watching properly. 
Human factors and training – Human factors are examined related to the use of 3D-
FLS as a means for navigating without having to impose any additional training 
requirements on watchstanders and other crewmembers. Further consideration of 
human factors is also accomplished pertaining to the use of 3D-FLS and the technical 
means for its display on ECDIS as well as the setting of alarms and training issues. The 
focus of these efforts was to integrate 3D-FLS with ECDIS rather than require the use 
of another display on the bridge, to adopt standard protocols for the display of 
electronic symbols, and in determining reaction times for watchstander intervention 
upon detection of hazards to navigation.  
Regulatory environment – The fifth frame of reference has to do with the regulatory 
environment and the many governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations in charge of the various areas of responsibility identified in this research. 
Governmental organizations such as the Coast Guard and NOAA are responsible for 
implementing IMO, IHO and national guidance in the United States; each of which are 
represented at the IMO and IHO. At the international level the IMO is cognizant of 
maritime affairs and the IHO is cognizant for issues pertaining to hydrographic survey 
and chart making. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include many professional 
and technical organizations such as International Association of Marine Aids to 
Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA), the Nautical Institute (NI), the Cruise 
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Line Industry Association (CLIA), and many others that provide industry, cause-
specific and other representation at the IMO and IHO.  
1.7 Objectives and research questions 
The hypothesis investigated by this research is that environmental sensor data can be 
acquired, managed, adopted and applied to provide real time guidance for vessels to 
safely transit uncharted waters and/or waters lacking physical aids to navigation. The 
overall goal is to determine the potential for and to design and evaluate ship-centric 
Virtual AtoN capable of rapid deployment and adapting to dynamic environmental and 
situational conditions enabling safe ship’s navigation without benefit of physical AtoN 
in remote and underdeveloped locations, war zones and disaster areas. 
The specific objectives of the research are as follows:  
1. Facilitating safe vessel transits of uncharted and poorly surveyed waters, as well as 
waters lacking physical aids to navigation; 
2. Creating infrastructure to support navigation system dynamic sensor fusion and 
integration with vector chart data to enhance watchstander situational awareness; 
3. Compatibility with existing and evolving standards and practices for AtoN, AIS, 
ECDIS, other eNavigation methods and technologies; and satellite services for 
GNSS positioning and data communications;  
To achieve these objectives, the following questions have guided this research: 
1. What sources of environmental sensor data can be used to maintain a lookout below 
the waterline, and are these data of sufficient resolution to safely use in vessel 
navigation? Additional aspects of this same question include: 
• How may these environmental sensor data be acquired, and with what area of 
coverage? Also, are the measurements repeatable and able to provide the same 
data at different times and conditions? 
• Are bottom, submerged and/or floating hazards to navigation (HtoN) detectable, 
to what degree and accuracy, and under what conditions? 
• How may hazards to navigation be represented to watchstanders as Virtual AtoN 
in a manner that is intuitive, understandable and correct? 
  
11 
 
 
2. Can data necessary to create static and dynamic Virtual AtoN be communicated to 
responsible AtoN authorities with sufficient resolution to meet evolving AtoN 
implementation goals and practices? 
 
3. Can 3D-FLS survey data be communicated to national hydrographic authorities 
with sufficient resolution to meet charting standards? 
1.8 Appended papers 
In addition to the main body of text, this dissertation is based upon the research results 
reported and described within the following papers: 
Paper 1 – Wright, R.G. and Baldauf, M. (2016) ‘Virtual Electronic Aids to 
Navigation for Remote and Ecologically Sensitive Regions’, Journal of Navigation, 
1–17. DOI: 10.1017/S0373463316000527. 
This paper describes the results of research that determines whether Virtual AtoN 
existing entirely as digital information objects can overcome the practical limitations of 
physical AtoN and AIS virtual AtoN. Also described are possible methods of 
deployment based upon similar concepts already in use. 
Paper 2 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2016) Correlation of Virtual Aids to 
Navigation to the Physical Environment. TransNav, the International Journal on 
Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, Vol. 10, No. 2, 287-299. DOI: 
10.12716/1001.10.02.11 
This paper describes the results of research in the ability of Virtual AtoN to fulfill 
traditional navigation aid functions by considering attributes of the physical 
environment to help ensure their proper location and to verify the display of correct 
characteristics.  
Paper 3 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2016). Hydrographic Survey in Remote 
Regions: Using Vessels of Opportunity Equipped with 3-dimensional Forward-
Looking Sonar. Journal of Marine Geodesy. Vol. 39, No. 6, 439-357. DOI 
10.1080/01490419.2016.1245266 
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This paper describes research efforts to exploit the capabilities of commercial-off-the-
shelf 3D-FLS installed on expeditionary and other vessels of opportunity for 
hydrographic survey and detecting bottom features to navigate by georeferencing. Also 
cited are capabilities to provide high-resolution full bottom survey data to supplement 
the assets of responsible hydrographic survey authorities in exploring and charting 
these regions. 
Paper 4 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf, M. (2016) Arctic Environmental Preservation 
through Grounding Avoidance
This paper describes the Arctic in terms of transit routes, the challenges of Arctic 
navigation and increases in vessel groundings that have occurred and may potentially 
occur as traffic in the region increases. The use of Virtual AtoN and 3D-FLS as means 
for developing strategies to avoid groundings and preserving the Arctic environment is 
considered. 
, L.P. Hildebrand & L.W. Brigham, editors. 
Springer International Publishing, AG, Cham. London. Submitted, undergoing 
peer review. 
Paper 5 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2014) ‘Enhanced Situational Awareness 
through Muli-Sensor Integration’, in Proc. 18th International Navigation Simulator 
Lecturers' Conference (INSLC 18), Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts USA, 40-59. 
ISBN 978-0-692-29012-5. 
This paper examines the capabilities of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation at 
cruising speed through an in-depth analysis of the Costa Concordia tragedy. Insight into 
bridge alerts and alarms that may have been generated had 3D-FLS been installed, 
operational and observed just prior to the grounding are also provided. 
1.9 Other related papers and publications 
Additional presentations, papers and publications resulting from this research useful to 
supplement the five primary papers cited in this dissertation are listed as follows: 
• Wright R.G., Baldauf M. “Physical Aspects of Virtual Aids to Navigation”, 
Activities in Navigation – Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; ed. 
Adam Weintrit, 61-68, 2015, CRC Press, London. 
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• Wright R.G., Zimmerman C. “Vector Data Extraction from Forward-Looking Sonar 
Imagery for Hydrographic Survey and Hazard to Navigation Detection”, Proc. of 
IEEE/MTS Oceans Conference, Washington D.C., 19-22 October 2015. 
• Wright R.G., Baldauf, M. “A Georeferencing Approach to Real-Time Virtual Aid to 
Navigation Verification”, in Proc. ION GNSS+ Conference 2015, Institute of 
Navigation, Tampa, FL, 14-18 Sep. 2015.   
• Wright R.G., Baldauf M. “Improving the Safety of Polar Navigation – Contribution 
of New Technology and Training”, presented at 6th Arctic Shipping Summit, 
Montreal, Canada, 18-19 March 2015. 
• Wright R.G.; Baldauf M.: “Collaborative Navigation through the Establishment and 
Distribution of Electronic Aids to Navigation in Real Time”, in Proc. Joint 
Navigation Conference, Institute of Navigation, 16-19 June 2014, Orlando, FL. 
• Mehdi, 2016: Mehdi Raza Ali, Wright R. Glenn and Baldauf Michael. “3-dimensional 
Forward-looking Sonar: Offshore Wind Farm Applications”, 2016 European 
Navigation Conference, Helsinki, Finland.  
• Patent Application: Number 62218306, “Method of Virtual Aid to Navigation 
Verification using Georeferencing”, US Patent and Trademark Office. Filing Date: 
14 September 2015. Named Inventor: R. Glenn Wright. 
• Patent Application: Number 62378691, “Virtual Dynamic Aids to Navigation”, US 
Patent and Trademark Office. Filing Date: 24 August 2016. Named Inventor: R. 
Glenn Wright. 
1.10 Limitations 
This dissertation presents a new approach towards the design, development and 
implementation of Virtual AtoN systems that can complement and work in conjunction 
with existing AtoN. The theories and concepts described do not presently conform to 
nor are in accordance with existing practices of national and international AtoN or 
hydrographic authorities. Analysis of the integration of the processes and products 
involved in Virtual AtoN creation with responsible authorities is beyond the scope of 
this research and must be investigated further with their cooperation. 
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Discussion is provided on the use of 3D-FLS to perform hydrographic survey of the sea 
bed ahead of the vessel’s path of transit as well as to analyze the features and 
characteristics of the water column itself to detect potential hazards to navigation. It 
should be noted that 3D-FLS is presently not mandated for use by the IMO or any 
national authority under equipment carriage requirements for vessels, nor is its use 
presently sanctioned for hydrographic survey by the IHO or any national authority. 
1.11 Structure of the dissertation  
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the domain of this research. The aims and 
objectives of the research are described in Chapter 2, followed by a discussion of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the approach in Chapter 3. Five areas of study examined as 
part of this research effort are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the materials and 
methods used in this research are described. Chapter 6 presents the results of this 
research, followed by a discussion of these results in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 findings 
and conclusions are provided. 
1.12 Discussion of aid to navigation terminology 
During the course of this research it came to light that there are several different terms 
with similar meanings, and different meanings for similar terms pertaining to aids to 
navigation. The use of proper terminology in a new discipline requires a learning curve 
as these concepts mature. The papers appended to this dissertation provide such an 
example as the terminology has changed in these writings over the several year course 
of this research. In an attempt to clarify the present use and meaning of terminology 
within the context of new capabilities identified herein, a summary of the following 
words, terms and working definitions are offered here for the basis of discussion: 
• Aid to Navigation (AtoN) – Any device or system, external to a vessel, which is 
provided to help a mariner determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of 
obstructions, or to give advice about the location of a best or preferred route (IALA 
NAVGUIDE, 2014). 
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• Physical Aid to Navigation (Physical AtoN)
• 
 – Reference to visual and other 
physical (real) aids to navigation in contrast to electronic AIS AtoN (IALA 
NAVGUIDE, 2014a). 
AIS Aid to Navigation (AIS AtoN)
• 
 – AIS AtoN that emanate VHF radio 
transmissions and can vary from the presence of an actual transmitter on a physical 
AtoN, to the transmission of a ‘synthetic’ or ‘virtual’ AtoN as a Message 21 from 
an AIS base station to a location within the radio transmission range of the AIS 
base station (IALA 1062).  
Virtual Aid to Navigation (Virtual AtoN)
- Static: Characteristics do not change over long periods of time, such as when 
emulating a physical AtoN. 
 – A Virtual AtoN does not physically 
exist but is a digital information object promulgated by an authorized service 
provider that can be presented on navigational systems (IALA 1081). In terms of 
letter capitalization, the word “Virtual” when associated with “AtoN” is capitalized 
in IALA 1081. This convention has been adopted throughout this dissertation. 
However, several variations of this practice may be spotted in the appended papers 
as usage appears to have changed over time. Two types of Virtual AtoN exist in 
terms of behavioral characteristics: 
- Dynamic: Characteristics may change in both the time and spatial domains in 
accordance with the specifications of the vessel itself by providing a capability to 
discern hazards to navigation based upon operating requirements in terms of 
draft, speed and other factors. 
Both Static and Dynamic Virtual AtoN may be implemented with time durations 
that are permanent, temporary or momentary in nature. 
Other commonly used terms found in discussion on this subject contain variations of 
the terms described above. These include: 
• Electronic Aid to Navigation (eAtoN or e-AtoN) – Reference to AIS AtoN 
emphasizing their electronic nature in contrast to physical AtoN (USCG 11D, 2014; 
Lewald, 2015). 
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• Real AIS Aid to Navigation (Real AIS AtoN)
• 
 – A ‘real’ AIS AtoN is transmitted as 
a Message 21 from an AIS Base Station that is physically located on the AtoN 
(IALA 1062a). 
Synthetic AIS Aid to Navigation (Synthetic AIS AtoN)
• 
 – A ‘synthetic’ AIS AtoN is 
transmitted to the location of a physical AtoN as a Message 21 from an AIS Base 
Station situated in the vicinity of the physical AtoN (IALA 1062b).   
Virtual AIS Aid to Navigation (Virtual AIS AtoN)
 
 – A ‘virtual’ AIS AtoN is 
transmitted as a message 21 for an AtoN that does not physically exist. (IALA 
1062c). In terms of punctuation the use of the word “virtual” when associated with 
“virtual AIS AtoN” is used as an adjective in IALA 1062 to denote its description 
of a type of AIS AtoN and is therefore not capitalized. 
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Chapter 2      Aims and Objectives 
 
Aids to Navigation (AtoN) comprise a portion of the set of tools needed to safely plan 
and execute a voyage from berth to berth. Another such tool is the navigation chart 
used by mariners to identify the depths needed to formulate a route providing sufficient 
under keel clearance to allow for safe passage. The navigation chart also shows the 
positions of AtoN that include buoys, daymarks, lights and ranges used to identify 
channels and routes of safe passage as well as known hazards to navigation in the area 
of intended transit. Although they are indispensable to mariners in helping to identify 
safe routes of passage, navigation charts merely provide a static representation of the 
results of hydrographic surveys that may have occurred years, decades or even 
centuries ago. Their depiction of AtoN portrays the locations of where they are 
supposed to be if they are on station and watching properly, and have not sunk or 
drifted away. Notices to mariners are issued by the appropriate authorities to update 
navigation charts with interim changes until the next formal release of an updated chart. 
However, there is no guarantee that these notices are sufficiently comprehensive or up 
to date to assure safe passage.  
The records abound with incidents where navigation charts and notices to mariners 
were inadequate or not observed. For example, in 2010 the cruise chip Clipper 
Adventurer grounded in the Northwest Passage on a shoal discovered in 2007, 
published in Canadian Notices to Shipping but not officially charted until June 2012 
(TSB, 2010). The February 2010 grounding on rocks of the sternwheel cruise boat 
Willamete Queen in Oregon was, as explained by the Captain, due to missing buoys 
that mark the hazard. These buoys were marked as seasonal on NOAA chart 18528 and 
were scheduled to be installed and watching the location between May and October 
(USCG vs Chesbrough, 2012).  
These are just two incidents that spotlight examples of master and bridge crew errors 
under circumstances that were well known and published in official notices and 
records. Many other current examples also exist: Exxon Valdez, Shen Neng 1, Fedra, 
Sea Diamond, Costa Concordia, USS Guardian... In each of these cases the vessel did 
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the airplane equivalent of flying into a mountain. Although charting errors may be cited 
as a contributing factor in some of these incidents, watchstanders on the bridge of 
vessels generally have had no primary or direct means to gain insight into the 
underwater environment other than an echo sounder showing the depth immediately 
below the keel. 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), common law and statutory authority of individual 
nations require ship owners and mariners to operate in a manner that is diligent by 
maintaining a proper lookout to conduct safe transit and avoid collision and grounding. 
This has traditionally been interpreted as being what watchkeepers can directly observe 
with their own eyes as well as using electronic aids such as RADAR and AIS. Other 
than through the use of navigation charts (a secondary measure) and an echo sounder (a 
direct measure) showing depth of the water under the keel, there is not and has not ever 
been an effective means to maintain a lookout below the waterline other than a 
watchstander examining the area ahead of the bow with a pair of binoculars looking for 
changes in water color, different wave patterns or other effects to indicate hazards or 
obstructions might lie ahead in the immediate path of the vessel. Until now, there has 
been no promise of technology that could assist in accomplishing this task. 
2.1 Safe transit of waters lacking physical aids to navigation 
The frontiers of the world are those areas that border the furthest extent of settled or 
inhabited areas beyond which lies wilderness and the unexplored (Oxford, 2016). This 
definition applies to the Polar Regions where extreme environmental conditions prevail 
and ship transits are relatively few. Although this definition is historically accurate, 
world events are fostering ventures into these areas for a variety of reasons that include 
exploration for energy and minerals, shortened trade routes, the expansion of national 
territorial claims and increasing military presence, and even tourism. The Arctic in 
particular is the focus of much of this activity, where figure 2.1 illustrates the primary 
routes of transit through this region.  
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 Figure 2.1: Arctic shipping routes (Source: AMSA, 2009) 
These routes may be considered coastal and archipelago waters that are relatively 
shallow and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation. Such routes 
require the use of piloting methods and procedures to safely prepare for and complete a 
voyage. In doing so it is vital to be able to obtain and evaluate soundings, identify and 
use AtoN effectively and to fix a vessel’s position throughout the voyage. However, 
such capabilities are extremely limited in the Arctic. 
2.1.1 Issues with Arctic navigation 
Arctic waters are for the most part unsurveyed, and many of the existing surveys were 
completed decades or even centuries ago using antiquated methods. Hydrographic 
authorities in Russia, Canada and the United States have recently stepped up their 
efforts using modern techniques with state of the art sensors, but the areas that need to 
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be surveyed are vast and the resources to accomplish them are relatively few. A recent 
initiative, the IHO Crowd-Sourced Bathymetry Working Group (CSBWG) whose 
purpose is to acquire useful hydrographic information through unconventional sources, 
represents an important step towards filling this gap (CSBWG, 2015). In the meantime 
many navigation charts in the Arctic contain unacceptably large areas without 
soundings by which mariners are expected to identify routes of safe passage. Many of 
these charts were created using different geodetic datums, complicating the situation.  
Another problem in the Arctic is the lack of short range AtoN by which vessel traffic is 
guided through channels where masters may generally be confident of safe passage, 
along preferred routes that minimize distances and transit times as well as avoid 
ecologically sensitive and wildlife protection areas, and which mark hazards to 
navigation that must be avoided. AtoN take the form of beacons that are permanently 
fixed to the earth’s surface using piles and other structures, and buoys that require 
mooring to the sea bed by concrete sinkers and other devices. However, ice movement 
in the Arctic can destroy beacons and hole and sink buoys or move them to positions 
where they are no longer useful. Incorrectly positioned AtoN may lure unwary seafarers 
to grounding and lose their ships to casualty with potentially great cost in human life 
and loss of cargoes, in addition to detrimental effects to the fragile Arctic environment 
through fuel and chemical spillage and pollution. Also, since AtoN are scarce or non-
existent in the Arctic, the information they provide regarding routes and safe areas for 
transit are also not available on navigation charts for voyage planning.  
Further complicating matters is that precise positioning and timing capabilities 
provided by GNSS at high Arctic latitudes are less accurate and reliable as a result of 
the satellite constellations that provide the radio signals used by GNSS receivers being 
low to the horizon. Additional factors affecting AIS and GNSS performance include the 
susceptibility of signals to propagation delays and resulting inaccuracy due to aurora 
activity and the atmospheric effects of the ionosphere and troposphere on radio waves. 
To sum it up, ship navigation in the Arctic is challenging due to the widespread lack of 
knowledge of water depths in the region, charts that are inadequate or blank and with 
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inaccurate equipment to ascertain position. This situation has changed little since the 
early days of Arctic exploration.  
2.1.2 Overcoming Arctic navigation issues 
The approach taken in this research acknowledges the limitations of hydrography and 
buoyage, and the relationships between these two disciplines. Simply put, the 
placement of beacons and buoys cannot be accomplished in areas that are poorly 
surveyed or not surveyed at all since the knowledge of where they should be placed is 
absent. Thus a twofold approach to this research was undertaken. The first challenge 
was to determine how to safely navigate without knowledge of the bottom topography. 
The second challenge was to provide a means to place short range AtoN in an area that 
is hostile to their existence.  
This research attempts to exploit modern sensor technology as a tool to increase 
watchstander awareness of the underwater environment in the vicinity of the vessel, and 
especially forward of the vessel in the direction of transit. Such increased awareness 
must be provided at a distance sufficient to promote the effective avoidance of 
grounding and hazards to navigation, or at least to significantly lessen the effects of 
allision with such hazards. This is attempted through the use of 3D-FLS that can 
provide high-resolution imagery forward of the bow out to 1,000 meters at speeds of up 
to 20 knots or more. Using this technology it appears possible to navigate in such an 
area in relative safety. The potential of 3D-FLS to perform this function was explored 
by examining its accuracy in creating a 3-dimensional bathymetric model of the sea bed 
and in using this information as a means to verify vessel positioning. With detailed, 
high-resolution knowledge of the sea bed obtained either through conventional 
hydrographic survey using multibeam sonar or 3D-FLS, sufficient knowledge of the 
area would be available to place AtoN.  
The second challenge was to overcome the physical barriers to the placement of AtoN 
in the Arctic in a manner that would be useful and intuitive to mariners, supportable 
within the existing AtoN design lifecycle, and maintainable by responsible AtoN 
authorities. The concept of Virtual AtoN seemed fully amenable to solving this 
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problem, excepting that the traditional methods of verifying that AtoN are in their 
proper position and watching properly cannot apply as there is no physical device for 
which to verify position. Certainly one could match the position of an icon on an 
Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) or ECDIS display with the proper position where a 
Virtual AtoN is supposed to be deployed. However, visibility may be limited 
precluding the taking of a fix using physical objects or landmarks or GNSS 
inaccuracies as a result of high latitude or atmospheric effects or a variety of manmade 
interference due to spoofing, aliasing or a denial of service attack may render any 
means of electronic positioning subject to significant error, with potentially disastrous 
results. Thus, the ability to verify Virtual AtoN as being on station and watching 
properly became a significant aspect of this research. 
2.2 Infrastructure creation to support general navigation 
The problem of harsh weather and environmental factors destroying and disabling 
AtoN may be solved with the advent of truly Virtual AtoN that require no physical 
presence whatsoever in the area of their deployment and are verifiable. Such an 
approach can dramatically enhance the ability to extend AtoN systems into the Arctic. 
This may be accomplished in part through an automated approach towards verification 
of position and watching properly in best waters that can be performed on a continuous 
basis by suitably equipped vessels of opportunity while passing Virtual AtoN as part of 
their normal operation without requiring any assistance or action by crewmembers.  
The capability to extend nations’ navigational infrastructure in terms of short range 
AtoN for shipping to the furthest and most remote and inhospitable regions is the 
ultimate goal of these objectives. However, this does not necessarily imply that this 
should occur with rapidity. Suitable projects for the development of prototype systems 
must first be established to integrate Virtual AtoN production and deployment into 
existing methods and procedures used for AtoN systems in general. Further research 
must still be performed to explore the potential limits in the verification of Virtual 
AtoN, and how this concept may be extended to physical and AIS AtoN in general, 
with the potential to produce significant cost savings over present methods. 
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Finally, no thoughts are entertained towards replacing existing physical or AIS AtoN 
with Virtual AtoN. Existing AtoN systems are fully capable and excellent at performing 
their required functions and these must remain the preferred methods of buoyage in all 
areas where their use is not limited by environmental or logistical factors. At present, 
Virtual AtoN should only be considered for use in the Arctic and remote areas that 
feature sensitive coral reefs where sinker placement for attaching buoys to the bottom is 
limited. 
2.3 Compatibility with existing and evolving standards and practices 
Early discussions with industry representatives at eNavigation and other conferences 
and venues produced clear-cut preferences that the use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN 
should not create any additional workload upon watchstanders on the bridge. The 
maritime industry has and continues to undergo significant change in terms of 
crewmember qualifications and training in accordance with STCW, and companies are 
struggling with keeping in compliance with existing training mandates and 
requirements. Indeed, widespread assurance was given (rightly so) that any thoughts of 
imposing additional training requirements based upon the introduction of new 
technologies would be met with stiff resistance by the maritime community. 
Based upon these observations, every opportunity has been taken to introduce new 
equipment, concepts and methods for use on vessels within the confines of existing 
requirements and regulations. For example, the display of 3D-FLS information to 
watchstanders should be accomplished using ECDIS, without imposing any new 
requirements for additional monitors on the bridge. All of the symbols, with few 
exceptions, expressed for Virtual AtoN have been prepared in accordance with the 
requirements for existing ECDIS symbols, with minor variation to depict their virtual 
nature. The only exceptions are where entirely new capabilities are identified for 
Virtual AtoN that are not available using physical or AIS AtoN. In terms of 
hydrography, the data obtained from 3D-FLS residing on vessels of opportunity should 
be readily compatible with the IHO S-100 and S-102 hydrography standards.  
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Chapter 3    Theoretical Underpinnings 
Virtual AtoN as envisaged in this research are used to enhance the situational 
awareness of watchstanders on the bridge as to hazards to navigation that exist at and 
below the waterline, including hazards detected in real time and ahead of the vessel. 
The availability of such knowledge, especially in poorly surveyed and charted regions 
such as the Arctic, can facilitate better decision making in ship operation while making 
way. The goal is to ultimately result in enhanced safety of navigation through a 
reduction in unintended groundings and allision with hazards to navigation. 
The theoretical underpinnings of this research encompass: 
• Virtual AtoN contribution to knowledge of the state of the environment, 
• 3D-FLS efficacy for hydrographic survey,  
• Single beam echo sounder efficacy for validation of Virtual AtoN operation, and 
• Assessment of risk based upon the availability of sensors and Virtual AtoN. 
This chapter discusses the concepts in the overall approach taken to guide the 
methodology and examine the results achieved in this research. The focus is on the use 
of Virtual AtoN and how they contribute to determining the state of the environment in 
establishing situational awareness to watchstanders on the bridge. Also discussed are 
the measurements and contributing factors towards measurement error in analyzing the 
experimental results achieved in determining the efficacy of 3D-FLS as a means to 
independently source hydrographic survey data, and single beam echo sounders in a 
georeferencing approach to Virtual AtoN verification. Advantages gained through the 
use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN from the point of view of risk management and 
decision theory applied to voyages in areas lacking proper survey and AtoN are also 
discussed.  
3.1 Ship-centric approach 
The application of these theories is accomplished through the establishment of a ship-
centric approach to enhancing watchstander situational awareness below the waterline 
when the use of traditional methods of voyage planning and following is not possible. 
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This is especially appropriate for vessels transiting littoral regions in the Arctic and 
elsewhere that are not adequately surveyed and nautical charts are blank or otherwise 
inadequate. This lack of situational awareness in modern times has not been an issue of 
great significance as shipping routes are generally well surveyed and mariners have the 
benefit of centuries of previous experience and observations to aid them. However, the 
recent increase of transits of poorly surveyed areas by vastly larger ships where the 
consequences of groundings and accidents in terms of loss of life, vessels and cargos 
along with catastrophic environmental damage attaches much greater significance to 
this issue. 
An approach is taken whereby Virtual AtoN are placed along routes to guide vessels in 
transit and warn of hazards to navigation where AtoN would not otherwise be available. 
In areas that feature recent hydrographic surveys and where hazards to navigation are 
known, static and dynamic Virtual AtoN may be incorporated by responsible authority 
directly into ENC and displayed to watchstanders on the bridge using ECDIS. Where 
hydrographic surveys are lacking or not performed to modern standards ENC may 
include inaccurate or missing soundings and hazard to navigation information, or this 
information may be entirely absent from the ENC. In such areas 3D-FLS can provide 
live soundings information and detect hazards in real time to compensate for ENC 
lacking this data so essential to safe navigation. Also, 3D-FLS can assist in detecting 
and identifying uncharted hazards that may have occurred since the last survey as well 
as hazards present in the water column. The creation of Virtual AtoN with momentary 
duration to represent such hazards may then be accomplished for display to 
watchstanders using ECDIS. 
3.2 Situational awareness 
Situational awareness is broadly defined as, “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley & Rodgers, 1998). In the 
context of maritime operations the U.S. Coast Guard defines this as simply “knowing 
what’s going on around you” (USCG TCT). The Endsley model of situational 
awareness is illustrated in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Situational awareness in dynamic decision making (from Endsley, 1995) 
Ship-centricity, as used in conducting this research, involves enabling mariners to 
envision their environment using ship’s own sensors to gain and maintain situational 
awareness in conjunction with or in the absence of resources that are normally available 
for this purpose. This capability is essential to safe navigation when no other direct or 
indirect method is available on which to base command decisions. Using the Endsley 
Model, the perception of environmental factors (state of the environment) is made 
possible through the use of 3D-FLS to acquire information regarding bottom 
topography ahead of the vessel. Comprehension of the current environmental situation 
is then achieved through the presentation of 3D-FLS data in the form of soundings and 
Virtual AtoN on ECDIS using standard symbology, the meanings of which mariners are 
already trained (ECDIS, 2012). Based upon this comprehension of the situation, a 
watchstander may then project future events and initiate action appropriate to the level 
of threat, such as altering speed and/or course to avoid grounding or allision. 
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The three issues considered primary in the Endsley definition of situational awareness 
in terms of assessing the state of the environment include: 
• Perception of the elements comprising the current situation (Level 1), 
• Comprehension of the current situation (Level 2), and  
• Projection of future status (Level 3). 
The factors pertaining to hydrographic survey and Virtual AtoN at each of these levels 
are described in the paragraphs that follow. 
3.2.1 Level 1 – Perception 
A mariner’s inherent perception of the state of the environment is limited to their own 
senses and their capabilities to process the various sensory inputs they receive in a 
timely and accurate manner to derive cues as to their meaning, with their visual sense 
being of the greatest significance for ship navigation in preventing accidents. The 
avoidance of unintentional grounding and allision is accomplished beginning with 
voyage planning by visually examining the elements of the domain using applicable 
navigation charts to gain an accurate understanding of the minimum depths of the water 
along a planned route and to identify and note prominent landmarks, AtoN and any 
hazards or obstructions that may be encountered. This process continues by monitoring 
the voyage as it progresses using these same charts along with analyzing live sensor 
data during the voyage. Also examined are the light lists to ascertain detailed AtoN 
descriptions and notices to mariners to identify updates and changes to navigation 
charts and/or light lists that may apply to the voyage. The relationships between voyage 
planning and monitoring and the use of resources in determining the state of the 
environment are illustrated in Table 1.  
Resources also used but not listed include tide tables and monitoring station data that 
predict and provide real time height of water information, meteorological and 
oceanographic forecasts and sensors to determine currents, wind speeds and related 
information. Given this reliance on navigational publications and forecast information 
used to determine the state of the environment during voyage planning, it is vital to 
ensure such routes are adequately surveyed and AtoN systems are in place and 
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maintained in accordance with modern standards for soundings and AtoN information 
to be included within these publications.  
Table 1: Use of resources in determining the state of the environment 
  
 Notes: 1. Static and Dynamic Virtual AtoN. 
   2. Virtual AtoN with momentary duration. 
In areas where hydrographic survey has been performed to modern standards, 
soundings information is used by responsible authorities to identify the types of AtoN 
required and the positions at which they should be situated. Figure 3.2 identifies the 
two types of existing AtoN as being physical and AIS, and a third type encompassing 
the proposed Virtual AtoN that is the focus of this research. Also identified are their 
functions, behavior characteristics, how they are manifest within the maritime domain, 
how they are observed by the mariner, and the time of their duration in practical use. 
Assuming an Arctic environment or tropical location featuring coral reefs where 
physical or AIS AtoN placement and maintenance is difficult, static and dynamic 
Virtual AtoN may be used in their stead. The same process currently used for physical 
and AIS AtoN is appropriate for establishing Virtual AtoN, resulting in their inclusion 
within navigation charts/ENC and light lists with updates between revisions included 
in notices to mariners (USCG M16500.7A (a)). This includes the review of criteria 
having to do with initial justification, system benefit analysis and system type 
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selection. Virtual AtoN may be displayed on ECDIS using symbology appropriate to 
function in the same manner as for physical and AIS AtoN.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Aids to navigation systems 
However, in the Arctic it has already been established that this is indeed not the case; 
and that great portions of the Arctic are not surveyed at all or have been surveyed 
using obsolete methods and AtoN are few or non-existent. Tide information, accurate 
forecasts and live environmental sensors are also deficient. Absent adequate 
information to conduct voyage planning, it is therefore necessary to acquire the needed 
information regarding bottom topography and hazards to navigation that exist in real 
time during the voyage itself.  
3.2.1.1 Static Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN may be implemented featuring 
characteristics that are static in nature and do not change over time instead of physical 
AtoN, and may be used in the same manner during voyage planning. This capability 
can emulate physical AtoN such as marks providing lateral guidance, notice of hazards 
and obstructions, warnings and information. Their characteristics can change, for 
example, as a result of responsible authority review determining that repositioning is 
appropriate to ensure the AtoN is positioned in best waters, replacement by another 
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AtoN with more appropriate characteristics, or is discontinued entirely due to no longer 
being needed. 
3.2.1.2 Dynamic Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN may be implemented featuring 
characteristics that are dynamic in nature and may change in either or both the time 
and/or spatial domains as a result of environmental features and/or to accommodate 
properties unique to a specific vessel such as draft and speed. For example, changes in 
the time domain may include seasonal adjustments in Virtual AtoN presence due to the 
establishment of marine animal sanctuaries, fishing and no-fishing zones; and daily or 
hourly adjustments due to regulatory requirements or special events. Changes in the 
spatial domain may include modifications to Virtual AtoN position to accommodate the 
needs of specific vessels, potentially eliminating the need for coaxial waterways with 
separate markings for deep draft and shallow draft vessels. This may also include the 
use of dynamic Virtual AtoN for individual vessels and for private aids to navigation 
that fulfill specific government, military, organizational and/or industrial requirements. 
Dynamic Virtual AtoN established in an area of planned transit can help to determine 
optimal routes or facilitate operations based upon changing voyage dynamics such as 
draft requirements considering different loads during the voyage planning stage.  
3.2.2 Level 2 – Comprehension 
The comprehension of a mariner regarding their current situation begins with their 
perception or mental model of the elements of the domain created during voyage 
planning and continues with the monitoring of events as the voyage progresses. These 
elements represent large amounts of data that must be combined and interpreted to 
derive their meaning. The symbols and conventions for presenting the information 
contained within the various resources used in gaining their perception of the current 
situation are placed into operational context as a result of their use and display within 
navigation charts, ECDIS and by sensors providing data in real time. Figure 3.3 
illustrates these various sensors available to the watchstander to supplement voyage 
planning information on SOLAS vessels, plus communications equipment from which 
other navigationally significant information including forecasts and reports from 
vessels traveling nearby routes may be available.  
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Watchstander comprehension of the meaning of these inputs with respect to the current 
situation involves comparing their perception of expected conditions against apparent 
conditions through the application of their knowledge within the context of real time 
events. 
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SOLAS Vessel Sensors
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Foward Looking 
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Figure 3.3: SOLAS vessel sensor compliment 
3.2.2.1 Permanent Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with permanent duration in terms 
of years would be created using the traditional AtoN provisioning process used for 
physical AtoN whereby traditional multibeam or 3D-FLS survey data obtained from 
national hydrographic authorities is examined along with direct observations from 
mariners by national AtoN authorities to identify specific areas where AtoN are needed.  
3.2.2.2 Temporary Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with temporary duration in terms 
of days or months would be created using the AtoN provisioning process for physical 
and/or AIS AtoN whereby traditional multibeam or 3D-FLS survey data obtained from 
national hydrographic authorities is examined along with direct observations from 
mariners by national AtoN authorities. This is to identify specific areas where AtoN are 
needed such as for marking incident locations and/or special events that may include 
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boat races and air shows being held over the water to mark restricted areas and special 
anchorage boundaries. 
3.2.2.3 Momentary Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with momentary duration of 
seconds to minutes created in real time from 3D-FLS data further enhances 
watchstander situational awareness by alerting them to the presence of transitory and 
short-lived hazards to navigation that exist within the water column, and translating 
their position and bearing information into ECDIS coordinates and displaying an 
appropriate symbol at this location. The detection of such in-water hazards are not 
possible through any hydrographic survey whose origin is through traditional 
multibeam sonar. 
In areas lacking hydrographic survey to modern standards 3D-FLS can provide vessels 
with a means to determine an awareness of bottom topography ahead of the vessel 
while making way to help bridge crews to assess minimum depths and ensure safe 
navigation. This capability is also a necessary precursor to the establishment of Virtual 
AtoN where they are most needed. This research focuses on the use of 3D-FLS to fulfill 
this need.  
Using the FarSounder 500 meter 3D-FLS system as an example, figure 3.4 illustrates 
the potential of 3D-FLS to provide real time, high resolution imagery ahead of a vessel 
while making way (FS-500, 2015). This image illustrates a swath of soundings ahead to 
125 meters showing  bottom  depths  ranging  from  approximately  25  meters  just  
below  the vessel sloping upwards to less than 5 meters. This image was created as a 
result of a series of single pings emitted from the 3D-FLS transmitter, and received by 
approximately 200 hydrophones. The imagery is updated at a rate of approximately 
once every 1.5 seconds, refreshing the hydrophone data each time resulting in greater 
accuracy based upon the repeated measurements of the same area using multiple 
hydrophones at different angles. A speed of 6 knots results in a new sampling of data 
along a swath of the bottom approximately every 4.6 meters. 
  
33 
 
 
    
 Source: FarSounder, Inc. Used with permission. 
Figure 3.4: Environmental perception using 3D-FLS 
Data from individual hydrophones may be recorded for subsequent analysis, from 
which the route of transit of a vessel may be recreated on a ping-by-ping basis. Figure 
3.5 illustrates the array of approximately 200 hydrophones showing relative signal 
strength between hydrophones ranging from blue (no or few echo returns) to red (high 
strength echo return). The waveforms depicting the actual returned signals are also 
recorded for each hydrophone, allowing for the determination of horizontal and vertical 
bearing and target range information. Further examination of target features and 
properties based upon ping signal characteristics is also possible. These hydrophone 
 
     
 Figure 3.5: Hydrophone data display 
Source: FarSounder, Inc. Used with permission. 
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data provide full-bottom bathymetric coverage that may be used by responsible 
hydrographic authorities to determine minimum depths over the survey area and to 
detect critical items such as wrecks, obstructions and hazards to navigation using 
procedures similar to that used with multibeam echo sounders.  
3D-FLS capabilities to detect in-water hazards to navigation such as growlers, logs, 
shipping containers and other objects that exist within the water column can add 
immensely to watchstanders’ comprehension of situational awareness by making them 
aware of the presence of these hazards that may otherwise be missed, continuously 
updating the state of the environment in real time. The positions of such hazards are 
determined in relation to the route of transit of the vessel and displayed on ECDIS 
using the appropriate symbology by examining individual hydrophone contact 
information with respect to nearby hydrophone signal characteristics. An in-water 
hazard is identified when a contact exists in one or more hydrophone(s) that does not 
appear to be physically connected to adjoining hydrophone contacts indicating bottom 
returns.  
3.2.3 Level 3 – Projection 
The third level of situational awareness involves thinking ahead or projecting into the 
near future possible situations and events based upon comprehension of the current 
situation. Within the context of this research this means the ability of the watchstander 
to assess the potential for his or her vessel to experience an unintended grounding or 
allision considering their knowledge of the present environmental situation as a result 
of voyage planning and voyage monitoring using sensor and other data.  
The factors associated with projecting risk of grounding and allision have to do with the 
operational specifications of the vessel as well as the characteristics of the route being 
taken, sea states and weather conditions (Mazaheri, 2009). The primary factors include 
the length, breadth and draft of the vessel itself; capabilities in terms of speed, power 
and environmental sensors; performance characteristics based upon windage, 
maneuverability, stopping distances and turning radius. Significant route characteristics 
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include the length, depth and width of the waterway; depth uncertainty, traffic volume 
and the slope of the sea bed.  
3.2.3.1 3D-FLS use in situation projection – The rate at which environmental 
conditions change and the distances in which these changes become apparent during the 
course of a voyage help to predict the range of possible events and subsequent 
consequences that may result from these events. One example of the use of 3D-FLS to 
project a possible future grounding situation is shown using the image provided in 
figure 3.4. In this case the rising slope of the sea floor ahead of the vessel to shallow 
depths provides decisive clues regarding imminent potential for grounding. Should the 
vessel lie adrift without making way, this imagery would not necessarily indicate 
imminent grounding unless the rise in the sea bed represents a lee shore upon which the 
vessel is being driven by winds and currents. Alternatively, should the vessel be making 
way at a speed of 15 knots over a steady bottom when the rise at 125 meters is suddenly 
detected an alert watchstander could visually project that a dire situation is imminent 
and alarms to that effect could also be generated. Soundings information may also be 
displayed directly on ECDIS in areas where charts are blank or incomplete using a 
suitably integrated system. 
3.2.3.2  Virtual AtoN use in situation projection – The use of Virtual AtoN can 
help watchstanders to determine potential future situations and scenarios by enabling 
them to determine their actual position and relative positions to any hazards that may 
exist and to establish a safe course. One means to accomplish this is through the use of 
either static or dynamic Virtual lateral aids to mark channels that provide safe passage. 
Dangers and obstructions may be identified using isolated danger marks, while cardinal 
marks, safe water marks and special marks may also be used as appropriate. Virtual 
AtoN with momentary duration may be generated in real time using 3D-FLS to display 
on ECDIS hazards that exist within the water column. In the case of the rising bottom 
shown in figure 3.4, these may include isolated danger and other marks. 
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3.3 Theory of Errors 
The Theory of Errors provides a foundation from which to base the assessment of 
experiment results to evaluate the capability of 3D-FLS technology in this role 
(Sheynin, 1966). This assessment then provides the basis upon which the viability of 
crowdsourcing for navigation chart development using 3D-FLS data obtained from 
vessels of opportunity may be judged. 
Measurement error is the difference between a measured value and a reference value of 
a measurand (JCGM 200:2008). Theory of errors is related to Estimation Theory in 
statistics and states that all measurements contain error and the exact measurement is 
not known. Tailoring this theory to this research involves evaluating the error 
associated with spatial data contained within the 3D-FLS and echo sounder 
measurement results (Fan, 2010; Wu, et al., 2010). There are three general types of 
errors to be considered when measurements are made: systematic, spurious and random 
errors.  
3.3.1 Systematic errors 
Errors that are systematic in nature relate to the accuracy, precision and trueness of 
measurements. Such errors are generally attributed to the instruments used to perform 
the measurements, but they can also pertain to the methods and procedures used in the 
process of making the measurements as well as human errors made in performing this 
process. Systematic errors tend to follow physical and mathematical rules that can be 
checked and adjusted through statistical analysis. Increasing the number of 
measurements will not result in a reduction of errors.  
Measurement accuracy is defined as the closeness of agreement between a measured 
quantity value and a true quantity value of a measurand (JCGM 200:2008a). Proper 
calibration of equipment against known references and using recognized standards are 
two examples of how equipment may be adjusted to improve accuracy. Measurement 
precision is the closeness of agreement between measured quantity values obtained by 
repeating measurements on the same or similar measurand, and can represent the 
repeatability of a measurement (JCGM 200:2008b). The ability of an instrument to 
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make precise measurements is generally a function of the quality of the instrument 
itself and the methods by which it performs a measurement. Measurement trueness is 
the closeness of agreement between the average of many (through an infinite number) 
repeated measured values and a reference value, and is inversely related to systematic 
measurement error (JCGM 200:2008c). Systematic errors may be reduced by changing 
the equipment, altering the measurement performance processes and/or changing 
human habits that contribute to systematic errors. 
3.3.2. Spurious errors 
Spurious errors affect measurements in a non-systematic way and may be caused by 
instrument malfunctions, the use of incorrect measurement methods, and human factors 
such as gross errors and mistakes caused by errors in reading the measurement results 
and errors in transcription made while recording the results. It is not possible to 
evaluate or compensate for spurious errors using statistical methods. Such errors are 
generally considered as outliers and are discarded. 
3.3.3. Random errors 
Random errors affect measurements in a non-systematic way which yields results that 
are unpredictable. They are caused by human factors, instrument malfunctions, 
characteristics of the physical environment that may alter measurement values and 
methods of measurement that do not consider all relevant factors which may affect 
measurement results. Random errors remain after systematic and spurious errors are 
excluded. 
3.3.4 Application to this research 
In this research errors apply to the uncertainties encountered in making measurements 
using 3D-FLS to ascertain bottom depths forward of the bow with accuracy in 
accordance with navigation charts to ensure safe navigation by detecting shoal depths 
that approach the draft constraints of the vessel (Wright & Zimmerman, 2015). A 
second set of different measurements using the data obtained from either multibeam 
echosounders or 3D-FLS in conjunction with single beam echosounders are also made 
in verifying Virtual AtoN as watching properly (Wright & Baldauf, 2015).  
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Uncertainties that pertain to measurement of depth and positioning include (IHO C-13): 
• Total Horizontal Uncertainty (THU)
• 
: The sum of both random and systematic 
measurement uncertainties in the horizontal plane. The maximum allowable THU 
for IHO Special Order surveys is 2 meters, and for Order 1a surveys is 5 meters. 
Factors used in determining THU include geodetic datum, availability of Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS), and equipment specifications in terms of 
angular accuracy and roll/pitch error. 
Total Vertical Uncertainty (TVU)
a + (b x d)+ 2 2
: Constant and depth-dependent uncertainties 
that affect depth measurements according to the formula: 
 
  Where: 
a  represents that portion of the uncertainty that does not vary with depth, 
b is a coefficient which represents that portion of the uncertainty that varies 
with depth, 
d is the depth, and 
b x d represents that portion of the uncertainty that varies with depth. 
The maximum allowable TVU for IHO Special Order surveys is factor a, 0.25 meters 
and factor b, 0.0075; and for Order 1a surveys is factor a, 0.5 meters and factor b, 
0.013. 
Factors used in determining TVU include:  
• Vertical offset between the transducer mounting location and the water’s surface 
determined by measuring the vertical distance between the transducer and the 
vessel waterline. 
• Actual height of tide offset from mean lower low water. Height of tide is 
determined based upon predicted values using the tide tables for the reporting 
station nearest to the measurement location, adjusted for local meteorological and 
oceanographic conditions based upon hourly forecasts. 
  
39 
 
• 3D-FLS angular accuracy. This value is obtained from the manufacturer 
specification for the 3D-FLS used in making measurements, and 
• Roll-pitch error. This value is obtained from the manufacturer specification for the 
3D-FLS used in making measurements. 
3.4 Georeferencing 
The navigation process encompasses careful route planning and closely monitoring 
vessel positions while enroute. In areas that lack traditional navigational infrastructure 
the means to verify position using visual landmarks and references can be severely 
restricted. This is especially true in the remote Arctic where soundings to indicate 
depths are often not available on charts, landscapes can be low to the horizon and 
nondescript, and AtoN rarely exist except in the immediate vicinity of a handful of 
major ports.  
Virtual AtoN may be placed in lieu of physical and AIS AtoN in such areas. An 
underlying assumption to the correct establishment of AtoN is that they must be 
verified as being in their correct position as part of a determination of watching 
properly. However, present verification methods established to determine that AtoN are 
correctly positioned are deficient under such circumstances. It is therefore necessary to 
implement a practical means to verify this condition essential to the establishment of 
Virtual AtoN. In addition, such an approach must be resilient to overcome any single 
point of failure condition by GNSS as a result of natural events or manmade actions 
where failure may render Virtual AtoN ineffective and result in an inability to fix vessel 
position. The consequences of lacking navigation capability to verify proper positioning 
can be accentuated in the Arctic environment which is often devoid of physical 
landmarks by which an accurate fix may be made. The theory of navigation by 
georeferencing, defined as aligning physical and geographical features to an internal 
coordinate system that can be related to a ground system of geographic coordinates, 
forms a vital means through which Virtual AtoN verification may be accomplished 
(USGS, 2016). 
The state of an aid to navigation on its assigned position may be expressed as follows: 
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  AtoNpos = TRUE 
where:   
 AtoNpos.  The correct position of the AtoN is the location given in latitude 
and longitude conforming with the precision standards of accuracy 
classification expressed as the radius of a circle around the 
assigned position of an aid to navigation within which the aid is 
considered to be on station (USCG, M16500.1C). 
As external references are likely to be minimal or nonexistent other than the AtoN 
itself, these circumstances presently require reliance upon ship’s own sensors in terms 
of GNSS to establish a fix, and the echo sounder to determine the relevant depth 
contour and the amount of water below the keel. There are two problems with this 
scenario. First, a number of natural and manmade problems are associated with GNSS 
availability, reliability and accuracy in the Arctic, increasing risk as a result of 
overreliance on this technology. Second, in areas that are unsurveyed and poorly 
charted echo sounder readings provide little reference as to vessel location based upon 
depth contours since no such information exists within an ENC nor is displayed on 
ECDIS.  
The approach followed to help verify Virtual AtoN as being in its proper position is 
based upon theories associated with the georeferencing of physical objects to 
topological features contained within an ENC, and navigation using georeferencing by 
virtue of topography following using echo sounder measurements. Virtual AtoN 
position verification considers the following: 
1. given a geographic position of a Virtual AtoN expressed in latitude and longitude: 
Virtual AtoNpos = (XX° YY' ZZ" North/South, XX° YY' ZZ" East/West), and 
a. a geographic area (A) encompassing a circular, rectangular or irregularly 
shaped area of size (n) wherein Virtual AtoNpos lies at the center, and 
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b. the geographic area (A) as represented in the ENC contains a high-resolution 
bathymetry model that meets the standards represented by IHO Order 1a 
survey, and  
c.  all viable routes to and from Virtual AtoNpos are contained within this 
geographic area (A), then 
2. the depths (DES) recorded by the vessel single beam echo sounder when adjusted 
for height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the water’s surface, and 
a.  the change of depths (dD/dt), and  
b.  the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)  
c. for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R), will 
approximate  
3.  the depths (DENC) as represented by the ENC bathymetric model when adjusted for 
height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the water’s surface1
a.  the change of depths (dD/t), and  
, and 
b.  the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)  
c.  for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R), 
4. within a certain tolerance level. 
A Virtual AtoN that meets the above criteria in combination with the use of traditional 
GNSS and/or navigational fixes to known objects or landmarks may be considered as 
having a higher probability of being in the correct position than a Virtual AtoN that 
does not meet these criteria. The exact probability varies and cannot be determined in 
                                                            
1 Note: The locus of points (P) approximating depths (DENC) of step 3 is searched based upon 
local patterns identified using a contour-tracing algorithm that identifies change of depths 
(dD/t) of immediately adjacent soundings along a local minima path within the route (R) in the 
specific AtoN geographic area (A) (Wright R.G., 2005; Seo, J., et al., 2016). 
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areas that are not well surveyed since the adjacent bottom contours are unknown to any 
relative degree of accuracy, and nearby similar seascapes may provide false indications 
of being in the correct position. Therefore, a Virtual AtoN should not be considered as 
being verified in its proper position using georeferencing criteria alone. 
However, the converse of this statement has also true. A Virtual AtoN that does not 
meet the above criteria, whether or not it is used in combination with traditional GNSS 
and/or navigational fixes to known objects or landmarks, may be considered as having 
a higher probability of being incorrectly positioned and not watching in the best waters. 
This may be due to two reasons. First, GNSS indications may be in error as a result of 
natural or manmade causes that place the vessel in a position other than the indicated 
position. Second, even if the correct position is indicated, should bottom contours not 
match the surveyed bathymetric model it is likely that bottom conditions have changed 
that may invalidate the Virtual AtoN position as being in best waters. This situation 
would warrant the sounding of an alarm to alert watchstanders of a possible position 
discrepancy or other unforeseen circumstances.  
This approach provides a positive baseline against which live single beam echo sounder 
measurements may be compared with ENC values. Including areas outside of normal 
transit within the soundings bathymetry model may also be useful in positively 
identifying that a vessel is outside of its intended route, as opposed to inferring this 
condition as a result of bottom topography not matching the features of the intended 
route. 
3.5 Risk assessment 
In assessing risk of Arctic operations it is appropriate to perform an analysis of the 
complex systems comprising a model of the interrelations between shipboard 
capabilities and external support services, the vulnerabilities that may be encountered 
as a result of the loss of these capabilities, and the potential consequences of the loss. 
Loosely based upon the so-called Swiss Cheese Model developed by Reason (1990), 
this analysis identifies priorities for navigation risk assessment considering the state of 
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hydrographic survey, the content and recency of navigation charts, environmental 
sensing capabilities and the availability of aids to navigation.  
An analysis of the causal relationships between the spatial and geographical 
uncertainties existing in the natural environment and technological capabilities for 
environmental sensing are explored considering sensor availability, resolution and 
accuracy; the means by which sensor data are communicated, the products created 
using sensor data, and potential effects of sensor data corruption and interruption due to 
natural and human causes.  
The potential for accident causation arising from interactions between latent failures 
and a variety of local triggering events considered in this research pertain to: 
• Hydrography, 
• Navigation Charts, 
• Environmental Sensing, 
• Aids to Navigation (AtoN), and 
• Human Error; 
and involves the unlikely and often unforeseeable conjunction of several contributing 
factors arising from different levels of the system. The use of the Swiss Cheese Model 
ties in well with the previously described Theory of Errors in terms of the types of 
errors that may occur and their potential effects on the processes involved at the 
different levels of the productive plane hierarchy.  
In the methodology used, potential hazards are identified in accordance with various 
scenarios that may result. Cause analysis considers both distal and proximate causes of 
error, and various options that may potentially reduce or eliminate these causes. 
Consequence analysis addresses the barriers and defenses erected to help reduce or 
eliminate the potential outcomes and effects of the errors that may result. 
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Chapter 4     Materials and Methods 
The hypothesis on which this research is based suggests the present state-of-the-art in 
ship sensors is sufficient to provide real-time guidance for vessels to safely transit 
uncharted waters and/or waters lacking physical aids to navigation. This premise is 
supported in that many modern expeditionary vessels are equipped with advanced 
oceanographic sensors such as forward-looking navigation sonar, enhanced radar, 
GNSS and satellite communications capabilities complimenting ECDIS to provide 
them with every available tool to accomplish their mission as safely as possible. Further 
support is provided in that few, if any, similarly equipped vessels with properly 
operating sensors and alert watchstanders are known to have been involved in incidents 
where uninstalled, missing or improperly watching aids to navigation were considered 
to be significant factors in the cause of the incident. 
This research examines whether maritime safety and environmental protection may be 
enhanced through the automation of sensor data interpretation and display in enhancing 
watchstander situational awareness below the waterline. A key element is the timely 
and accurate establishment of Virtual AtoN in real-time hazard to navigation detection, 
classification and characterization in a form already familiar to watchstanders. Further 
investigation explores the archiving of sensor data for use by hydrographic/navigation 
chart and AtoN service providers. 
Prioritization of ship sensors is given to 3D-FLS which appears to be the most critical 
of available modern sensors pertaining to vessel operation in unknown environments.  
This is due to the unique ability of such sensors to explore the area below the waterline 
ahead of the bow to seek and identify hazards to navigation that may jeopardize a 
voyage. However, consideration of other technologies is made in developing a system 
architecture that will support a full and comprehensive modern vessel sensor suite. 
4.1 Overall approach 
Specific tasks are formulated within study areas to investigate answers to the research 
questions identified in this dissertation. The setting within which these studies are 
performed is described including two research vessels used as test beds for experiments 
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and environmental sensor data collection using 3D-FLS and other instruments along 
with the various inputs required for their performance; the processes and procedures 
employed to acquire, manage and evaluate these inputs; the outcomes to be achieved as 
a result of these processes and procedures; and the metrics used to measure these 
outcomes in determining whether the results are correct or not. Expectations are 
provided as to the results along with areas of risk encountered in performing each of the 
study tasks that may alter expectations or invalidate the premise upon which the 
question itself was based. Results are recorded throughout the performance of each 
study task, and comparisons are made with expected results. Conclusions are then 
drawn as to whether the questions have been answered along with rationale as to why 
or why not. Finally, lessons learned are documented regarding errors in input, process, 
product and/or metrics; assumptions made and actual proceedings; and expectations 
and outcomes. 
4.2 Areas of study 
Several specific areas of study were followed during the course of this research. Details 
on these studies are provided in the paragraphs below. 
4.2.1 Study area 1: 3-dimensional forward looking sonar data acquisition 
The acquisition of 3-dimensional forward-looking sonar (3D-FLS) data has been 
performed supporting experiments to obtain and extract sensor data of sufficient 
resolution to accomplish the following: 
• Perform hydrographic survey of the sea bottom, 
• Detect hazards to navigation present in the water column or attached to the 
bottom, and 
• Create a 3-dimensional surface topography model to be included as a portion of 
the characteristics of Virtual AtoN. 
3D-FLS systems produced by different manufacturers were used in the acquisition of 
data in an effort to determine whether measurements taken by different systems with 
varied capabilities using different methods and algorithms can achieve similar results.  
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The EchoPilot 3D-FLS with a range of 200 meters utilizes two one-dimensional arrays 
of receiving transducers, with the arrays mounted at a predetermined angle relative to 
each other so as to receive reflected sound waves from different respective segments of 
the water in front of the vessel that are separated from each other in a horizontal plane. 
The transducer arrays emit sound waves into non-overlapping segments of water, 
reflected by the underwater floor back to the transducer arrays, which convert them to 
electrical signals. The electrical signals are processed to calculate a three-dimensional 
position of each point on the underwater floor (EchoPilot, 2012). Positioning of the two 
transducers is recommended by the manufacturer near the stern of the vessel where 
three-axis movement may be minimized. This unit provides only raster data from which 
soundings were extracted using a method previously developed by this researcher 
(Pendleton & Wright, 2002). Only soundings information was available from this 
system to analyze potential to perform hydrographic survey, with no capabilities 
evident for hazard to navigation detection. 
Data was also acquired using the FarSounder model 500 3D-FLS with a range of 500 
meters. This system utilizes one sonar transducer combined with a roll, tilt and yaw 
sensor mounted at the bow. A raw data signal is generated and transformed into an 
image rotated responsively to the sonar sensor's orientation generating a complete 
image with a single transmission (FarSounder, 2008). In-water target multi ping 
stabilization was also used to detect hazards to navigation that are not attached to the 
bottom such as shipping containers floating at or just below the surface, icebergs, large 
debris and debris fields, and possibly whales and other marine mammals and large fish 
that may lie in the vessel’s path. A software development kit helped ease the use and 
analysis of data at sea and post-voyage for Virtual AtoN creation. High-resolution 
digital data from each of the approximately 200 hydrophones on the single transducer 
representing both soundings and hazards to navigation were available directly available 
from this system. This access to the internal data structures containing the vector data 
from which the raster images are derived is useful for generating the soundings data in 
a format suitable for use by hydrographic agencies. 
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In making comparisons between 3D-FLS depth measurements and ENC soundings, 
specific hydrophone data is examined with respect to the closest location(s) to the 
corresponding sounding as shown on the ENC. This is accomplished by analyzing ping-
by-ping 3D-FLS hydrophone coordinates based upon bearing and distance with ENC 
sounding positions.  
Sensor data resolution for both systems were examined to determine sufficiency for 
charting near coastal and inland locations to IHO order 1A survey and Virtual AtoN 
verification requirements as described in appended Paper 3. Issues pertaining to 3D-
FLS measurement accuracy, precision and repeatability were examined in both cases 
considering systematic, spurious and random errors as part of this evaluation. The 
comparisons made between the two systems were to determine strengths and 
weaknesses in their data content and representation for study purposes, and not to 
evaluate each from a product point of view. A key factor in this evaluation is any 
potential differences in accuracy or induced error as a result of the raster to vector 
conversion performed on the EchoPilot data, as compared to the direct digital data 
access without conversion permitted by the FarSounder system. The analysis of sonar 
data supports work efforts performed under Study Areas 2 and 4. 
4.2.2 Study area 2: Virtual AtoN establishment from hazard to navigation data 
Hazards to navigation and identifying class definitions are based on examples likely to 
occur in the Arctic and the tropics, but are also commonly found worldwide. These are 
obtained from the United States Code of Federal Regulations (33CFR64) where three 
specific hazard attributes are identified as follows: 
• Hazard to Navigation means an obstruction, usually sunken, that presents 
sufficient danger to navigation so as to require expeditious, affirmative action 
such as marking, removal, or redefinition of a designated waterway to provide 
for navigational safety. 
• Obstruction means anything that restricts, endangers, or interferes with 
navigation. 
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• Structures mean any fixed or floating obstruction, intentionally placed in the 
water, which may interfere with or restrict marine navigation. 
Specific examples of hazards to navigation were identified by examining navigation 
charts from those portions of the Arctic where detailed surveys have been conducted, 
followed by tropical coral reef regions, and then other regions where such hazards, 
obstructions and structures exist. This examination also covers Notices to Mariners 
where hazards to navigation have been identified but are not yet charted. Attempts were 
also made to identify specific examples that provide realistic test cases that replicate 
hazard to navigation attributes and characteristics during actual in-water testing using 
3D-FLS. This includes objects and features that are attached to and project from the 
bottom such as shoals, rocks, ledges, reefs and wrecks. Also included are test cases that 
represent in-water hazards within the water column, the presence of which is 
opportunistic in nature and not necessarily abundant or easily found in the natural 
environment. Similar targets such as buoys were used when available and appropriate. 
Differences in precision and accuracy are considered between hazards to navigation 
attached to the bottom and those drifting within the water column. This is anticipated 
due to potential differences in resolving targets that lie on a plane where adjoining 
hydrophone signals may tend to promote averaging of measurements, as opposed to 
detecting and characterizing a target that exists in free space without reference to 
adjoining hydrophone signals. Bottom targets are detectable with 3-dimensional 
characteristics, while depth information for hazards to navigation drifting in the water 
column may not be readily discerned. 
The detection of hazards to navigation is accomplished in real time by the FarSounder 
system itself directly from the sonar data, eliminating any possible delay that may be 
incurred as a result of post-processing sonar data. The EchoPilot system has no specific 
capability for this purpose and detection is dependent upon user interpretation of sonar 
data presented in the visual display. Post processing of the raster data provided by this 
system would be required to detect hazards to navigation, which is beyond the scope of 
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this research. Presentation on navigation displays in a form that is easily interpreted 
considering human factors is discussed under Study Area 5. 
The process used in acquiring 3D-FLS data, analyzing the data to detect hazards to 
navigation, developing ENC and then displaying ENC data on ECDIS is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. High resolution data representing a 3-dimensional topological model of the 
sea floor in areas where the bottom rises to above 50 or 100 meters, depending on make 
and model of 3D-FLS, is acquired live and displayed to the watchstander on ECDIS in 
real time while a vessel is making way. Hazards to navigation that are present either 
attached to the sea floor or suspended in the water column between the surface and the 
sea floor are detected and also displayed as momentary Virtual AtoN using appropriate 
symbology in accordance with existing ECDIS protocols, with minor variation to depict 
the virtual nature of the notification.   
Static Virtual AtoN
Dynamic Virtual AtoN
3D-FLS Real Time 
Survey Ahead of 
the Vessel
ECDIS
Bottom Contours
Hazards to Navigation
ENC
Transient Virtual AtoN
Chartmaking 
Authority
Aids to Navigation 
Authority
Hydrography
Hazards to 
Navigation
Navigation 
Chart
High Resolution
3D-FLS Data
 
Figure 4.1: Correlation of 3D-FLS data flow with  national authorities and Virtual AtoN 
creation for electronic navigation chart development and display to mariners on ECDIS. 
This data is also recorded and subsequently transmitted for use by national 
hydrographic authority in chart making, and also by national AtoN authority for 
determining the placement of AtoN, including static and dynamic Virtual AtoN for 
Virtual AtoN (momentary) 
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inclusion in navigation charts. This information is embodied within an ENC for display 
to mariners on ECDIS. 
The methodology used in this research is illustrated in figure 4.2. The objectives to be 
achieved are defined and boundary conditions and constraints identified as the first step 
in our analysis. Once completed, the assessment of risk can then be performed. This is 
accomplished by first identifying potential hazards and development of a scenario by 
which their causes and consequences may be examined, followed by the identification 
of options to control risks and to compare benefits of each of the options. Finally, 
recommendations are provided based upon the hazards identified, the options to reduce 
or eliminate their occurrence, or the consequences and associated costs and benefits. 
 
Figure 4.2: Risk assessment methodology 
The objective of this research is to identify the various factors and reduce associated 
risks that may lead to the unintentional grounding of vessels, especially in remote 
regions where hydrographic surveys to modern standards are rare and navigation charts 
are incomplete and inaccurate. Also included in this objective is allision with objects 
that exist either afloat or present in the water column that may cause an accident. A 
further objective is to examine new sensor technologies and reduce the occurrence of 
unintentional groundings and how this may be accomplished. This includes results 
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obtained directly through new technology use along with products and capabilities 
obtained indirectly through the post-processing and secondary use of data. Examples of 
new technologies include 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN that do not require the use of AIS 
radio technology or physical infrastructure of any kind for its use.  
This analysis is limited to SOLAS vessels that are likely to operate in the Arctic 
including those involved in community re-supply, bulk cargo transportation, fishing 
activities and tourism. Scope is also limited specifically to spatial and geographical 
uncertainties along transit routes that may lead to unintentional grounding.  
Ship systems include those generally considered under the e-Navigation umbrella and 
communication systems needed for provisioning of meteorological and oceanographic 
data associated with weather, tides, currents and waves (sea state). This includes 
ECDIS, AIS, GNSS, Radar, Sonar and communications system components providing 
maritime safety information broadcasts. Also considered is hydrographic data for 
creating navigation charts, including ENC, in their present form and also with detailed 
hydrography data integrated within the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) 
S-100 framework standard Universal Hydrographic Data Model. Specific reference is 
made to the draft S-102 High Definition Gridded Bathymetry standard that supports 
development of new navigation products not possible under the S-57 and previous 
hydrographic standards (IHO S-102). New products can include tools for navigation by 
georeferencing to known features that exist on the bottom to supplement positioning 
information provided by GNSS and AIS. This same hydrographic data is used for the 
design, implementation, placement and verification of AtoN in the Arctic to guide 
vessels along their routes (Wright and Baldauf, 2015 and 2015a).  
Limitations include risk to personnel, environmental and property damage. A 
prototype case is developed to illustrate the factors involved to generalize to other 
segments of the Arctic fleet. Choice of route illustrates a typical trade for the vessel 
type and size. There is 100% ENC coverage for this route and ECDIS availability is 
assumed. However, ENC data content in terms of soundings and other data useful for 
navigation over many portions of this route is sparse and even non-existent in many 
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areas. Paper charts for these areas are not required when electronic charts are in use, 
and high speed vessels are not considered. 
A generic model characterized by functions and capabilities inherent to ship 
navigation was defined representing an integrated collection of systems, including the 
interactions of functions and systems appropriate to unintended grounding. 
4.2.3 Study area 3: Value added for hydrographic and AtoN authorities 
The focus of this study area included cognizant national authorities in the United States: 
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration – NOAA (responsible for 
hydrography) and the Coast Guard (responsible for AtoN) and elsewhere under 
appropriate national and international authorities. Research efforts undertaken 
determined whether geographical references can be established to assess the feasibility 
of verifying positions of Virtual AtoN as being correct as part of a determination of 
their watching properly. The study focused on accomplishing this using several 
measures of a vessel’s apparent position to determine if it is different from the expected 
position. Additional research includes the assessment of the capability to verify Virtual 
AtoN that can also be extended to the verification of physical AtoN and AIS radio-
based AtoN to spawn the creation of more robust verification methods.  
Methods used in analyzing the value added for hydrographic authorities are specified in 
terms of soundings and features deliverables required of commercial contractors 
performing hydrographic services and include specifications that gridded data must 
meet, survey coverage and resolution and quality control (NOS, 2015). These methods 
include adjustment for errors that may be encountered during survey including 
corrections to echo soundings and uncertainty assessment that include instrument error 
corrections (draft, speed of sound, attitude, error budget analysis for depths and 
uncertainty budget analysis for depths) and quality control (multibeam sonar calibration 
and positioning system confidence checks). Although 3D-FLS data is currently not 
included as part of the investigations currently being performed by the IHO CSBWG, 
consideration is also being given to conformance with basic system and sensor 
descriptions, metadata and data formats relevant to the working group’s functions. 
  
53 
 
Methods used in analyzing the value added for AtoN authorities reflect those 
promulgated for use by the U.S. Coast Guard involve processes governing the 
establishment of an AtoN system, review and modification of AtoN systems, survey 
requirements, marking systems and system design and configuration, and correction of 
AtoN discrepancies as pertains to federal and private AtoN (USCG M16500.7A). The 
ability to automate such processes was considered, enhancing the ability of present 
AtoN authority personnel members dedicated to perform this task. Second, 
consideration was also made regarding the integration of algorithms to perform these 
automated verification tasks into ECDIS installations whereby every passing ECDIS-
equipped vessel can routinely and without human assistance perform AtoN verification 
of position and watching in best water while making way on a continuous basis. Such 
algorithms would track the position of each Virtual AtoN in relation to the vessel route 
of transit and correlate the single beam echo sounder measurements with the 
bathymetric model contained within the ENC. When there is little or no correlation 
between these two data sources alarms may be generated to alert the watchstander of a 
possible condition that either the vessel is not in the correct position or the bottom 
conditions relative to the Virtual AtoN has changed. Statistics of Virtual AtoN position 
verification results may be maintained for each one encountered. 
4.2.4 Study Area 4: Virtual AtoN data object verification 
The concept of Virtual AtoN verification arose out of a critical need to ensure their 
suitability and correctness in cyberspace without having the luxury of a physical 
presence for comparison. With the susceptibility of AIS and GNSS to spoofing, 
jamming and outages, it is essential this issue be adequately addressed to ensure safety 
of navigation (AIS, 2015).  
The approach followed to verify Virtual AtoN as watching properly in terms of 
positively identifying the aid, determining it is displaying the proper characteristics and 
is in its proper position was conceived during this research based upon georeferencing 
of physical objects to topological features contained within an ENC, and navigation 
using georeferencing by virtue of topography following using echo sounder 
measurements. This approach may be described as follows: 
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A Virtual AtoN that is watching properly (AtoNwp) is “on its assigned position 
(AtoNpos) exhibiting the advertised characteristics {AtoNchar(1-n)}∗
 AtoNwp = AtoNpos + {AtoNchar(1→n)} 
 in all respects” 
(USCG, M16500.7A). 
where: AtoNpos = TRUE  
and: {AtoNchar1 + AtoNchar2 + AtoNchar 3 + … + AtoNchar (n-1) + AtoNchar n} = TRUE 
given: 
 AtoNpos   The correct position of the AtoN is the location given in latitude 
and longitude conforming with the precision standards of accuracy 
classification expressed as the radius of a circle around the 
assigned position of an aid to navigation within which the aid is 
considered to be on station (USCG, M16500.1C). 
 Characteristic1: Light List number. 
 Characteristic2:  Name of the aid to navigation. 
 Characteristic3:  AtoN geographic position in latitude and longitude.  
 Characteristic4:  Not applicable to Virtual AtoN. 
 Characteristic5:  Not applicable to Virtual AtoN. 
 Characteristic6:  Not applicable to Virtual AtoN. 
 Characteristic7:  Not applicable to Virtual AtoN. 
 Characteristic8:  Aid remarks, seasonal remarks, and Private AtoN identification. 
 Characteristic9:  Symbol for aid to navigation included on navigation charts and ENC. 
 Characteristic10:  Latitude and longitude coordinates comprising the boundaries of the 
AtoN geographic area used for georeferencing. 
Virtual AtoN verification is therefore represented by the following assertions: 
1. The Virtual AtoN name contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed 
on ECDIS is the same name as that contained within the Light List. 
Assertion A (name verification) 
                                                            
∗ Note: Characteristics are numbered in accordance with U.S. Coast Guard Light List format. 
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1. The Virtual AtoN number contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed 
on ECDIS is the same number as that contained within the Light List. 
Assertion B (Light List number verification) 
1. The Virtual AtoN symbol contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed 
on ECDIS is the same symbol as that contained within the Light List. 
Assertion C (symbol verification) 
The method of Virtual AtoN position verification involves the comparison of live echo 
sounder data to bathymetric data over the vessel’s track using three factors, including: 
Assertion D (position verification) 
1. Depth (D) after adjustment for height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the 
water’s surface,  
2. the change of depths (dD/dt),  
3. and the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)  
for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R) as recorded by 
the vessel single beam echo sounder.  
Research in this study area encompasses how the use of environmental, physical and 
electronic characteristics; performance requirements, and database representations for 
Virtual AtoN can help to determine whether they are watching properly and performing 
their proper function. Also included were experiments simulating the verification of a 
Virtual AtoN obstruction mark for a wreck that exists in a well-charted area and the 
second experiment involves verification of Virtual AtoN lateral marks in an area 
lacking adequate hydrographic survey.  
In experiments related to verifying Virtual AtoN as watching properly, 3D-FLS data 
was compared to single beam echo sounder measurements along the same tracks 
representing nominal GNSS operating conditions and performance, and different tracks 
that represent compromised GNSS operation and performance as a result of natural 
effects of the Ionosphere and tropospheric ducting and due to intentional interference 
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resulting from denial of service attacks, spoofing and aliasing. Throughout these 
experiments the obtaining and recording of positions of the data collection platforms, 
3D-FLS sensors, and bench marks using a GPS receiver were performed in accordance 
with US National Ocean Service specifications (NOS, 2015a). 
Additional experiments focused on demonstrating the use of these same methods to 
verify physical AtoN. These results are described using a representative sampling of the 
thousands of data points shown in reduced form for clarity. A significant focus of this 
study area included assessing the ability to verify Virtual AtoN are watching properly 
despite the unavailability of precise positioning information normally obtained using 
GNSS, AIS and other sources due to a variety of manmade and natural events.  
Virtual, physical as well as AIS AtoN characteristics associated with position are 
generally ascertained using GNSS to compare the measured position with the charted 
position. In the case of physical AtoN and synthetic AIS AtoN there is a physical AtoN 
present at the location as well as an AIS/ECDIS representation to corroborate the GNSS 
fix. For AIS virtual AtoN and Virtual AtoN the problem becomes more complicated 
since there is no physical AtoN presence at all. A fix developed based upon bearings 
taken to physical landmarks and features would be a suitable method for determining 
location only in the case where such features were visible and not obscured or out of 
visual or radar range.  
However, there is another means to take such a fix through reference to ground. This 
may be accomplished, again using modern technology, by ground referencing to obtain 
position verification using known surface landmarks through sonar bearings. This can 
include bottom features obtained through bathymetric ENC models compared to live 
echo sounder measurements made during the transit of a vessel over time intervals 
using running averages and derivative trend information. An ENC containing high 
resolution hydrographic data is required to implement this approach using the concepts 
illustrated in figure 4.3 where depths associated with the correct Virtual AtoN position 
can be readily determined at high resolution. This is envisioned using the IHO S-100 
Universal Hydrographic Data Model that that supports a wider variety of hydrographic-
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related digital data sources and products than the S-57 IHO Transfer Standard for 
Digital Hydrographic Data. Specific reference is made to new spatial models to support 
imagery and gridded data, 3-D and time-varying data, and new applications beyond 
those of traditional hydrography. Such ENC can be integrated with ECDIS with the 
proper resolution and correlation to determine bearings, produce the necessary fixes and 
generate warnings. 
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Figure 4.3: Georeferencing characteristics showing correlation between Virtual AtoN and 
surrounding depths 
Integral to each Virtual AtoN digital data object as <characteristic10> is high resolution 
hydrographic data associated with the ENC. For example, tracks A and B in figure 4.3 
represent non-regulated, recommended tracks not based on fixed marks associated with 
depths along the track centerline at a span of predetermined width. The routes C and D 
fairways are associated with depths along the route between the fairway boundaries 
such as may be the case in areas where only channels are properly surveyed to modern 
standards and adjacent waters may be poorly surveyed or not surveyed at all. Areas E 
and F may represent restricted or exclusion zones through which vessel passage is 
regulated while mark G may be positioned at any appropriate location where the waters 
are properly surveyed. 
Fix and bearing information to known physical environmental features such as 
soundings for each Virtual AtoN can be taken during initial installation and encoded as 
part of its characteristics. These characteristics can then be used anytime thereafter to 
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verify position accuracy during normal use and subsequent verification. Encryption of 
position characteristics data can ensure their security and validity. Such methods can 
also detect the effects of AIS and GNSS jamming and spoofing since the presumed 
location based upon GNSS would not coincide with environmental features of the 
actual route of transit. Used with inertial navigation system backup, it would also be 
possible to verify position in the event of GNSS outage.  
An example of this approach is shown in figure 4.4 under conditions of nominal GNSS 
operation and during GNSS spoofing activities are underway such as attempting to 
highjack a vessel into hostile or restricted waters or to intentionally ground a vessel by 
making watchstanders believe they are in one location when in fact they may be miles 
away at a location unbeknownst to them. 
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Vessel proceeding
with nominal GNSS.  
Figure 4.4: Tracks of Vessels Illustrating the Effects of GNSS Spoofing 
In the above situation Track B (in green) illustrates the path of transit of a vessel when 
GNSS equipment is operating correctly and accurately depicts vessel position. Track A 
(in red) illustrates a potential path of transit of a vessel while making way during a 
GNSS spoofing attack. Even though in both cases the GNSS and ECDIS will show the 
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vessel is adhering to the same track (Track B), during the spoofing event the vessel is 
actually transiting a different course as illustrated by Track A. This is the same scenario 
followed by a vessel in 2013 where scientists from the University of Texas successfully 
spoofed the GPS on a yacht, directing it on a parallel path hundreds of meters off 
course while the chart display showed only a straight line (Divis, 2013). Examination of 
the vessel tracks illustrated in figure 4.5 show differences between ECDIS and echo 
sounder indications under nominal and spoofed GNSS conditions.  
Figure 4.5a shows that a close correlation exists between vessel’s echo sounder 
measurements and the ENC depths displayed on ECDIS when both the GNSS and echo 
sounder equipment are operating under normal conditions. However, there may be poor 
correlation between the ECDIS representation of position and route and echo sounder 
measurements depicting the actual terrain over which the transit is made when GNSS 
spoofing activity is underway as shown in figure 4.5b. In this case the echo sounder 
accurately depicts the physical environment below the waterline at the vessel’s actual 
position while ECDIS indications are displaying an inaccurate position showing depths 
that are very different than that which exists below the hull. Indeed, a vessel transiting 
Track A is in jeopardy of grounding in the shallows depicted on this line of transit.  
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Figure 4.5: Correlation of ENC to echo sounder measurements during nominal GNSS 
operation and during GNSS spoofing. 
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Watchstanders would be notified via alarms and other indicators that a discrepancy 
exists between ENC and ECDIS indications of position as compared to echo sounder 
sensor measurements of the actual physical environment. These indications would not 
necessarily help the watchstander to directly determine actual position since navigation 
by georeferencing is much more computationally complex than determining 
navigational discrepancies by georeferencing. However, notification of the navigational 
discrepancy would alert the watchstander of a condition in which caution is justified 
and action should be taken to determine actual vessel position before proceeding further 
on course. 
4.2.5 Study Area 5: Virtual AtoN representation on navigation display systems 
This study area analyzed the depiction of hazards to navigation using standard AtoN 
symbology on IMO-compliant ECDIS. Although this effort is tailored to the specific 
scope of this research, it was accomplished within the boundaries established by 
existing AtoN initiatives of the U.S. Coast Guard where the physical characteristics of 
AIS AtoN include the symbols for real, synthetic and virtual; and non-AIS Virtual 
(NOAA AIS). NOAA also provides ENC depiction of the physical characteristics for 
AIS AtoN that are also available for Virtual AtoN on ECDIS and includes symbols for 
cardinal marks (N/E/S/W), lateral marks (IALA A/B port and starboard), isolated 
danger, safe water, special purpose and emergency wreck marking (NOAA 2013). This 
includes compliance with the fourth attribute of marking a hazard to navigation, where: 
Markings mean the lights and other signals placed on or near structures, sunken 
vessels, and other obstructions for the protection of navigation. 
One of the primary references used in the performance of this task is IHO Publication 
S-52, Specifications for Chart Content and Display aspects of ECDIS (IHO S-52). 
Within the United States NOAA Chart No. 1 also provides guidance for ECDIS 
symbols (NOAA, 2013a). Virtual AtoN are intended to exist only in ENC using very 
similar symbols as presently existing for physical and AIS radio-based AtoN, and 
display only on ECDIS.  
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Chapter 5     Results 
The ultimate outcome of this research includes a comprehensive definition of a Virtual 
AtoN that requires no presence in the physical environment whatsoever, along with 
definitions of constituent characteristics that comprise this aid. A detailed description of 
a Virtual AtoN is provided in paragraph 5.1 of this chapter. 
A significant  impediment to achieving this outcome is a lack of adequate hydrographic 
survey to modern standards in remote Arctic and tropical regions necessary to 
determine where AtoN are most needed and to place them with precision sufficient to 
verify they are on station and watching properly. To overcome this impediment the 
results of experiments exploring the capability and utility of 3D-FLS are described. For 
properly equipped vessels it will be possible to also safely transit uncharted and poorly 
charted waters with an increased level of safety that is not possible under existing IMO 
carriage requirements for vessel equipment.  
Two significant outcomes resulted from the use of this technology. First, the capability 
of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation directly in the path of a vessel in real time 
resulted in the creation of a new type of Virtual AtoN with momentary duration capable 
of detecting imminent hazards to navigation in real time that has not previously been 
possible. Second, 3D-FLS can provide high resolution swaths of hydrographic data that 
appear to be comparable with multi-beam sonar used for hydrographic survey. Such 
independently sourced data can supplement national authority survey efforts through 
the crowd sourcing. 
The research leading up to this outcome has been documented in the form of the results 
of studies and experiments described in peer-reviewed papers published in academic 
journals and in conference proceedings, presentations made at industry and academic 
forums, and previously unpublished findings that are included within this dissertation. 
Of these papers, five that best describe the various aspects of this research have been 
selected and appended to this dissertation.  
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Paper 1 provides a general description of what constitutes a Virtual AtoN, followed by 
a presentation of findings regarding potential Virtual AtoN implementations, their 
capabilities and limitations, and their use. This discussion is described in paragraph 5.2. 
Results are discussed in paragraph 5.3 and provided in Paper 2 that can be used to 
verify that Virtual AtoN are deployed in the correct position and watching properly by 
displaying the appropriate characteristics while in use. Further elaboration is provided 
on verifying proper implementation of requirements and validating intermediate and 
final results throughout the entire development lifecycle.  
Paragraph 5.4 describes Paper 3 wherein is presented the results and findings of field 
studies using different 3D-FLS systems that pertain to accuracy in terms of their 
potential to provide topography data to support hydrographic survey in regions that are 
poorly surveyed or not surveyed at all. This paper also presents findings on the use of 
topography data obtained using 3D-FLS to help verify Virtual AtoN are in their correct 
position and watching properly.  
In paragraph 5.5 results are presented regarding vulnerability and risk assessment for 
Arctic voyages as a result of the combination of poorly surveyed waters and limitations 
of environmental sensing capabilities in modern vessels. The potential advantages of 
expanding these sensing capabilities using 3D-FLS and resulting risk control options 
are also discussed.  
Paragraph 5.6 discusses the contents of Paper 4 that describes the potential use of 
Virtual Aids to Navigation and 3D-FLS as a means for developing strategies to avoid 
groundings and preserving the Arctic environment. 
Paragraph 5.7 discusses the results of the initial investigation described in Paper 5 of 
the capabilities of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation at cruising speed through an 
in-depth analysis of the Costa Concordia tragedy. Insight into bridge alerts and alarms 
that may have been generated had 3D-FLS been installed, operational and observed just 
prior to the grounding are also provided. 
5.1 Description of a Virtual Aid to Navigation 
The technical definition of a Virtual AtoN as pertains to this research is:  
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Apparatuses comprising one or more digital information object(s), systems and 
methods that can improve situational awareness by providing guidance pertaining 
to characteristics of the physical environment external to a vessel to help a 
mariner determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of obstructions, or 
to give advice about ship routing without requiring a presence in the physical 
environment external to a vessel. 
The implementation and realization of a Virtual AtoN may be static in nature where its 
characteristics do not change such as when emulating a physical AtoN, may be 
dynamic where its characteristics may change in either or both the time and/or spatial 
domains as a result of changing environmental features and/or to accommodate 
properties unique to a specific vessel such as draft and speed. It may also reflect 
characteristics that exist momentarily or for only short periods of time. Such invention 
is essential to enhance safety of navigation as vessel traffic in areas such as the Arctic 
that is expanding in vessel traffic volume both within and transiting the region, yet the 
necessary physical infrastructure in terms of buoys, beacons and other physical and 
radio-based devices can be difficult or impossible to place and maintain in this hostile 
environment that stretches across vast distances. This also applies in tropical regions 
where sensitive environmental features such as coral reefs prevent the placement of 
sinkers to affix physical AtoN. Virtual AtoN may also be used to designate positions of 
tactical significance in planning and executing military, search and rescue and 
emergency relief operations. 
This concept was defined as a consequence of examining responsible national authority 
practices identified in Study Area 2 and implementation requirements identified in 
Study Area 3 through elaboration as to the apparatus, systems and methods establishing 
the embodiment of Virtual AtoN and descriptions of various means of implementation. 
5.1.1  Embodiment 
The embodiment of a Virtual AtoN may include: 
• Apparatus designated as short range aids to navigation traditionally represented as 
beacons, buoys, lighthouses, lightvessels, lines, daymarks and traffic signals, 
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•  Apparatus designated as positions, routes, tracks, areas, zones and other regions that 
are safe for navigation or transit, 
• Apparatus designated as positions, routes, tracks, areas, zones and other regions 
from which navigation or transit may be restricted or excluded, 
•  The above apparatuses that encompass a high resolution three-dimensional digital 
terrain model data of the sea bottom at and in the vicinity of the position wherein 
the apparatuses are located and designated for use, 
•  Systems of one or more apparatuses that together comprise a Virtual AtoN,  
•  Methods that enable the use of virtual aids to navigation to enhance the safety of 
vessel navigation, and/or 
•  Methods to verify that virtual aids to navigation are in their proper geographical 
position (on station) and exhibiting their correct characteristics (watching properly). 
These apparatuses, systems and methods may be employed where freedom of 
movement of shipping is inhibited by restricted sea-room and where there is the 
existence of hazards and obstructions to navigation, limited depths, critical depths or 
unfavorable oceanographic conditions. They may be used to implement routes 
organizing safe traffic flow to stay clear of fishing grounds, wildlife preservation areas 
or the organization of traffic through these areas; and to implement routes preventing or 
reducing the risk of pollution or other damage to the marine environment caused by 
ships through allision or grounding in or near environmentally sensitive areas. They 
also may be used to implement tracks along which previous experience has shown, so 
far as possible, these tracks are free of dangers and along which ships are advised to 
navigate. 
Guidance to mariners may be provided pertaining to characteristics of the physical 
environment external to a vessel that are relatively static in nature and do not change 
over relatively long periods of time, where these characteristics are dynamic in nature 
and subject to change over relatively short periods of time or are in effect for 
designated periods of time, and/or are provided in real-time and exist only momentarily 
or for very short periods of time. Guidance to mariners may also be provided to 
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determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of obstructions, or to give advice 
about the location of a best or preferred route.  
Characteristics of the physical environment external to a vessel that are relatively static 
in nature and do not change over relatively long periods of time include information 
regarding rocks, sea mounts, ledges, reefs, wrecks, drilling platforms and other natural 
and manmade static hazards to navigation that may persist within a geographically 
defined area in the environment over months, years, decades and centuries. 
Characteristics of the physical environment may also be dynamic in nature, subject to 
change over relatively short periods of time or in effect for designated periods of time 
may pertain to shoals, wrecks, construction sites and other natural and manmade 
dynamic hazards to navigation that may persist within changing geographically defined 
areas in the environment over days, months and years. Characteristics of the 
environment may also be determined in real-time that are momentary in duration and 
exist only for very short periods of time that may pertain to ice bergs, growlers, 
flotsam, jetsam, buoys that are adrift, marine mammals and other natural and manmade 
hazards to navigation. These hazards may persist within changing geographically 
defined areas in the environment over seconds or minutes. 
Virtual AtoN apparatuses, systems and methods may be considered to be of primary 
navigational significance (Category 1), of navigational significance (Category 2), or 
less navigational significance (Category 3) than Category 1 or 2. 
Virtual AtoN characteristics may be realized in physical form and media such as 
navigation charts and maps and/or may be realized in electronic form and media 
integral to human-machine interfaces such as analog and digital electronic monitors and 
signage. Their characteristics may be stored in electronic, optical and other media, 
form(s) and format(s) such as databases, data depositories and data archives; may be 
integrated into electronic navigation charts (ENC), electronic chart navigation and 
display systems (ECDIS) and other software, systems and apparatuses used to contain 
and present navigationally significant information to mariners using a human-machine 
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interface; and may be accessed, retrieved, sorted, manipulate, arranged, classified 
and/or operated upon by a computer or computational device. 
5.1.2 Essential Elements 
In assessing modern AtoN system requirements three primary elements must be 
considered in terms of system functions, capabilities and the duration of the services 
provided by AtoN: functions, capabilities and durations. 
Functions. Functions traditionally accorded to mariners by AtoN have been manifest as 
physical beacons and buoys whose functions based upon color, shape, topmarks and 
other characteristics have explicit meaning in the context of their use. Their placement 
within an overall AtoN system is used to denote tracks, routes, areas and limits 
implemented across the entire waterway using a systematic approach. Emulation of 
these same functions can be accomplished using Virtual AtoN to supplement physical 
AtoN. They may also be used when the deployment of physical AtoN or AIS AtoN is 
difficult or impossible. Virtual AtoN can provide additional capability to facilitate the 
electronic display of lines and symbols that represent areas, routes, tracks and limits 
directly on ECDIS or other system(s) by emulating the physical or AIS AtoN that are 
typically used to denote these functions or exhibiting new capabilities that are not 
possible with physical or AIS AtoN. 
Capabilities. Capabilities for implementing AtoN functions have historically been 
viewed from a static point of view where, upon completion of a waterway design, 
physical AtoN are deployed to required locations. The ability to provide dynamic AtoN 
capabilities where their characteristics can change based upon a function of time and 
other factors has only recently been accomplished using AIS AtoN broadcasting area 
special messages. Virtual AtoN can be used to display in real time the detection of 
underwater hazards to navigation detected using 3D-FLS. 
Duration. The use of physical beacons, marks, ranges and other apparatus including 
AIS AtoN continues to be the preferred method of deployment for channels, routes and 
other locations. Changes are made primarily resulting from experience and maintenance 
issues as they arise and not based upon new design and implementation methods. 
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Virtual AtoN can also perform these same functions designed for use over long periods 
of time, the temporary marking of wrecks and other features as well as marking features 
with very short or momentary significance like a shipping container that is adrift, 
growler or whale directly in the vessel’s path. 
5.1.3  Symbology 
Traditional short range AtoN include marks in the form of beacons and buoys, ranges 
and other apparatus. A primary reference used in developing symbols representing 
these apparatuses is IHO Publication S-52, Specifications for Chart Content and 
Display aspects of ECDIS (IHO S-52). Within the United States NOAA (2013a) Chart 
No. 1 also provides guidance for ECDIS symbols. 
A small sample of possible Virtual AtoN symbols similar to existing Cardinal, Lateral 
and Special Purpose marks in ENC and display on ECDIS are shown in figure 5.1: 
V V V V VV
V
VV
V V V V
Cardinal Marks
North East South West
Lateral Marks
IALA A IALA B
Starboard Port PortStarboard
Special Purpose Marks
Starboard PortEmergency
Wreck
Mark
Isloated
Danger
Safe
Water
 
Figure 5.1: Symbols for marks. 
These Virtual AtoN symbols are alike to and differ from physical AtoN and AIS AtoN 
as shown in Figure 5.2 in the following manner: 
1. The basic mark symbol is identical in all cases. This is an existing symbol that is 
in use and presently found in ENC and displayed on many ECDIS; 
2. AIS AtoN utilize the basic mark symbol surrounded by a magenta circle denoting 
a radio AtoN. The letters “V-AIS” are also posted alongside the AIS AtoN mark 
to designate it as a virtual mark created by an AIS transmitter. This is an existing 
symbol that is in use and presently found in ENC and displayed on many ECDIS; 
  
68 
 
Cardinal Marks
V-AIS V
Virtual AtoN
(proposed)
AIS radio-based AtoN
(existing)
Physical AtoN
(existing)
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison between physical AtoN, AIS AtoN and Virtual AtoN Symbols for 
marks. 
3. Virtual AtoN utilize the basic mark symbol followed by the letter “V” posted 
alongside the mark to designate it as a Virtual AtoN. This is a proposed mark for 
Virtual AtoN that is experimental in nature and presently not in use. It is not 
found in ENC and presently cannot be displayed on ECDIS. 
Not all ECDIS are presently equipped to display many of the symbols currently 
identified for use. Introduction of an extended symbol set into new ECDIS systems will 
begin in 2017 and continue after this date for older systems.  
The capability of Virtual AtoN to emulate physical AtoN can also support new 
functionality that is not possible with physical AtoN. For example, some additional 
short range AtoN symbols that exist to represent tracks, areas and zones are illustrated 
in Figure 5.3.  
Tracks and Routes Areas and Zones
B
F
No-EntryA C D
E
F
 
Figure 5.3: Experimental Virtual AtoN symbols for tracks, areas and zones. 
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These symbols may all be implemented as Virtual AtoN. Tracks A and B represent 
non-regulated, recommended tracks with two way vessel traffic not based on fixed 
marks. Route C represents a fairway designated by regulatory authority with minimum 
depth or maximum authorized draft. The width of the fairway, along with traffic 
separation zone D, is indicative of the span through which vessel traffic may safely 
pass. Area E represents an intuitive approach to designating a geographic area with 
irregular boundaries to supplement the present “–“, “┬“ and “< ” symbols found on 
ECDIS that require interpretation. Area F represents a geographic area whose 
boundaries expand a specified radius from the center, one implementation of which 
could be represented as shown using well understood “no-entry” symbols. 
The tracks, routes, areas and zones illustrated here reflect only a small portion of 
symbols presently available, and soon to be available using ECDIS. There exists 
opportunities for further expansion of ECDIS symbols to include characteristics and 
capabilities that are not yet implemented, and possibly those not yet even conceived as 
the potential for Virtual AtoN technology becomes more fully realized.  
5.1.4  Characteristics for Georeferencing 
Virtual, physical as well as AIS AtoN characteristics associated with position are 
generally ascertained using GNSS to compare the measured position with the charted 
position. In the case of physical AtoN and synthetic AIS AtoN there is a physical AtoN 
present at the location as well as an AIS/ECDIS representation to corroborate the GNSS 
fix. For AIS virtual AtoN and Virtual AtoN the problem becomes more complicated 
since there is no physical AtoN presence at all. A fix developed based upon bearings 
taken to physical landmarks and features would be a suitable method for determining 
location only in the case where such features were visible and not obscured or out of 
visual or radar range.  
 5.2 Virtual Electronic Aids to Navigation for Remote and Ecologically 
Sensitive Regions 
Paper 1 provides a comprehensive discussion regarding the overall Virtual AtoN 
concept as envisioned by this research and several of the possible implementations 
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thereof. The results described were defined in part as a consequence of experiments and 
findings as part of Study Area 1 that relate to the acquisition, use and analysis of 3D-
FLS data in identifying environmental conditions below the waterline relevant to AtoN 
creation and placement. This encompasses requirements definition pertinent to the 
establishment of AtoN and the examination of traditional physical AtoN and AIS AtoN 
characteristics. Early in this research it became evident that robust and high resolution 
3D-FLS sensors could provide new capabilities in terms of performance resiliency that 
could detect and possibly overcome many disadvantages inherent in overreliance on 
GNSS and AIS technologies for vessel navigation. Also resulting from these studies is 
the identification of momentary objects and events representing potential hazards to 
navigation such as cargo containers, marine mammals, ice bergs, growlers and other 
phenomena for which the provisioning of existing AtoN is not possible. This resulted in 
the creation of Virtual AtoN with momentary duration concept described in this paper. 
Significant elements that comprise Virtual AtoN are placed into perspective with 
physical AtoN and AIS AtoN in figure 5.4. 
 
Physical AtoN
• Beacons.
• Buoys and Day Marks.
AIS AtoN
• Buoys and Day Marks.
Virtual AtoN
• Buoys and Day Marks.
• Tracks.
• Routes. 
• Areas. 
• Limits.
Function DurationBehaviour
Static
Static
Static
Dynamic
Permanent
Temporary
Permanent
Temporary
Permanent
Temporary
Momentary
 
Figure 5.4: Essential Aids to Navigation (AtoN) elements. 
Additional results were obtained as a consequence of examining responsible national 
authority practices pertaining to AtoN creation, provisioning and maintenance 
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identified in Study Area 2. The concepts associated with Virtual AtoN can generally 
work in harmony with existing AtoN practices that result in their establishment by 
responsible national authority. An exception is the creation in real time of momentary 
Virtual AtoN outside of the purview of competent national authority due to their 
requirement for quick and timely implementation. 
Results obtained as a consequence of Study Area 3 were realized in terms of new 
capabilities for providing AtoN services using Virtual AtoN in areas where these 
services are presently not possible such as in remote Arctic regions where the harsh 
weather prevents AtoN placement due to ice movement. This also applies in both the 
Arctic and tropical regions where the great distances involved and the lack of 
infrastructure, vessels and staffing capabilities prohibit proper AtoN use and 
maintenance.  
Human factor issues investigated as part of Study Area 5 resulted in the determination 
that the display of Virtual AtoN should be wholly integrated into ECDIS displays 
presently mandated by IMO for SOLAS vessels and with which mariners are required 
to be trained in its operation. Technical issues pertaining to this topic were addressed 
and examples provided as to how such issues may be resolved using existing ECDIS 
capabilities. Further analysis of notification and alarms that are possible to be issued as 
a consequence of hazard to navigation detection and resulting notifications are also 
discussed separately within Paper 5 as described in paragraph 5.7. 
Additional research results are shown below where a buoy with a floating presence 
within the water column just below the waterline was detected using 3FD-FLS as 
shown in Figure 5.5.a. The position of this buoy was placed within an ENC as shown in 
figure 5.5.b.   
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a. Buoy detected using 3D-FLS b.  Sonar contact placed over ENC buoy 
Figure 5.5:  Momentary Virtual AtoN detected using 3D-FLS. 
5.3 Correlation of virtual aids to navigation to the physical environment 
In Paper 2 a method is described to verify the performance of Virtual AtoN to help 
ensure they are watching properly through the use of georeferencing to bottom features 
and characteristics obtained through electronic nautical chart (ENC) models and/or live 
sonar data compared to live echosounder readings using running averages and 
derivative trend information. This approach also utilizes IHO S-102 ENC capabilities to 
attach tangible physical attributes and characteristics to a virtual data object that has no 
other physical presence (IHO S-102). This is especially important in an era when both 
AIS and GNSS on which precise positioning is based are subject to spoofing, aliasing, 
jamming and denial of service attacks that threaten to render AtoN useless or even pose 
a hazard to navigation.  
Two results emerged from Study Area 3 that are highly significant in terms of value 
added to national AtoN authorities. First, the ability to verify Virtual AtoN can also be 
extended to the verification of physical AtoN and AIS AtoN. This capability can spawn 
the creation of more robust verification methods that may be automated to a great 
extent, thereby enhancing the efficiency of present AtoN authority staff members 
dedicated to this task. Second, the algorithms to perform these automated verification 
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tasks can be integrated into ECDIS installations such that every passing vessel can 
routinely and without human assistance perform AtoN verification of position and 
watching in best waters while making way on a continuous basis. 
Results from Study Area 4 are provided illustrating how environmental, physical and 
electronic characteristics; performance requirements, and database representations for 
Virtual AtoN can determine they are watching properly and performing their proper 
function. There are presently no other methods identified within industry or 
Government for the verification of Virtual AtoN. This includes the results of 
experiments performed simulating the verification of a Virtual obstruction mark for a 
wreck that exists in a well-charted area and the second experiment involves verification 
of virtual lateral marks in an area lacking adequate hydrographic survey. Results from 
additional experiments are also provided to demonstrate the use of these same methods 
to verify physical AtoN using a representative sampling of the thousands of data points 
available in the high resolution geospatial model of the sea floor obtained through 
hydrographic survey. 
A significant outcome of these experiments is confirmation of the ability to help verify 
Virtual AtoN are watching properly despite the unavailability of precise positioning 
information normally obtained using GNSS, AIS and other sources due to a variety of 
manmade and natural events.  
5.4 Hydrographic Survey in Remote Regions: Using Vessels of Opportunity 
Equipped with 3-dimensional Forward-Looking Sonar 
Paper 3 describes the results of two different sets of experiments designed to explore 
the usefulness and versatility of commercial off-the-shelf 3D-FLS to carry out different 
tasks. The first set of experiments focused on determining its accuracy in representing 
the physical environment in which it operates, and the second set involved determining 
its capability to provide data of sufficient resolution to assist in verifying position using 
geographical features of the bottom.  
The data sources for Paper 3 include two conference papers that are not appended to 
this dissertation but are included under Other Related Papers and Publications in 
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paragraph 1.7 and listed under References. The first paper describes detailed results 
obtained under Study Area 1 that represent initial efforts to extract vector data from 3D-
FLS measurements to determine their accuracy when compared to the nautical chart 
that is the legal standard for vessel navigation (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015). The 
second paper describes results obtained under Study Area 4 from experiments further 
expanding upon previous efforts involving verification through georeferencing (Wright 
and Baldauf, 2015). These previous efforts are reported under the discussion in Paper 2. 
Differences between different vessel transit track data sets positively indicate the 
detection of GNSS and/or bottom topography anomalies. 
The results of these two sets of experiments are examined to arrive at a conclusion as to 
whether a high quality 3D-FLS with suitable range, regardless of manufacturer, is 
capable of providing high resolution data necessary to accomplish the stated objectives 
of these two sets of experiments. Results pertaining to value added for national 
hydrographic authorities as a consequence of Study Area 3 research indicates 3D-FLS 
resolution is in accordance with hydrographic survey requirements of less than IHO 
Orders of Survey 1a resolution with full sea floor coverage over a predetermined swath 
of the bottom (IHO S-44). This result indicates a hybrid data product somewhere 
between those provided by IHO Orders of Survey 1a, and 1b surveys that do not require 
full sea floor search.  
5.5 Cooperative use of 3-dimensional forward looking sonar and Virtual Aids 
to Navigation in reducing risk for Arctic voyages 
Results described include the identification of hazards using a scenario by which their 
causes and consequences were examined. Options to reduce risks and/or their 
consequences were also identified, followed by the recognition of options to control 
risks and to compare benefits of each of the options. Recommendations are provided 
considering the hazards identified, the options to reduce or eliminate their occurrence 
and/or their consequences and associated costs and benefits. 
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5.5.1 Identification of Hazards 
Groundings can occur through a wide variety of indirect and direct causes. A list of 
system capabilities associated with voyage planning and execution, hazards that may 
result from the loss or compromise of these capabilities and the potential consequences 
of these hazards is shown in Table 2. Lack of hydrographic survey is an indirect cause 
for grounding due to a lack of available information of the undersea environment 
fundamental to the development of comprehensive, complete and accurate navigation 
charts. This results in the creation of a navigation chart that contains large areas of 
blank space lacking soundings and other information normally available to mariners.  
Table 2: Factors pertaining to unintentional groundings and allision.  
Capability Loss or Compromise Hazard due to Effect of Loss or Compromise Potential Consequences 
Hydrography 
  - Lack of Assets to Perform Surveys Poor Navigation Charts Improperly plan/monitor voyage. 
Navigation Charts 
  - Lack of Soundings Unknown depths along route  Grounding 
- Uncharted Hazards to Navigation Danger posed to surface vessels Grounding, Allision 
- Different Datum Different positions using the same coordinates Grounding 
- ECDIS Warnings and alarms may be inoperable Grounding 
Environmental Sensing 
  - Automated Identification System (AIS) Identification and location of vessels and AtoN Grounding, Allision 
- Precision Positioning and Timing (GNSS) Loss of electronic position and time acquisition Grounding, Allision 
- Tides and Currents Inaccurate depths along route Grounding, Allision 
- Weather Unknown or inaccurate atmospheric conditions Grounding, Allision 
- Sonar (Echo sounder, 3D-FLS) Inaccurate or unknown depths along route Grounding, Allision 
- Radar identification/location of vessels, AtoN, land Collision, Grounding, Allision 
Aids to Navigation (AtoN) 
  - Virtual (Permanent/Temporary duration) Unmarked hazards, reefs, ledges, shoals, etc. Grounding, Allision 
- Virtual (Momentary duration) Unmarked hazards floating in the water column Allision 
Human Error 
  - Inaction Lack of knowledge, situational awareness Grounding, Allision 
- Action too little/too much Inattention Grounding, Allision 
- Incorrect action Procedural deficiencies, poor learning Grounding, Allision 
- Action too soon/too late Poor communication Grounding, Allision 
- Misdirected action Miscalculation Grounding, Allision 
   
 
A direct cause of grounding is illustrated by the navigator of a vessel relying upon a 
poor chart that may be lacking soundings information while attempting to transit an 
area where bottom characteristics are unknown and any hazards to navigation that may 
exist are as yet undiscovered. Another problem in the Arctic is the use of charts where 
surveys were performed using a datum other than World Geodetic System 1984, 
requiring a datum shift correction before a position can be plotted on a chart (WGS84,  
Pub. 180). This also requires that GNSS are set to the same datum as the ENC. The 
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various alarms integral to ECDIS that are intended to alert the watchstander of 
insufficient water depth ahead along the transit route to prevent groundings will not 
operate when the ENC does not contain this information. 
Environmental sensing capability discrepancies are a potential cause of grounding 
due to system failure and/or lack of situational awareness on the part of the 
watchstander. With the sole exception of the echo sounder that provides water depth 
directly below the hull, all navigational sensor coverage including AIS, GNSS and 
radar is limited to the environment as it exists above the waterline and is capable of 
detecting only secondary, indirect references that may indicate shoal waters or hazards 
to navigation significant to grounding. Such references may include a rock or pinnacle 
that extends above the surface of the water, or a physical AtoN or AIS AtoN that 
depicts a hazard or obstruction.  
The use of 3D-FLS to supplement the echo sounder in sensing the features and 
characteristics of the underwater environment should be considered when transiting 
unsurveyed and poorly charted waters. Such systems can be used at depths to 50 meters 
or more at speeds to over 20 knots to detect hazards to navigation up to 1,000 meters 
ahead of the bow. This has been shown to provide up to 1.7 minutes advance notice of a 
hazard while cruising at speeds of 15 knots (Wright and Baldauf, 2015b). Human error is 
also a significant contributor to factors relevant to hazard assessment. 
The list of capabilities and resulting hazards in table 2 has been examined to 
determine priorities for risk assessment, resulting in the creation of table 3. 
Hydrography and the subsequent navigation chart capabilities are considered high 
priority as these are essential tools for navigation. Direct environmental sensing and 
aids to navigation, although essential to navigation, are given medium priority as some 
degree of alternative capability is possible through human intervention if one or more 
of these sensors are unavailable. Indirect environmental sensing of weather, tides and 
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currents is not considered as these capabilities do not originate on the vessel itself but 
originate elsewhere, and are provided through communications links. Human factor 
issues are important considerations in a formal risk assessment and have not been 
thoroughly investigated in this preliminary assessment. 
5.5.2 Risk analysis 
The following vessel and barge combination was chosen as a reference case for risk 
modeling and as baseline for risk analysis from which generalizations may be made to 
other segments of the fleet:  
Barge for oil: L 180ft (55m), W 52ft (15m), D 14.5ft (4.4m); 2,400 DWT LT, 1100 
GRT with 12,000 bbl. capacity trading between Anchorage, Kotzebue and 
Kaktovik, Alaska. Push tug with engines rated at 1,350 HP total. 
Vessels of this type provide home heating and diesel oil supplies to rural Alaska 
communities along the western and northern coasts in the spring and autumn each year 
(NSREP 2015). Supplies are transferred to shallow draft literage barges for local 
delivery. 
Although the area nearby the city of Anchorage is well surveyed and charted, the 
areas to the north along the west coast and further around and to the east along the 
northern slope of Alaska are poorly surveyed, if at all, and navigation charts are poor. 
Proceeding north to Kotzebue only the five mile channel from clear water to the harbor 
is surveyed with adjacent waters shown in blue without soundings in figure 5.6. Aids to 
navigation are not charted at all, and are subject to being moved based upon constantly 
changing bottom conditions. A portion of the route between Kotzebue and Kaktovik is 
shown in figure 5.6a where spot and track line soundings predominate except directly 
Table 3. Capability prioritization. 
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along the shoreline. Such navigation chart coverage is common along the entire route. 
The immediate area around Kaktovik and the harbor shown in figure 5.6b is well 
charted, however most soundings disappear after leaving the shoreline. 
 
(a) Channel to Kotzebue Harbor, AK (NOAA Chart 16161) 
 
(b) Kaktovik, AK (NOAA Chart 16043) 
Figure 5.6: Approaches and Harbor Charts for Kotzebue and Kaktovik, Alaska, USA. 
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Risk assessment using existing technology – A process for risk assessment using 
present technology is shown in table 4. Assessment of hydrography is made based upon 
the recency of survey and the coverage of the survey along the route. Where 
hydrographic surveys have recently been performed and absent significant storm 
activity, is it likely that the surveyed bottom configuration still accurately represents the 
present bottom configuration. As the time since the last survey becomes greater the 
probability of changes in the bottom increases. However, when surveys are more than 
30 years old another factor comes into play in terms of the lower resolution of older 
sensors and technologies used to perform the survey. Multibeam sonars that provide 
full bottom coverage at high resolution have only come into use since the 1990’s (NOS, 
HHS). Prior to that single-beam echo sounders were used from the 1940’s to the 1980’s. 
Earlier technologies included the wire drag survey introduced in 1904 and the leaded 
line survey before then. 
Coverage of survey refers to comprehensiveness in the area along the route of transit. 
Full bottom coverage with soundings, depth contours and other topography and 
hydrography features are given a lower risk factor than areas where only partial full 
bottom exists in some areas and is absent in others. Likewise, track and spot soundings 
and lack of depth contours and other features warrant a higher risk factor. A navigation 
chart exhibiting a complete lack of soundings is given a high risk score. It is entirely 
possible for a navigation chart to be of the most recent version and current to the latest 
Notice to Mariners, yet still be entirely devoid of hydrographic information since no 
survey may have ever been performed in the area covered by the chart.   
Table 4. Risk factors. 
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The assessment of environmental sensors is made on the basis of whether they are 
operational or not operational. As these sensors are required carriage on SOLAS vessels 
the only consideration given is to the increase of risk to conduct a voyage without them.  
Assessment of AtoN is made on the basis of their presence along the route of transit 
to guide the vessel. Although physical AtoN are generally plentiful in well surveyed 
and well traveled areas, the Arctic has neither of these characteristics. Few physical 
AtoN and fewer AIS AtoN exist in and around the Arctic except possibly in the 
immediate vicinity of harbors during the warmer months.   
Risk is evaluated by assessing each of the individual capabilities according to the 
criteria listed and assigning a score corresponding to these capabilities. A total score 
within the boundaries of low risk indicate that hydrography, navigational charts and 
sensor capabilities are at or near their optimal state and a voyage under these 
circumstances may be appropriate if all other criteria for getting underway are met. A 
total score in the medium risk range indicates deficiencies exist in the recency of 
hydrographic survey or the presence of AIS AtoN along the route. Neither of these 
factors may indicate that a problem exists. However, caution should be exercised during 
transit. A total score greater than 9 indicates a high risk voyage is possible and 
additional planning and preparation is needed before attempting the voyage. 
Risk assessment using emerging technologies – A process for risk assessment using 
new technology to supplement existing technology is shown in table 5. Specific 
reference is made to 3D-FLS to enhance situational awareness into the environment 
below the waterline by providing a live rendering of the sea bottom and potential 
hazards to navigation that exist either afloat or within the water column. This system 
can provide an additional margin of safety when risk associated with a lack of current 
and comprehensive hydrographic survey is high, and can also provide similar data and 
functionality as an echo sounder, if necessary.  
Further reference is made to the use of Virtual AtoN to replicate physical AtoN and 
AIS AtoN functions on ECDIS and provide new capabilities for displaying hazards to 
navigation detected by 3D-FLS that are afloat or in the water column. Capability is 
provided to lessen the impact of GNSS and AIS service interruptions, spoofing and 
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denial of service attacks, and AIS aliasing resulting in misleading position information. 
This is accomplished through georeferencing to known bottom features and 
characteristics as depicted in ENC created in accordance with the IHO S-102 standard. 
Table 5. Alternative risk factors with inclusion of 3D-FLS and virtual aids to 
navigation. 
 
Risk is evaluated in the same way by assessing each of the individual capabilities 
according to the criteria listed and assigning a score corresponding to these capabilities. 
However, there is a difference in the determination of a total score by which risk 
assessment is made, especially as pertains to hydrography since a live rendition of the 
bottom configuration can now be viewed in real-time. 
The modeled results indicate risk reduction as a consequence of including 3D-FLS to 
gain insight into the underwater environment and to overcome the limitations of 
hydrographic survey in areas where no or partial survey was performed, and also using 
obsolete technologies that provide lower resolution and coverage than modern survey 
methods. Redundancy in sonar equipment through the use of both an echo sounder and 
3D-FLS can also serve to cross-check the performance of each individual system, 
providing a means to detect sub-nominal performance in either and eliminating a single 
point of failure that could otherwise go undetected. Further potential risk reduction is 
possible when an echo sounder is used for navigation through georeferencing to known 
bottom features and characteristics in conjunction with upgraded ENC developed in 
accordance with the IHO S-102 standard that supports high resolution environmental 
models.  
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5.5.3 Cost benefit assessment 
Reliable statistics for grounding in poorly surveyed and inadequately charted waters are 
limited at best, and it would be premature to provide definitive cost-benefits analysis. 
However, empirical observations can serve as a starting point for discussions. Using the 
model barge-tugboat combination (Anchorage, Kotzebue and Kaktovik, Alaska) the 
cost for 3D-FLS system acquisition and installation would be approximately $200,000 
U.S. Cost avoidance resulting from the prevention of one significant grounding 
accident in the Arctic may be on the order of several million dollars in terms of lives 
lost, damage to hull and equipment, loss of cargo, search and rescue, pollution 
remediation, salvage cost and the payment of fines and penalties. A valid comparison is 
the approximately $2 billion US cost for salvage of Costa Concordia that grounded 
under the exact conditions that 3D-FLS is designed to overcome.  
The use of vessels of opportunity equipped with 3D-FLS to acquire high-resolution, 
full bottom coverage hydrography as externally sourced data for navigation chart 
development can be accomplished at very little relative cost on the order of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars US. This can be compared to the multi-million dollar cost of 
acquiring and operating a fleet of hydrographic survey vessels in the vast expanses of 
the Arctic. 
Accurate costs and benefits associated with the development, implementation and 
deployment of Virtual AtoN are not yet available. It can be presumed that the cost of a 
viable virtual AtoN program for vast remote areas where physical AtoN and AIS AtoN 
are not practical would be far less than the alternatives of implementing existing aids 
strategies or having no AtoN that may result in a significant accident in the region. 
5.6 Arctic Environment Preservation through Grounding Avoidance 
Paper 4 describes research exploring technological innovation to contribute to 
substantially reducing pollution resulting from ship groundings and collisions that are 
often caused by human factors. The goal of this research is to significantly increase 
watchstander situational awareness of environmental conditions below the waterline. 
This goal is especially relevant to ship navigation in the Arctic which poses unique 
challenges requiring transit through shallow, draft-constrained coastal and archipelago 
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waters that are relatively uncharted, lacking aids to navigation, without adequate search 
and rescue facilities, and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation.  
Under Study Area 1 the contributions of 3D-FLS were examined with regard to its 
capability to survey the sea bottom and to detect hazards to navigation attached to the 
bottom and floating in the water column to aid in Arctic navigation. Study Area 3 
results considering contributions of Virtual AtoN in the Arctic are described as a means 
to extend AtoN services in the area. The significance of Virtual AtoN characteristics 
used to verify these aids are in proper position and watching properly were also 
examined in the context of the lack of surveys in this poorly charted environment. 
Human factors in terms of the potential effects of terrorism were also considered under 
Study Area 5. Factors relevant to the development of grounding avoidance strategies 
were identified and the results of human reaction times to alarms and indicators 
relevant to groundings using several case studies were provided. 
5.7 Enhanced Situational Awareness through Multi-Sensor Integration 
The development of the concept and basic functional and technological structure to 
support enhanced situational awareness is explained and discussed in Paper 5 from the 
perspective of the grounding of M/V Costa Concordia. Under Study Area 1 the 
potential contributions of 3D-FLS in alerting watchstanders of the potential for 
groundings are provided in a detailed examination of the final moments of the voyage 
just prior to grounding. Human factors considerations under Study Area 5 are also 
provided in terms of bridge alerts and alarm generation. Results of this study include 
the identification of factors where the use of simulation to accomplish testing, 
verification and validation to assimilate 3D-FLS into the integrated navigation system 
(INS) environment. This is vital to ensure systems are properly integrated and mariners 
are adequately trained prior to the introduction of the technology into widespread use 
and as IMO carriage requirements. 
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Chapter 6     Summary and Discussion 
The aims and objectives of this dissertation as stated in chapter 2 are: 
1. to investigate how safety of navigation may be enhanced in areas deficient in aids 
to navigation,  
2. to determine the means by which infrastructure may be created to deal with these 
deficiencies, and  
3. to establish how the implementation of this infrastructure may be accomplished in 
a manner that is compatible with existing and evolving standards and practices.  
This chapter summarizes and discusses the results of the research performed to 
accomplish these aims and objectives highlighting the various outcomes achieved as 
well as discussing their broader implications to enhancing maritime safety. 
6.1 Navigation enhancements to Arctic, tropical, under developed regions,  
 disaster areas and war zones 
The common denominator between the Arctic, tropical regions dominated by coral 
reefs and sensitive ecosystems, under developed regions, disaster areas and war zones is 
that all of these areas are or can be deficient in AtoN infrastructure in terms of beacons 
and buoys that are traditionally used to aid mariners in navigating their vessels. The 
reasons for this vary from environmental and economic conditions that prevent their 
adequate installation, use and maintenance; to infrastructure having been damaged or 
destroyed through natural and manmade occurrence. Also generally lacking in these 
same areas is the high-resolution bathymetry that is needed to survey the sea bottom to 
help determine where AtoN should be placed.  
An approach was taken to enhance the safety of navigation in two steps by: 
1. exploiting the capabilities of modern sensor systems that are currently available in 
the commercial marketplace but are not necessarily mandated as part of IMO 
carriage requirements for vessels under SOLAS or other regulatory accord, and 
2. extending the existing IALA Virtual AtoN concept to create an entirely new type 
of Virtual AtoN that requires no physical infrastructure whatsoever and possesses 
85 
 
new characteristics and capabilities not available through any other means. These 
Virtual AtoN may be verified as being on station and watching properly through 
automated means, and can be implemented and maintained in extreme remote 
areas regardless of weather conditions or access limitations. 
A detailed Virtual AtoN implementation framework was established that includes a 
definition specific to the use of this term in the context of this research, drawing 
distinctions between both physical AtoN and the several variations of AIS AtoN. The 
embodiments and essential elements comprising a Virtual AtoN are made in terms of 
digital apparatus and characteristics, the system(s) of Virtual AtoN that may be created, 
the methods to use and to verify their proper operation; and the functions, capabilities 
and duration of services provided. This includes the introduction of new dynamic and 
transient characteristics to supplement presently existing static AtoN characteristics, as 
well as georeferencing as a characteristic that is entirely new to AtoN.  
The definition of basic symbology and a range of suggested symbols capable of being 
used with Virtual AtoN show great similarities in comparisons to existing AIS virtual 
AtoN symbols. Sample implementations of static and dynamic Virtual AtoN featuring 
different settings and functions in real world applications are provided for future 
consideration in AtoN system design. Examples illustrate the creation and functionality 
of solely Virtual AtoN implementations as well as possible hybrid AtoN systems 
consisting of the integration of a mix of physical AtoN, AIS AtoN and/or Virtual AtoN 
marking the same waterways. 
Vessels of opportunity can transit remote areas with greater safety when equipped with 
3D-FLS to acquire high-resolution hydrographic survey data that corresponds with the 
legal standard for coastal vessel navigation in the form of ENC data in areas that are 
considered to be well surveyed and charted. Information derived from detailed analysis 
of experimental data make the case that 3D-FLS appears capable of providing the 
equivalent of a hybrid of IHO Orders of Survey 1a and 1b resolution with full sea floor 
coverage over a predetermined swath (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015).  
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Discussion points include the following: 
• The Virtual AtoN framework includes a small subset of possible AtoN 
configurations that are suitable to a limited number of real world applications. This 
subset may serve as a basis for future expansion into a comprehensive suite of 
Virtual AtoN suitable for widespread use across broad application areas.  
• Evidence is provided of measurement accuracy and repeatability to acceptable 
tolerances when compared to ENC soundings. Systematic errors were considered 
in terms of horizontal and vertical uncertainty and other factors such as vertical 
offset between the sonar transducer and the water’s surface, roll/pitch error, track 
error, tide adjustments, effect of GPS Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) 
and estimated positioning error (EPE) in determining adjusted 3D-FLS depths. No 
evidence was detected of spurious errors or random errors introduced through 
human or other causes. 
• Evidence is provided of measurement accuracy and repeatability to acceptable 
tolerances for use in georeferencing direct to ENC data originating from 3D-FLS. 
Differences in depth values caused by tide variation between predicted and actual 
as well as between actual and mean lower low water as depicted in ENC were 
considered a systematic error represented as a constant in direct measurements, and 
are not present in derivative measurements for change in bottom slope and rate of 
change in bottom slope. No evidence was detected of spurious errors or random 
errors introduced through human or other causes. 
• In all cases of 3D-FLS and single beam echo sounder measurements the speed of 
sound through the water were not measured, further contributing towards 
systematic error. One attempt to overcome this limitation is through the use of a 
normalized sound velocity of 1500 m/s recommended to the CSBWG for 
consideration at the second meeting of this group (Olex, 2016). 
6.2 Innovation and invention in ship operations 
There are two areas of innovation and invention in ship operations that pertain to the 
research results described in this dissertation. The first has to do with expanding 
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watchstander situational awareness by providing direct insight in real time into the 
environment below the waterline and ahead of the vessel to enhance the ability to detect 
hazards to navigation and respond accordingly to avert these hazards. The second 
involves the introduction of new concepts in navigation through the introduction of the 
Virtual AtoN and the additional capabilities they are able to provide. This also includes 
the ability of ships to serve as vessels of opportunity to acquire and disseminate to 
competent national authorities both hydrography data and Virtual AtoN verification 
results. 
Voyages by vessels of all tonnages are presently conducted with an appalling lack of 
situational awareness regarding the physical configuration of the sea bed forward of the 
bow. Indeed, the only direct knowledge of water depth available to the watchstander is 
typically in the form of a two or three digit number provided by an echo sounder 
measuring the distance between the keel and the bottom at some point that is likely 
amidships or astern, oftentimes hundreds of meters aft of the bow. The irony of this 
situation is that the bow may be firmly grounded on a ledge while the echo sounder 
may still be reporting hundreds of meters depth below the keel. All other information 
sources by which a watchstander may ascertain water depths are through indirect means 
by the use of a navigation chart created at some time in the past based upon an even 
earlier hydrographic survey that may have been performed years or even centuries 
before. Another source of relatively recent data that can be used for voyage planning 
and execution is the Notice to Mariners. However, this source also suffers the same 
latency problem as all other indirect sources. 
Historically, AtoN are the means by which this problem has been solved. Their 
placement along the boundaries of channels and routes known to be safe for navigation, 
and their marking of hazards to navigation to warn mariners of peril have for centuries 
greatly contributed to enhance the safety of navigation. However, AtoN do not exist in 
the Arctic and other remote regions, and are not likely to be introduced anytime in the 
near future due to lack of hydrographic surveys, the harsh environment, budgetary 
constraints and numerous other reasons. 
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One approach has been demonstrated in assessing potential vulnerabilities and risk 
through the identification of hazards likely to be encountered in vessel operations in the 
Arctic based upon existing SOLAS equipment carriage requirements. This can prompt a 
reduction of potential vulnerabilities and the lowering of risk that may occur through 
the introduction and proper use of the environmental sensing capabilities of 3D-FLS 
onto the bridge are also described. 
New capabilities have been created to assess vulnerabilities in Arctic transits through 
the examination of risk, providing tools for voyage planning. The ability to determine 
the amount of time provided to crewmembers to accomplish avoidance procedures has 
been demonstrated in response from the detection of hazards to navigation on the sea 
floor using 3D-FLS and the generation of Virtual AtoN with transient characteristics. 
Further definition of these capabilities was accomplished through the performance of 
several vessel grounding scenarios as a follow-up to the detailed analysis of the 
grounding of Costa Concordia. 
Discussion points include the following: 
• The potential to achieve “ship centricity” has been demonstrated by providing 
watchstanders on the bridge with direct visibility into the underwater environment 
using 3D-FLS. This new capability supplements the direct method of assessing 
the sea bottom by identifying depth contours using an echo sounder, and indirect 
methods of assessing the sea bottom through existing means such as navigation 
charts and Notice to Mariners. Integration into existing navigation systems is 
possible through ECDIS. 
• Further demonstrated is the ability of 3D-FLS to detect the presence of hazards to 
navigation both affixed to the bottom and suspended in the water column. 
Detection of such hazards can spur the generation of Virtual AtoN with static or 
dynamic characteristics for display on ECDIS upon examination and direction by 
competent national authority. Also, in-water hazards likely to exist for a relatively 
short period of time such as may be caused by buoys adrift, growlers, large timber 
or other objects can spur the creation of Virtual AtoN with characteristics that are 
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momentary in nature for display on ECDIS. Such capabilities can provide 
mariners with the capability to be proactive in their approach to navigation in 
reducing groundings by providing specific guidance as to the actual bottom 
configuration rather than what is believed to be the bottom configuration based 
upon navigation  chart data. The degree to which capability is effective to guide 
mariners in avoiding groundings is yet to be studied. 
• Assessment of risk has been accomplished from the perspective of having the 
advantages of new 3D-FLS capabilities for the bridge watch in providing an 
additional margin of safety as opposed to not having such capabilities as is 
currently the case in vessel navigation in poorly surveyed and charted waters. This 
approach can form the foundation for future statistical analysis to assist in 
predicting accidents based upon extrapolating vessel traffic and accident statistics 
of the region. However, there does not yet exist a database of significance related 
to vessel traffic due to the occasional and infrequent passage of vessels through 
such areas. Moreover, the application of accident statistics obtained from sources 
world-wide is not appropriate as the data is derived from a wide variety of vessels 
under varying circumstances that cannot readily be extended to Arctic traffic and 
navigation conditions.  
• The concept of using shipboard equipment assets to capture large volumes of 
hydrographic data obtained using 3D-FLS was introduced. However, it is 
emphasized that any such innovation in ship operations must be accomplished 
without interference with existing crew responsibilities or adding to crew 
workload. 
• Initial checklists created to assist in assessing vulnerabilities in overall capabilities 
required for planning Arctic voyages and resulting risk can provide a basis for 
considering 3D-FLS as an IMO carriage requirement.  
6.3 Verification of Virtual AtoN watching properly 
Determining that AtoN are on station in their correct position, and watching properly in 
best waters and showing proper characteristics is an essential part of the overall AtoN 
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verification process. This is accomplished through comparison between AtoN position 
and characteristics on navigation charts, AtoN description as represented in the Light 
List and supplemental information contained in Notices to Mariners. 
The capability for hydrographic data provided by 3D-FLS when compared with single 
beam echo sounder data to detect differences in the sea floor has been demonstrated 
that are indicative of Virtual AtoN being on station and watching properly based upon 
matching topography signatures between actual course taken and charted course. This 
confirms georeferencing capabilities to detect Virtual AtoN improperly watching or not 
watching in best waters as a result of differences in topography signatures between 
actual course taken and charted course. 
Virtual AtoN verification has also been demonstrated to automatically, and in real time, 
correlate vessel positioning information to the physical environment in helping to verify 
Virtual AtoN as being on station and watching properly. This is a new capability not 
previously available to vessels. The only existing scenario that is similar is a AIS 
virtual AtoN that may be broadcasting to a geographic position. However, in this case it 
is incumbent upon the watchstander to determine whether the AIS virtual AtoN is 
incorrect. 3D-FLS use in hydrographic survey as independently sourced data illustrates 
the potential use of vessels of opportunity to perform this role.  
A new process for deployed Virtual AtoN as well as the validation process throughout 
the entire Virtual AtoN life cycle considers the integrity of Virtual AtoN data as may be 
represented in complementary databases residing at both hydrographic and AtoN 
authorities. It also includes automation of much of this part of the verification process. 
Discussion points include the following: 
• The methods and processes identified for Virtual AtoN verification are based upon 
existing AtoN verification methods and are intended to work cohesively with 
physical and AIS AtoN verification.   
• The automation of Virtual AtoN verification may also be accomplished with 
physical and AIS AtoN with the adoption of IHO S-102 Bathymetric Surface 
Product Specification. 
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6.4 Contributions to environmental protection and preservation 
One of the essential outcomes of this research is the protection and preservation of 
fragile ecosystems as exist in the Arctic and tropical regions in areas of coral reefs and 
other critical habitat. The dynamic characteristics of Virtual AtoN may now be applied 
to rapidly designate no-entry and restricted entry zones around wildlife protection areas 
and refuges. This same concept can be applied to no-fishing and other areas on a daily 
to seasonal basis. The potential for reduction in unintentional groundings has also been 
demonstrated with potential benefits in significant reductions in loss of life, vessel and 
cargos; and pollution with the subsequent fouling of the environment and loss of 
wildlife. This includes Virtual AtoN verification providing a means to help ensure 
Virtual AtoN are on station and watching properly and to reduce the chance of accident 
resulting from AtoN failure. Sensor fusion technologies also illustrate additional 
aspects of grounding avoidance and possibly the detection of other hazards to 
navigation for which Virtual AtoN with momentary duration may be created to alert 
watchstanders to their presence.  
Discussion points include the following: 
• Analysis of groundings accidents resulted in the identification of critical elements 
in the timing and unfolding of events. One of the factors considered, Watchstander 
Response Time (to a grounding alarm), was selected at 5 seconds after initiation of 
warning. Even with the quadrupling of response time to 20 seconds and a resulting 
reduction in time to grounding of approximately 10% from 2.1 minutes to 1.9 
minutes, significant time remained to effect corrective action to avert or lessen the 
consequences of grounding 
• Vulnerability assessment and risk analysis was performed at three levels: 
- Organizational level (e.g., cognizant national authority, shipping company) 
- Workplace level (on the vessel itself), and 
- Personal level (e.g., captain, watchstander) 
Analyzing causal factors between these levels revealed the sequential relationships 
that may potentially result in accident. A key element was indicated to be the lack 
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of primary shipboard capabilities including sensors and other resources available to 
thwart mishap when lacking outside, secondary resources such as accurate 
navigation charts in well-surveyed environments and Notices to Mariners. 
6.5 Virtual AtoN implications on human factors and training 
Extensive measures have been taken to ensure Virtual AtoN conform to existing 
standards and training conventions whenever possible. The use of existing ECDIS 
symbology with minor modification may be accomplished to indicate the virtual nature 
of the AtoN. The only exceptions are in cases of new dynamic capabilities and 
momentary duration not available with existing AtoN. Likewise, the use of standard 
ECDIS symbology has been stressed in depicting hazards to navigation detected while 
making way.  
Discussion points include the following: 
• Analysis of fatigue risks in the shipping industry often point to workload 
redistribution as a means to reduce errors and incidents as part of a fatigue risk 
management system (TNO, 2008). However, redistributing additional workload on 
an already overburdened crew is not a satisfactory solution especially in light of 
ever-increasing STCW requirements. The approach taken in this research focuses 
on the display of 3D-FLS information and resulting Virtual AtoN targets using 
existing ECDIS display requirements and symbology. This eliminates the need for 
an additional display monitor dedicated to 3D-FLS on the bridge, as well as the 
need for additional crewmember training in its use. 
6.6 Regulatory contributions to Virtual AtoN establishment 
The focus of this research has been primarily aimed at national authorities cognizant of 
AtoN and hydrography, although authorities that pertain to environmental protection, 
fish and wildlife preservation and other related jurisdictions are also appropriate. It is 
these national authorities that comprise the membership of the larger, international 
organizations that establish industry standards and practices in these related disciplines.  
An example is the Coast Guard who is responsible for AtoN within the United States, 
and who is the U.S. representative to the International Maritime Organization. 
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Likewise, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for 
hydrography and chartmaking, and is the U.S. representative to the International 
Hydrographic Organization. There are in addition, many non-Governmental and 
industry organizations that are relevant to these issues. All such national organizations 
are instrumental to setting the agenda at the various general and committee meetings of 
the umbrella international organizations at which issues of vital concern are discussed 
and decisions are made as to their disposition and solution. 
Discussed throughout this research is the importance of working within the confines of 
existing standards and recommendations that are established by these organizations, a 
short summary of those referenced within this dissertation include: 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea - SOLAS. (IMO) 
• International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters - the Polar Code. (IMO) 
• S-44. Standards for Hydrographic Surveys. (IHO) 
• S-52. Specifications for Chart Content and Display Aspects of ECDIS. (IHO) 
• S-100. Universal Hydrographic data Model. (IHO) 
• S-102. Geospatial Standard for Hydrographic Data. (IHO) 
• Aids to Navigation Manual - Administration. (USCG) 
• NOS Hydrographic Surveys Specifications and Deliverables. (NOAA) 
• United States Chart No. 1; Symbols, Abbreviations and Terms used on Paper and 
Electronic Navigational Charts. (NOAA) 
• Guideline 1062, On the Establishment of AIS as an Aid to Navigation. (IALA) 
• Guideline 1081, On Virtual Aids to Navigation. (IALA) 
• Aids to Navigation Manual. (IALA) 
The concepts of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN are not addressed in any of these documents 
other than IALA 1081 that defines the concept of a Virtual AtoN but provides no 
guidance regarding implementation. The initiative to address such issues must originate 
from the national organizations which rely upon and take action based on the inputs, 
advice and needs of their constituents. Coalitions between member states must act 
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together to effect changes to carriage requirements, equipment standards and to make 
meaningful changes in these areas. 
6.7 Broader implications of these research results 
Several of the key outcomes of this research are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
6.7.1  Virtual aids to navigation 
Virtual Aids to Navigation are conceptually foreign to the mariner, who traditionally 
have relied on physical AtoN to provide much of the guidance needed for safe 
navigation. The potential configurations of Virtual AtoN and AtoN systems, alone and 
in combination with physical and AIS AtoN discussed in this dissertation provide a 
glimpse as to the possibilities associated with their adoption and use. However, these 
are just a small sampling of the true capabilities such aids may possess and of the 
services they will be able to provide in the future. These services include those 
provided directly to the mariner in terms of navigational guidance, as well as data feeds 
associated with the autonomous verification of Virtual AtoN communicated from the 
vessels to national AtoN authorities.  
6.7.2 Greater automation in shipping 
An obvious application for which Virtual AtoN are well suited includes providing 
navigational guidance to the operators of present day vessels to vessels using increasing 
levels of automation in the future. Being that the operators themselves are providing 
virtual control and direction to the vessel in an artificial reality setting, it stands to 
reason that there is no reason or requirement for physical AtoN associated with the 
operation of highly automated or even autonomous vessels. Such vessels are expected 
to transit amongst physical and AIS AtoN in coastal and harbor areas that are used for 
navigation by all vessels. However, the concept of Virtual Private AtoN (PAtoN) can 
come into play for proprietary use by only the shipping companies involved. Processes 
similar to those currently used by national authorities for PAtoN provisioning and 
deployment can be adapted for Virtual PAtoN. The advantages of such an approach 
include the ability to provision literally hundreds to thousands of Virtual PAtoN 
systems worldwide tailored to the needs of individual vessels and shipping companies, 
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and to which only those vessels and companies have access. This approach alleviates 
the crowding of harbors and waterways with multiple beacons and buoys, yet fulfills 
the exact requirements of large numbers of vessels and company, government and 
tactical military operations.  
6.7.3 3-dimensional forward looking navigation sonar 
The use of 3D-FLS should not be limited to remote and unsurveyed locations, but 
should be encouraged for use by vessels of all sizes for routine operations worldwide. 
The capability to provide increased situational awareness below the waterline ahead of 
the vessel should not be overlooked, and it is incumbent upon the masters of all such 
vessels to be knowledgeable of all aspects of the environment through which they pass 
throughout voyage planning and execution. The examples are legion of vessel 
groundings resulting from physical changes that occur due to storms and the natural 
movement of sand and sediment due to currents in well dredged and charted inlets, 
channels and passes. One notable example is the shoreline of New Jersey and the entire 
New York metropolitan region in the U.S. where, as a result of Hurricane Sandy in 
October 2012, a new inlet was created by storm action and wind and waves altered the 
shoreline and sea floor (NOAA, 2014). By November 2012 NOAA’s rapid response 
teams had many survey assets on the water in response to this storm (NCS, 2014). 
NOAA was funded in 2013 to begin the task of redoing the coastal elevation models for 
the entire area. During the interim period, many vessels passed along the coast with 
little direct knowledge of the sea floor topography and the hazards to navigation that 
included buildings, vehicles and debris washed into the sea that existed in their path 
other than the two or three-digit depth indication provided by the echo sounder. 
6.7.4 Crowd sourcing of hydrographic data 
Rear Admiral G. S. Ritchie, the President of the Directing Committee of the 
International Hydrographic Bureau, in his paper noted three possible technical 
revolutions in hydrography with the introduction of these advances (Ritchie, 1982): 
1. Echo-sounding after World War I, 
2. Electronic positioning after World War II, and 
3. Multibeam swath sounding in the 1960s 
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The fourth possible technical revolution may very well entail the introduction of crowd-
sourcing techniques involving the use of many hundreds to thousands of vessels of 
opportunity equipped with a variety of equipment ranging from simple echo sounders, 
multibeam echo sounders and 3D-FLS in an unprecedented attempt to document the 
vast expanses of the world’s oceans, seas and littoral waters. Such an approach may 
bear the greatest fruit in the Arctic. Vessel traffic is increasing in the region in 
synchronization with the introduction of 3D-FLS to aid vessels in safely navigating 
poorly charted waters. The establishment of crowd-sourcing initiatives such as the IHO 
CSBWG also has the potential to capture and make use of this high-resolution data to 
supplement official hydrographic surveys and aid in chart making. The future 
availability of broadband Internet access worldwide, including the Arctic using 
terrestrial and satellite services will accelerate the transfer of terabytes of data for use in 
this effort. 
There are three challenges that must be addressed in the future to devise an effective 
solution to this issue: 
• Equipping a fleet of vessels of opportunity with sufficient size and range to provide 
significant and useful data collections.
• 
 This may be accomplished through joint 
industry, government and IMO initiatives to enhance safety of navigation by 
encouraging the installation and use of 3D-FLS navigation sonars in remote and 
poorly charted regions. 
The distribution of extremely large volumes of data from remote data gathering 
sources to crowd sourced data processing destinations.
• 
 Several commercial firms 
that include Google (Mountain View, CA, USA) OneWeb (Arlington, VA USA) 
SpaceX (Hawthorne, CA USA) and Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES, 
Luxemborg) have initiated projects dedicated to providing worldwide broadband 
Internet access within the next several years. 
Data reliability and validity checking to ensure correctness. Large scale and big data 
analytics utilizing trusted source criteria in conjunction with IHO data quality 
monitoring functions will be needed to ensure data quality assurance. Issues 
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pertaining to the user of tide and sound speed uncertainties in determining TVU 
must still be addressed. 
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Chapter 7     Conclusions 
7.1 Findings  
The findings of this research indicate the following: 
• A means to provision Virtual AtoN without requiring any corresponding physical 
presence to remote locations and hostile environments has been created that can 
overcome the limitations of physical AtoN, and is verifiable as being in a state of 
“watching properly” as determined by being in its assigned position and 
exhibiting the correct characteristics. This is a new navigational capability which 
presently does not exist in the maritime domain that can provide greatly needed 
infrastructure in the Arctic as well as in remote tropical regions where the 
placement of sinkers to moor physical AtoN is hampered by live coral reefs. 
Furthermore, the method created to verify Virtual AtoN provides resilience to 
GNSS and AIS spoofing and denial of service attacks to which existing physical 
and AIS virtual AtoN are susceptible.  
• The initial version of a Virtual AtoN resulting from this research provides a 
foundation for experimental implementations in a suitable environment that may 
be developed, tested and evaluated for mariner use.  
• Further findings indicate that, given proper hydrographic survey, the provisioning 
of Virtual AtoN may be accomplished alone, or in combination with physical 
AtoN and/or AIS AtoN to mark waterways and increase the safety of navigation 
where AtoN do not presently exist.  
• 3D-FLS can accurately, repeatedly and at high resolution perform measurements 
over the sea floor that approximate soundings as represented in ENC data that is 
the legal standard for coastal vessel navigation.  
• The hydrographic information provided by 3D-FLS appears to be of sufficient 
resolution and accuracy to facilitate Virtual AtoN verification of position and 
watching in best waters determination. This finding makes it possible to 
accomplish this on an automated basis by all vessels using ENC and equipped 
with an echo sounder during the normal course of operation. Such a capability has 
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significant implications in terms of the design of integrated navigation systems in 
terms of the implementation of new alarms, the criteria by which these alarms are 
activated and the training of crewmembers in how to react and what procedures 
are to be followed in the event of alarm activation.  
A means to report such information to competent national authority responsible 
for action in resolving deficiencies in Virtual AtoN deployment must be 
developed. 
• A method to assess the viability of large-scale 3D-FLS data collection from 
vessels of opportunity as a means to supplement responsible authority resources 
in the crowdsourcing of hydrographic data for survey and the development of 
navigation charts was created. 
• Capabilities to detect hazards to navigation suspended within the water column 
that are not attached to the bottom were evidenced by 3D-FLS detection of buoys 
in open water. 
• Virtual AtoN can provide new capabilities to actively, rapidly and dynamically 
designate areas and zones to protect specific environmental habitat and wildlife 
populations and that can be displayed to mariners on ECDIS. 
• The capability to passively utilize Virtual AtoN capabilities and automated 
processes without requiring crewmember intervention or increasing crew 
workload can further enhance environmental protection and preservation. 
• Coordination between national authorities for fish and wildlife preservation, park 
services, hydrography and AtoN are essential to secure the greatest benefit from 
Virtual AtoN capabilities described. 
• The reduction of risk in the world’s frontier is greatly enhanced through 
introduction of new technologies to pioneer innovative approaches towards 
enhancing Arctic infrastructure. The use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN are two 
technologies for which the Arctic is perfectly suited as a laboratory and testbed.  
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7.2 Recommendations to stakeholders 
• The concept of truly virtual aids to navigation that require no physical 
infrastructure is unique and unorthodox in many respects. National authorities 
must retain cognizance over AtoN system design and provisioning processes, yet 
the real-time nature of Virtual AtoN of momentary duration is not amenable to the 
long timeframes that presently exist in the AtoN development life cycle. Further 
research and prototype implementations are required to adequately test and ensure 
all aspects of Virtual AtoN in their described implementations are verifiable and 
supportable. Additional research is required to integrate Virtual AtoN into 
existing AtoN development and provisioning systems.  
• The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code) 
should reconsider their rejection of mandating use of forward-looking sonar and 
amend to specify 3D-FLS as a mandatory carriage requirement for vessels while 
sailing in Arctic waters (IMO SDC 1). Absent this, acknowledgment of 3D-FLS 
as the preferred implementation of the requirement for a second echo sounder as 
currently specified in the Code (MSC.385(94)). 
• Further research is required to conclusively determine the usefulness, 
effectiveness and limitations of 3D-FLS as an independent source of hydrographic 
data as compared to multibeam sonar.  
• Coordination must exist between national hydrographic and AtoN authorities. 
Post-processing of data to enhance 3D-FLS measurement accuracy by integrating 
speed of sound and other factors need to be thoroughly investigated, along with 
new sensor designs for sound speed measurement that may be integrated with 3D-
FLS systems. The timing and evolution of new hydrographic standards by which 
ENC are created is well aligned with innovation in georeferencing techniques by 
which navigation may be accomplished, and the performance of navigation 
systems may be verified. Finally, the development of new tools by which 
mariners can determine the depths of water ahead of the bow to fulfill 
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requirements to maintain an effective watch can also serve to improve self-
reliance in this demanding environment.   
• The IMO eNavigation initiative, and any follow-on initiatives, should provide for 
a means to integrate new technologies beyond those currently pursued for 
consideration as part of their inquiries. 
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Vessel traffic in the Arctic is expanding in volume both within and transiting the region, yet
the infrastructure necessary to support modern ship navigation is lacking. This includes aids
to navigation such as buoys and beacons that can be difficult to place and maintain in this
hostile environment that stretches across vast distances. The results of research are described
which determine whether virtual electronic Aids to Navigation (eAtoN) existing entirely as
digital information objects can overcome the practical limitations of physical aids to naviga-
tion (AtoN) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) radio eAtoN. Capabilities unique to
virtual eAtoN that are not available using either physical or AIS radio technologies are also
examined including dynamic and real time properties and immunity to Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) and AIS spoofing, aliasing, denial of service attacks and service
outages. Conclusions are provided describing potential methods of deployment based upon
similar concepts already in use.
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1. INTRODUCTION. The seascape is changing in terms of beacons used as short
range Aids to Navigation (AtoN) to provide regulatory guidance and information to
vessels. Their traditional role to help navigators determine their position, follow a
safe course and avoid dangers and obstructions remains unchanged. However, the
methods used for implementation and presentation to navigators and watchstanders
on the bridges of vessels are evolving and expanding using new technologies. The
results are awider range of more capable AtoN that can now be deployed in more loca-
tions to supplement existing AtoN, as well as to regions where environmental factors
and remoteness have in the past prevented AtoN use. Instrumental to this change is the
concept of virtual electronic AtoN (eAtoN) presently implemented using Automatic
Identification System (AIS) radio technology viewable on the bridge where eAtoN
can be projected to locations where no physical AtoN exists. These may also be
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included within Electronic Navigation Charts (ENC) and displayed using Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS).
The nature and outcome of new research is described focusing on the creation of
truly virtual eAtoN that require no physical infrastructure whatsoever and are
intended for use where physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN are impractical. This includes
the Arctic where ice can hole and sweep away buoys from their intended locations, the
tropics where sinkers cannot be placed on ecologically sensitive coral reefs, and other
areas where navigational infrastructure does not exist or has been destroyed due to war
or natural disaster. This concept is more than simply placing a symbol on a chart as it
includes high-resolution hydrographic and geospatial data correlation of the physical
environment to virtual eAtoN characteristics essential to their operation. This physical
data is also used to verify eAtoN are watching properly, defined by the US Coast
Guard as, “an aid to navigation on its assigned position exhibiting the advertised char-
acteristics in all respects” (USCG, 2005a). The described implementation can over-
come many vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and AIS,
technologies essential to modern vessel navigation.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR VIRTUAL eAtoN. A marine AtoN is a device or
system external to vessels that is designed and operated to enhance the safe and effi-
cient navigation of vessels and/or vessel traffic (IALA, 2014a). There are limitations
to the present AtoN system that impede expansion to geographic regions which are ex-
periencing significant growth in marine traffic yet are highly remote and ecologically
fragile. In the United States this includes thousands of square miles in the Arctic
encompassing the northern slope of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, tropical regions
spanning the Hawaiian Islands to Midway Atoll and other US territories. Figure 1
(a) illustrates the volume and transit patterns of vessel traffic along a portion of
Alaska’s northern slope based upon ships using AIS to transmit their position and
other information (NOAA, 2015). These same areas are poorly charted, if they are
charted at all. According to the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Arctic is severely deficient in many capabilities extended
to the rest of the nation and large gaps exist in the information it does have illustrated
by empty white space on nautical charts of the region (NOAA, 2011; 2013). This is
shown in Figure 1(b) where empty white space is interrupted occasionally by track
lines and spot soundings that are often many miles apart.
The scale of these charts is 1:700,000, therefore the soundings appear inordinately
large compared to the actual geographic areas represented. According to the U.S.
Coast Guard, a situation to be avoided unless specifically warranted by unusual cir-
cumstances is the establishment of AtoN in areas not properly charted or where
they would invite the inexperienced to attempt a passage which would still be danger-
ous in spite of the AtoN (USCG, 2005b). The phrase “unusual circumstances” can be
applied directly to the Arctic, where vessel traffic is increasing and traditional AtoN
systems are inadequate and not practical. Virtual eAtoN can overcome many limita-
tions that afflict physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in these remote and harsh locations. A
significant need can be fulfilled using eAtoN for vessels to transit safely and efficiently
and avoid unintentional groundings, obstructions and hazards to navigation. The
problem of hydrographic survey insufficiency in much of the region can be solved
using 3-Dimensional Forward Looking Sonar (3D-FLS) to assist vessels of
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opportunity to safely navigate uncharted waters while simultaneously capturing
high-resolution, full bottom coverage swaths of sonar data that can assist in the
development of nautical charts.
3. AIDS TO NAVIGATION: AN OVERVIEW. AtoN systems are intended to fa-
cilitate safe and efficient movement of vessels through a waterway. Their responsible
provisioning requires that systems be designed to meet the minimum requirements
for safe and expeditious navigation through special waters in accordance with the
type and volume of traffic and the degree of risk. Requirements will change due to
revised circumstances, the introduction of new technologies and increased demands
by crews, vessels and operations. The means to fulfill new requirements must also
change through the use of modern techniques, new tools and implementation method-
ologies in the analysis of sites, needs, simulation, and operations. In assessing modern
AtoN system requirements, three primary elements illustrated in Figure 2 must be
considered in terms of system functions, capabilities and the duration of the services
provided by AtoN.
3.1. Functions. The traditional functions accorded to mariners by AtoN have
been manifest as physical beacons and buoys whose functions based upon colour,
Figure 1. Comparison of AIS tracking of vessel volume and transit routes to official nautical charts
of the northern slope of Alaska, US.(a) (top) AIS vessel tracking across the Chuckchi and Beaufort
Seas. (source: NOAA, 2015). (b) (bottom) Mosaic of NOAA nautical charts 16004 and 16005
illustrating large areas of unsurveyed bottom.
3VIRTUAL ELECTRONIC AIDS TO NAVIGATION
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0373463316000527
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 151.225.111.30, on 10 Oct 2016 at 16:03:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
shape, topmarks and other characteristics have explicit meaning in the context of their
use. Their placement within an overall AtoN system is used to denote tracks, routes,
areas and limits implemented across the entire waterway using a systematic approach.
Emulation of these same functions can be accomplished using AIS radio-based eAtoN
and virtual eAtoN to supplement physical AtoN. They may also be used in their stead
when the deployment of physical AtoN or AIS eAtoN is difficult or impossible.
However, both AIS and virtual eAtoN can provide additional capability to facilitate
the electronic display of lines and symbols that represent areas, routes, tracks and
limits directly on ECDIS without having to emulate the physical AtoN that are typic-
ally used to denote these functions.
3.2. Capabilities. Historically the capabilities for implementing AtoN functions
have been viewed from a static point of view where, upon completion of a waterway
design, physical AtoN are deployed to required locations. The ability to provide
dynamic AtoN capabilities where their characteristics can change based upon a func-
tion of time and other factors has only recently been accomplished using AIS radio-
based eAtoN broadcasting area special messages. One example is their use to broad-
cast race boundary lines that appear on spectators’ electronic charts marking a
safety zone during the 2013 America’s Cup races in San Francisco (Queeney, 2013).
Exploration of AIS dynamic operational information from both ship and shore instal-
lations can lead to further enhancement of AIS eAtoN capabilities. Real time reporting
capabilities are inherent in the design of physical AtoN by virtue of their presence in
the environment at the time they are viewed. Similar capabilities can exist using AIS
eAtoN to report the position of sensor arrays and other tows. Virtual eAtoN can
also be used to display in real time underwater hazards to navigation detected using
3D-FLS.
3.3. Duration. The use of physical beacons and marks continues to be the pre-
ferred method of physical AtoN deployment for channels, routes and other locations.
Changes are made primarily resulting from experience and maintenance issues as they
arise and not based upon new design and implementation methods. AIS eAtoN can
also be used to permanently mark features that are difficult to mark using physical
AtoN such as the Isolated Danger mark located on Tarapunga Rock in Doubtful
Sound near the South Island of New Zealand (Marinetraffic VIRT, 2016). Virtual
eAtoN can also perform the temporary marking of wrecks and other features in addition
to marking transient features that have very short or momentary significance such as a
shipping container that is adrift, growler or whale directly in the path of the vessel.
Figure 2. Aids to Navigation (AtoN) elements pertinent to safety of navigation.
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4. eAtoN IMPLEMENTATIONS. A beacon is defined by the International
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) as
“a fixed artificial navigation mark” that can be recognised by its shape, colour,
pattern, topmark or light character, or a combination of these (IALA, 2014b).
Beacons are realised in the IALA Maritime Buoyage System (MBS) using piles or
buoys as Lateral Marks, Cardinal Marks, Isolated Danger Marks, Safe Water
Marks, Emergency Wreck Marking Buoys and Other Marks (IALA, 2014c). They
are used to mark a landfall position, obstruction, danger or area; indicate lateral
limits of a channel and navigable waterway and turning points or junctions, bearings
or lines of position. The methods described using the IALA Region BMBS applicable
to the Americas, Japan, Korea and the Philippines also apply to the IALA Region A
MBS (IALA, 2014d).
4.1. AIS eAtoN. The eAtoN concept has recently been introduced using AIS
radio technology to emulate the characteristics of physical AtoN using their electronic
equivalents. Their capabilities for rapid deployment and update have proved very
useful in operational situations. AIS eAtoN may or may not be present at the deployed
location, depending upon their method of implementation which includes the follow-
ing (IALA, 2008):
. Real: AIS signal broadcasts originate from a physical AtoN,
. Synthetic: AIS signals originate from a remote AIS base station and are broadcast
to a location where a physical AtoN exists, and
. Virtual: AIS signals originate from a remote AIS base station and are broadcast to
a location where no physical AtoN exists.
Infrastructure to support Very High Frequency (VHF) transmitters, receivers, power
and health monitoring must be present at a suitable location in the local environment
within line-of-sight to the AIS eAtoN deployment location due to radio range limita-
tions. This requirement for physical infrastructure limits their deployment to accessible
regions where personnel and vessels to support the installation and maintenance of
these aids are available. Hundreds of locations exist worldwide where AIS eAtoN
are currently deployed, with the vast majority being Real and Synthetic aids. Their
capability to emulate physical AtoN can support new functionality that is not possible
with physical AtoN. Using the symbols shown in Figure 3 charts currently produced by
NOAA with AIS eAtoN present within ENC are displayed on ECDIS (NOAA,
2013b). A second line in this table has been added to suggest possible symbols for
(non-AIS) virtual AtoN display on ECDIS omitting the magenta radio station circle
and text for AIS. Not all systems are presently equipped to display many of the
symbols currently identified for ECDIS use. Introduction of an extended symbol set
into new ECDIS systems will begin in 2017 and continue after this date for older
Figure 3. Present AIS virtual eAtoN symbols with suggested non-AIS virtual eAtoN symbols.
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systems. Symbols similar to those shown in Figure 3 are also contained in raster and
printed charts to depict virtual AtoN.
AIS eAtoN have been tested to mark the entrance to a Traffic Separation
Scheme (TSS), provide emergency wreck and obstruction markings, identify waypoints
and turning points, supplement existing physical AtoN, mark bridge abutments and
offshore structures alone and in groups to make them more visible. Examples of
wreck marking include a sunken former Russian Whiskey class submarine off
Denmark in February 2007 and the cargo vessel Omar N that capsized in the Baltic
Sea in October 2007 (FRV, 2009).
In 2008 AIS eAtoNwere used to aid vessels on the approaches to the southern end of
Drogden Channel between Denmark and Sweden. In 2014 the US Coast Guard began
testing synthetic and virtual AIS eAtoN to mark reporting points in the offshore TSS
approaches to San Francisco as shown in Figure 4. They are also used to mark the
bridge towers to better alert mariners of their presence on the western span of the
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge as shown in Figure 5 (USCG, 2014). Many add-
itional AIS eAtoN have been deployed along both coasts, in the Great Lakes and in the
interior along portions of the western rivers within the US (Lewald, 2015).
4.2. Virtual eAtoN. The virtual eAtoN concept is enhanced beyond AIS eAtoN
technology as computer-generated and existing entirely as a digital data object with no
corresponding presence in the physical environment required for implementation.
Virtual eAtoN also include expanded functional elements beyond AIS eAtoN to
support static, dynamic and real time elements with permanent, temporary and tran-
sient durations. The basic definition of a virtual aid to navigation is (IALA, 2010):
“A virtual aid to navigation (Virtual AtoN) does not physically exist but is a digital
information object promulgated by an authorised service provider that can be presented on
navigational systems”,
Figure 4. AIS AtoN Marking the Entrance and Exit from the San Francisco Traffic Separation
Scheme. Source: NOAA Chart 18645
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where a digital information object is further defined as:
“An item or group of items, regardless of type or format that a computer can address or ma-
nipulate as a single object that will inform the user as to the characteristic of a Virtual AtoN”.
This definition is further amplified to describe Virtual AtoN use in informing mar-
iners about dangers to navigation, safe waterways, caution and avoidance areas as may
be represented by a line, area, position or other form displayed graphically without
providing specific implementation mechanisms. Recommendations provided for the
provisioning of Virtual AtoN and their deployment under the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) e-Navigation initiative have thus far been limited to
AIS eAtoN that use VHF radio technology (IALA, 2011; NCSR, 2014).
The characteristics and benefits of virtual eAtoN have been explored byWright and
Baldauf (2014) in research designed to enhance the safety of navigation for vessels in
regions that are uncharted or poorly charted. Each of these types of AtoN has their
unique functions, characteristics and associated advantages and disadvantages that de-
termine how and where they may be deployed and how they are used by mariners.
4.2.1. Functions. Virtual eAtoN can provide the same beacon functions as AIS
eAtoN along with additional functionalities pertaining to areas and limits, and
tracks and routes that are not possible with either physical AtoN or AIS eAtoN.
4.2.1.1. Beacons and Buoys. Figure 6 illustrates the placement of virtual eAtoN
lateral marks at the entrance to and along a channel that is particularly difficult to
mark with physical AtoN in Kotzebue, Alaska, US.
Located 26 miles inside the Arctic Circle, much of the area is not surveyed and there
are constantly changing sandbars along the approaches. A note to this effect is posted
on the nautical chart along with advice to seek local knowledge when using this route
Figure 5. AIS AtoN Marking Bridge Towers on the San Francisco-Oakland Bridge.
Source: NOAA Chart 18645
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that spans several miles from clear water to Kotzebue Harbor. Physical AtoN are
placed each season along this route but are not marked on charts due to their
varying positions. This location provides circumstances advantageous to determining
the viability of virtual eAtoN as it represents a transitional point where VHF radio
coverage is also suitable for AIS eAtoN operation. This makes it useful to evaluate
the integration and performance of AIS eAtoN and virtual eAtoN. The route is also
sufficiently travelled to offer useful experience and feedback in their operation from
numerous vessels.
A prime location for the use of virtual eAtoN is remote and not easily accessible for
AtoN installation and maintenance and exhibits one or more hazards to navigation
that, if left unmarked, may result in significant risk to life, property and the environ-
ment. One such example is shown in Figure 7 along a possible Bering Strait TSS pro-
viding northbound and southbound traffic lanes through the narrow passage around
Big Diomede Island in Russia and Little Diomede Island in Alaska, US (MarEx,
2015). A hazard to navigation exists as Fairway Rock to the south and east of Little
Diomede Island.
Virtual eAtoN placed at entrance and exit positions along the TSS and along the
transit path centreline or at lateral positions would define the route. These could be
mixed with AIS eAtoN along the lanes of the TSS using VHF transmitters located
on Big Diomede and Little Diomede Islands respectively, with one additional AIS
eAtoN transmitting from Fairway Rock also possible. This figure depicts the use of
virtual eAtoN in combination with AIS eAtoN special purpose TSS buoys marking
the port and starboard sides of the traffic lanes separated by the two islands along
with radio reporting points at the ends of each lane.
Marking of hazards to navigation that heretofore has been difficult or impossible
due to the harsh environment and lack of accessibility may now be accomplished.
This includes sites such as the previously discovered but uncharted ledge in Resolute
Bay, Canada upon which MV Clipper Adventurer grounded in 2006 (TSB, 2012). In
this respect it might be reasonable to further integrate and investigate the potential
of virtual eAtoN for enhanced route, position or direct grounding warnings or alarms.
4.2.1.2. Tracks and Routes. In addition to virtual eAtoN temporarily marking
beacons, areas and limits, their use can be advantageous to mark tracks and routes
in cases where knowledge of previous recent transits can directly contribute to increas-
ing the safety of navigation. One such example is the track of an icebreaker where the
Figure 6. Portion of NOAA Chart 16161 for Kotzebue Harbour, Alaska, US depicting the
placement of non-AIS virtual eAtoN where physical AtoN are normally not shown.
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route of transit may provide guidance to where ice may be substantially thinner and
more suitable for navigation. In this case it is likely the best representation would
take the form of a non-regulated recommended track not based on fixed or virtual
marks. Virtual eAtoN encoded characteristics represented by this track should
include vessel name and time of most recent transit, an expiration date and time
when the virtual eAtoN is no longer valid, heading information and possibly the shoal-
est depth value along a track as illustrated in Figure 8. Should previous hydrographic
survey data exist along the route of transit this information would already be included
in the ENC. However, when depths in the track are not known due to lack of survey a
reported shoalest depth using single-beam echo sounder measurements from the ice-
breaker may be encoded but identified as being unreliable.
4.2.1.3. Areas and Limits. Virtual eAtoN may also be used to mark specific geo-
graphic areas such as the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands groundfish fishery desig-
nated conservation areas and protection zones. The availability of such functionality
Figure 7. Portion of NOAA Chart 16220 showing a possible Bering Strait TSS and placement of
both AIS and virtual eAtoN.
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is valuable where conservation measures requires rapid action to temporarily and spa-
tially limit fishing efforts, especially in relation to closures around areas involving
marine mammals. One such implementation is shown in Figure 9(a), where transit
of the area is normally allowed between 1 April and 15 August with a permit.
During times when walrus activity is high it may be necessary to restrict entry with
little advance notice during the normally open to transit period as shown in
Figure 9(b) (FMP, 2015). This may be accomplished using virtual eAtoN depicting
area and limit boundaries without having to emulate one or more buoys to achieve
this same purpose. These boundaries may also rapidly expand and contract as local
needs dictate. Such functions can be used to place no-entry zones and advisory
areas near to coral reefs and other ecologically sensitive areas, disaster areas, race
and other events that require time and spatial restrictions. This applies to other restric-
tions that pertain to offshore wind farms, fishing, anchoring and diving as well as
marking bird and seal sanctuaries and marine parks.
Virtual eAtoN use in poorly surveyed regions where physical and AIS eAtoN are
not practical can also enhance the safety of navigation where charting data is inad-
equate or does not exist at all resulting in blank white spaces on nautical charts.
The use of aids to navigation in such areas is greatly restricted since the knowledge
of where to place them is deficient due to lack of soundings. To help solve this
Figure 8. Portion of NOAA chart 16206 depicting virtual eAtoN icebreaker trackon approaches to
Nome, Alaska.
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problem research was performed using 3D-FLS for navigating poorly surveyed regions
to avoid unintentional groundings (Wright and Baldauf, 2015a). Further research
involved assessing the usefulness, resolution and accuracy of 3D-FLS to supplement
hydrographic survey resources as externally sourced data (Wright and Zimmerman,
2015). The findings indicate that it is possible to perform examination with full
bottom coverage using 3D-FLS to obtain an accurate characterisation of the sea
floor, useful for nautical chart development and virtual eAtoN placement. Figure 10
provides an example of how multiple special purpose virtual eAtoN beacons may be
placed along a track with a swath of sonar datawhere neither soundings nor AtoN pre-
viously existed, itself a virtual eAtoN representing an area. This data can be obtained
from a vessel of opportunity equipped with 3D-FLS and used to define a route in an
uncharted area.
4.2.2. Capabilities. Beyond the functions virtual eAtoN are able to provide in
terms of use are the capabilities through which these functions may be delivered and
observed on the bridge of the vessel while underway. This can also extend to shore-
based vessel traffic service operators (including fleet operation centre operators),
vessel owners and others involved in supervising vessel activity. Many of these capabil-
ities are new, having become possible due to detailed hydrography data integrated
within the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) S-100 framework standard
Universal Hydrographic Data Model and specifically the draft S-102 High Definition
Gridded Bathymetry standard that supports development of new navigation products
not possible under the S-57 and previous standards (S-102, 2012).
4.2.2.1. Dynamic Virtual eAtoN Positioning for Marking Coaxial Waterways.
One example of new capability is dynamically repositioning virtual eAtoN considering
vessel physical and performance characteristics rather than to maintain fixed geo-
graphic positions regardless of vessel size and draft requirements. This can be used
to mark a deep draft channel within a wider waterway, a portion of which is illustrated
Figure 9. Portion of NOAA Chart 16315, Bristol Bay, Alaska depicting the Round Island virtual
eAtoN walrus protection area: transit permit active and inactive.
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in Figures 11(a) and 11(b), and is different from related ECDIS capabilities as the phys-
ical bottom configuration characteristics of the virtual eAtoN existing within ENC are
used together with vessel draft parameters and live single-beam echo sounder measure-
ments to determine lateral spacing requirements for channel width. This is based upon
detailed hydrographic surface topography model data and is accomplished in real time
considering bottom depths and the forward motion of the vessel. Here it is shown that
the bottom configuration offers a much broader geographic area for the safe naviga-
tion of a vessel with a two metre draft compared to a vessel with a four metre draft
where the vessels travel at the same speed.
4.2.2.2. Single and Group Virtual eAtoN. An additional layer of abstraction in
the overall AtoN scheme has been added with AIS virtual eAtoN that may be
placed on physical AtoN to supplement their characteristics, and at locations other
than AtoN to project AtoN characteristics to locations where no AtoN exist at all.
The introduction of completely virtual eAtoN provides an opportunity to further
extend AtoN capabilities to create a “group” virtual eAtoN representing a “system
of systems” that together provides capabilities beyond the sum of the individual
virtual eAtoN components is comprised. For example, the Kotzebue channel shown
Figure 10. Portion of NOAA chart 16723, Controller Bay, Alaska, US depicting virtual eAtoN
special purpose buoys and soundings swath from 3D forward-looking sonar equipped vessel.
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in Figure 6 and the possible configuration of a Bering Strait TSS shown in Figure 7 can
support new capabilities by linking individual virtual eAtoN characteristics when ac-
companied by detailed hydrographic surface model data in an ENC. This can include
automatic determination of changes and shifting of bottom contours resulting from
storm action and other causes by comparing the ENC terrain model data with live
echo sounder measurements while underway. This same process could be used to
detect whether AtoN (physical, AIS or virtual) are on station and watching properly
in good water. Furthermore, this technique would rapidly detect poor GNSS availabil-
ity due to atmospheric interference, spoofing or a denial of service attack taking place
that results in the apparent vessel position being different from the actual vessel pos-
ition based upon differences in bottom topography.
4.2.2.3. Real-time Hazard to Navigation Detection. Virtual eAtoN can be used to
contribute new alarms and methods to notify in real time watchstanders on the bridge
Figure 11. Portion of NOAA chart 12283, Annapolis, Maryland, US depicting mix of fixed
position AIS eAtoN and dynamic positioning of virtual eAtoN to mark coaxial waterways.
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of the detection of uncharted hazards to navigation when integrated with 3D-FLS ad-
equate to support this capability. This includes shoals, ledges and rocks, as well as float-
ing hazards and those suspended in the water column in the path of transit based upon
research performed by Wright and Baldauf (2015b). Notable case studies were pre-
sented illustrating how MVs Clipper Adventurer, Exxon Valdez, Rena and Costa
Concordia could have been provided 1·7 to 2 minutes advance warning of grounding
had 3D-FLS been installed and operational. This would have also been useful for
a situation such as was encountered by Carnival’s Ecstasy in April 2010 which
responded in very short time to miss a large, partially submerged data buoy adrift in
the Gulf of Mexico (Yanchudas, 2010).
The detection of such hazards to navigation can be accomplished using algorithms
already available within 3D-FLS. However, their display to watchstanders must
conform to existing human-machine interface conventions and standards. Hazards
to navigation may be displayed on ECDIS by placing an isolated danger mark
shown in Figure 3 directly at one or more positions where contact was made using
3D-FLS as illustrated in Figure 12. The background shown within this figure corre-
sponds to many poorly charted and uncharted locations in the Arctic where ECDIS
is essentially blank since the underlying ENC contains no or sparse sounding informa-
tion. The isolated danger marks shown in this figure represent a hazard to navigation
detected in real time while making way and within the range of the 3D-FLS providing
a significant acoustic target when compared to surrounding waters. These targets can
represent a shipping container, growler, whale or other target. A transient virtual
eAtoN is something that is neither permanent nor temporary in nature, and is likely
to exist only momentarily until the hazard passes. Such an approach is wholly unortho-
dox in terms of the present AtoN development lifecycle as the mark has not been pro-
mulgated by a competent authority. However, consideration by a competent national
authority of the processes that make such capabilities possible through the integration
of new technologies must be considered, especially when risk is heightened while tran-
siting unknown waters.
Figure 12. Live display of real time virtual eAtoN isolated danger mark using 3D-FLS integrated
with ECDIS.
14 R. GLENN WRIGHT AND MICHAEL BALDAUF
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0373463316000527
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 151.225.111.30, on 10 Oct 2016 at 16:03:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
4.2.3. Virtual eAtoN Adoption. Examples of virtual eAtoN realised as beacons,
areas and limits, and tracks and zones are provided to illustrate functions that are pos-
sible. The capabilities described to employ these functions are also illustrative, as are
the specific characteristics that have been described for implementation.
Determination of virtual eAtoN adoption for future test, evaluation and/or operation-
al use must be made by the competent national authority after the development and
validation of the processes required to assure their performance and technical viability
have themselves been validated.
4.2.4. IHO S-100 Framework Standard. A key component of virtual eAtoN im-
plementation includes high resolution three-dimensional digital terrain model data of
the sea bottom incorporated into ENC represented as IHO S-102 High-Definition
Gridded Bathymetry featuring level 1 (harbour) 0·02° x 0·02° grid sizes and a final
surface grid resolution of 0·0001° or approximately 8 metres (Journault et al., 2012).
Sufficient resolution exists within these data to perform the verification of virtual
eAtoN physical characteristics using the metrics described and illustrated by Wright
and Baldauf (2015c). Similar resolution available from 3D-FLS data as a source for
hydrographic survey data from vessels of opportunity in inadequately surveyed areas
can accelerate the deployment of virtual eAtoN (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015).
Issues yet to be resolved include the transport architecture that will be used to
convey ENC from shore to on board vessels, cyber security enhancements needed to
ensure trust in data sources, training in the use of this infrastructure and the range
of new products to be delivered. One issue still to be addressed is the orientation of
gridded data with the meridians and parallels at the higher latitudes of the Arctic.
5. CONCLUSIONS. The ability of virtual eAtoN to emulate beacons and buoys,
tracks and routes, areas and limits and other functions with minimal investment and
recurring cost for physical assets and support infrastructure is very appealing to sup-
plement physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in the many inaccessible, remote and ecologic-
ally sensitive regions of the world. The trend of increasing budget constraints for AtoN
research, development, deployment and maintenance is contrasted with the rise in
vessel traffic in regions that are the least amenable to support such traffic. These
regions are the least surveyed, most remote, devoid of AtoN infrastructure, lacking
safe harbours and adequate search and rescue capabilities, and among the most eco-
logically fragile on the planet.
Results of this research reported to date indicate a realistic potential for the use of
virtual eAtoN, especially in locations and regions where traditional AtoN are not prac-
tical or feasible. Evidence has been presented to indicate the proposed approach pro-
vides advantages over physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in overcoming the vulnerabilities
and limitations of GNSS and AIS technology. New functions and capabilities available
using virtual eAtoN integrated with 3D-FLS can provide significant enhancements to
safety of navigation especially in regions that are not surveyed and remain uncharted
such as the Arctic. An initial starting point may include the adaptation of existing 3D-
FLS in-water hazard and obstruction detection algorithms to produce standard
ECDIS symbology. Also, the Polar Code should be amended to mandate 3D-FLS
as an echo-sounding device having forward-looking capabilities as a vessel carriage re-
quirement in the Arctic (MSC.385(94), 2014). Alternatively, 3D-FLS should qualify as
one of the two already required independent echo-sounding devices.
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The concepts involved have already been proven in the aviation industry, where air-
craft plying the airways at speeds orders of magnitude faster than vessels at sea routine-
ly navigate in safety. All airborne AtoN are virtual. There is not one physical AtoN
suspended in the air to help guide aircraft to their destinations. The described imple-
mentation of maritime virtual eAtoN is firmly grounded in high-resolution geodetic
data traceable directly to the local environment in which they are deployed. Such char-
acteristics provide the means by which assurance of their correct implementation and
watching properly can be established and continuously monitored. These concepts can
be extended to existing physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN, enhancing overall confidence
in short-range AtoN performance throughout the maritime industry.
6. NOTE. The symbols shown in Figures 3 through 12 are used for illustration pur-
poses only and do not correspond with the current IMO Guidance (IMO Circ. 243).
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Virtual aids  to navigation  (AtoN) are defined by  the 
International  Association  of  Lighthouse  Authorities 
(IALA)  as  something  that  “does  not physically  exist 
but is a digital information object promulgated by an 
authorized service provider  that can be presented on 
navigational  systems”  (IALA  O143).  Truly  virtual 
aids that do not require physical infrastructure of any 
kind are still relegated to the future. However, similar 
capabilities are presently being implemented through 
the  use  of  Automated  Identification  System  (AIS) 
radio‐based  devices  that  can  project  their  presence 
directly from a buoy or other physical location such as 
a bridge abutment. AIS  radio AtoN are  electronic  in 
nature  and  distinguished  from  physical  AtoN  with 
the  addition  of  an  “e”  to  the  AtoN  designation 
(eAtoN).  They  can  project  their  presence  to  remote 
locations where, for example, a buoy should exist but 
placement and/or maintenance of a physical AtoN  is 
too difficult. The intended location must be in the line 
of  sight  of  the  very  high  frequency  (VHF)  radio 
required  to  originate  AIS  transmissions.  One  such 
example  is  an  Isolated  Danger  mark  located  on 
Tarapunga  Rock  in Doubtful  Sound  near  the  South 
Island of New Zealand (Marinetraffic VIRT). 
This concept  is  revolutionary  to vessel navigation 
in much the same manner as was the  introduction of 
radar – with many of the same problems  likely  to be 
encountered  in  terms of  training and operation. Real 
potential  exists  to  instill  new  vessel  navigational 
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capabilities that cannot be achieved using traditional, 
physical  AtoN.  However,  the  probability  of 
encountering many  limitations and  fragilities unique 
to  virtual  eAtoN  is  high,  and  it  is  necessary  to 
anticipate  and  adequately  prepare  for  such 
eventualities  to  ensure  safety  of  navigation  is 
maintained.   
This  paper  describes  research  into  the 
development  of  truly  virtual  eAtoN  that  do  not 
require  radio  transmitters or other physical presence 
at  the  eAtoN  location.  Significant  portions  of  this 
research  addresses  eAtoN  needs  critical  to  their 
proper installation and verification of performance by 
authorized service providers and safe and reliable use 
by mariners. An expanded  range of eAtoN physical, 
performance,  environmental  and  computational 
factors  are  considered  in  this  analysis. Strategies  are 
also  provided  to  overcome  some  of  the  potential 
vulnerabilities of such devices at various points in the 
eAtoN  lifecycle  to  avert  threats  by  opportunists  to 
render  such  devices  themselves  useless  or  even 
hazardous to navigation.   
2 PHYSICAL ATON VS. VIRTUAL EATON 
Physical AtoN have been used for thousands of years 
to  guide  vessels  along  their  routes  and  provide 
assurance  of  safe  passage  using  known  landmarks 
and structures to  indicate safe waters. In  the modern 
era  technology  has  provided  us  with  buoys, 
lighthouses,  light  ranges,  day  marks  and  other 
devices  to  accomplish  this  capability.  AtoN 
complemented with radar, depth sounders, precision 
positioning  and  timing  devices  broadens  situational 
awareness by helping identify environmental features 
and tracking vessel progress while underway.   
Virtual eAtoN are intended to supplement and not 
replace  existing  AtoN  in  areas  where  the  timely 
marking  of  hazards  to  navigation  can  be  performed 
faster  and  more  effectively  than  placing  physical 
AtoN.  This  may  be  on  a  temporary  basis  until 
physical  AtoN  can  be  installed  such  as  in marking 
new wrecks  or where previously uncharted hazards 
to navigation are detected. They can also be  installed 
on a permanent basis where the use of physical AtoN 
is  problematic  or  not  possible.  This  includes  coral 
reefs  where  sinkers  cannot  be  placed  due  to  their 
adverse environmental effects, in the Arctic where ice 
movement can carry away physical AtoN, and along 
rivers and tributaries where water levels and channel 
locations  are  subject  to  frequent  change.  Another 
possibility  is  that  eAtoN  functionality  can  provide 
flexibility  in  terms  of  purpose  and  positioning  that 
may  be  tailored  to  the  unique  requirements  of 
individual vessels for determining adequate widths of 
channels,  placement  locations  and  other  capabilities 
such  as  aid  to  vessels  having  lost  their way  and  in 
need of position assistance. 
3 EATON IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOLOGIES 
The  IALA  definition  of  a  virtual  aid  to  navigation 
cited  earlier  provides  no  direction  as  to  the 
implementation  technologies  through  which  such  a 
capability  may  be  achieved.  However,  earlier 
guidance recognized that AIS can be applied to AtoN 
to  further  improve and enhance services  to mariners 
and  assist  AtoN  authorities  to  ensure  the  safe 
provisioning of such aids to navigation as the volume 
of  traffic  justifies  and  by  the  degree  of  risk  (IALA 
G1081). 
The  use  of AIS  to  effect  eAtoN  implementations 
must  rely  on  physical  infrastructure  to  accomplish 
their  objectives.  This  in  itself  is  not  problematic  in 
areas where  ready  access  is  available  and  adequate 
financial  resources exist  to  install and maintain  such 
physical  infrastructure. However,  this  is not  the case 
over  vast  portions  of  the  planet  where  eAtoN 
capabilities  are  needed  most  –  the  Arctic  and  in 
sensitive  tropical  regions.  Indeed,  regions  that  are 
without  adequate  financial  resources  and  those 
affected by war can benefit from the ability to rapidly 
install  eAtoN  without  physical  infrastructure  that 
fulfill  the  IALA definition, “does not physically exist 
but is a digital information object”. Such an approach 
requiring no physical infrastructure has recently been 
presented that can overcome other limitations such as 
the  lack  of  hydrographic  survey,  sporadic  and  low‐
bandwidth  communications,  and  an  absence  of 
government support (Wright and Baldauf 2014). Both 
such implementations require eAtoN presentation on 
navigational  systems,  with  the  primary  system  for 
navigation  being  the  Electronic  Chart  Display  and 
Information  System  (ECDIS)  (MSC  82).  AIS  signals 
are  also  presented  on  radar  and  other  appropriate 
displays. 
AIS eAtoN have been deployed along both coasts 
of  the United  States,  in  the Great  Lakes  and  in  the 
interior along portions of the western rivers. (Lewald 
2015).  Deployment  of  these  eAtoN  is  being 
accomplished  in an effort  to best determine  their use 
and  application  for  future  waterway  guideline 
development.  Descriptions  may  be  found  in  Local 
Notice  to Mariners  chart  corrections  and  illustrated 
eAtoN portrayals on paper charts, electronic nautical 
charts (ENCs) and radar for:   
 Physical  AIS  eAtoN:  AIS  signal  broadcasts 
originate from a physical AtoN, 
 Synthetic AIS eAtoN: AIS signals originate from a 
remote  AIS  base  station  and  are  broadcast  to  a 
location where a physical AtoN exists,   
 Virtual  AIS  AtoN:  AIS  signals  originate  from  a 
remote  AIS  base  station  and  are  broadcast  to  a 
location  where  no  physical  AtoN  exists  but  are 
displayed on ENCs and ECDIS. 
(USCG 2014; see also IALA G1062). 
The US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) announced an expanded set 
of symbols used to portray AIS eAtoN on ECDIS and 
that  NOAA  charts  would  be  updated  to  add  AIS 
eAtoN locations (OCS 2014). These symbols include a 
magenta  radio  ring  surrounding  the  AIS  eAtoN 
reflecting  the radio  transmission of  the signal, which 
does not apply to non‐AIS virtual eAtoN. 
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4 CHARACTERISTICS 
The  term  “characteristics” when  used  in  relation  to 
AtoN  have  generally  referred  to  their  physical  and 
performance  aspects  as  can  be  readily  seen  and 
measured  to  determine whether  they  are  “watching 
properly” which  is defined by  the U.S. Coast Guard 
as,  “an  aid  to  navigation  on  its  assigned  position 
exhibiting  the  advertised  characteristics  in  all 
respects”  (USCG  2005).  However,  with  the 
introduction  of  eAtoN  that  exist  solely  as  digital 
information  objects  this  concept  has  become 
somewhat  muddled.  Even  virtual  eAtoN  have  a 
physical presence on navigation display devices such 
as ECDIS and radar.   
The  following paragraphs attempt  to clarify  these 
issues  by  introducing  their  digital  representations 
within  the  context  of  characteristics  by  which  an 
assessment of watching properly may be determined. 
A discrepancy is defined as any failure of an AtoN to 
display  its  characteristics  as  described  in  the  Light 
List  or  to  be  on  its  assigned  position.  When  a 
discrepancy  is  reported,  a  response  level  for  its 
correction  is  determined  based  upon  severity  and 
availability of assets (USCG 2005a). 
The lines of demarcation as to whom discrepancies 
are  to  be  reported  must  also  be  redrawn.  The  US 
Coast  Guard  is  the  cognizant  organization  for 
reporting  AtoN  discrepancies,  while  NOAA  is 
cognizant  for  charting  discrepancies  that  include 
ENCs  and  ECDIS. However,  if AIS  or  virtual  (non‐
AIS) eAtoN are portrayed  incorrectly on a  chart  this 
occurrence  should  also  be  reported  to  the US Coast 
Guard. 
4.1 AtoN Characteristics   
For traditional AtoN, two main aspects of their design 
encompass  various  characteristics  that  must  be 
verified  to  determine  they  are  watching  properly. 
These include:   
 Physical, and   
 Performance.   
Physical  AtoN  characteristics  consist  of  nominal 
operating and discrepant conditions and include type 
(buoy,  daymark,  range,  lighthouse,  racon)  color, 
shape,  numbering,  light  features  (red/green/yellow, 
flashing/  steady/occulting),  sound  features 
(bell/gong/horn/  whistle),  position  (lat/long,  on 
station, off  station,  adrift, missing, not marking  best 
water)  as  well  as  condition  (sinking,  stranded, 
capsized, excessive rust). Performance aspects include 
light  and  sound  intensity,  racon  (operational,  not 
operational, operating improperly), rhythms and rates 
of  installed devices, and visibility (day boards faded, 
lights/numbers obscured), etc. (USCG 2010). 
AtoN are documented and described  in databases 
(ATONIS/USAIMS,  ENC)  and  data  products  (e.g., 
Light List, Notice to Mariners, Coast Pilot). However, 
these data objects and  representations are  secondary 
to  their  physical  manifestation  in  terms  of 
performance. Indeed, physical AtoN have existed and 
stood watch  properly  for  centuries with  little more 
representation  as  “data  objects”  than  a written  note 
on a hand‐made chart.   
4.2 eAtoN Characteristics 
Both  physical  and  synthetic  AIS  eAtoN  share  the 
characteristics  cited  in  the  previous  paragraph with 
their  associated  physical  AtoN  that  must  be 
considered  during  verification  and  when  reporting 
discrepancies.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily 
apply  to AIS or non‐AIS virtual eAtoN  since neither 
are  associated with  a  physical  AtoN.  Although  the 
IALA  definition  of  virtual  AtoN  describes  them  as 
data  objects,  they  actually  do  exist  in  the  physical 
sense  when  they  are  depicted  on  a  navigational 
display  to  be  observed  and  acted  upon  by  a 
watchstander.  The  physical  characteristics  of  AIS 
eAtoN include the symbols for physical, synthetic and 
virtual;  and  non‐AIS  virtual  (USCG  2014).  ENC 
depiction of physical characteristics for virtual eAtoN 
(AIS  and  non‐AIS)  on  ECDIS  includes  symbols  for 
cardinal marks  (N/E/S/W),  lateral marks  (IALA A/B 
port  and  starboard),  isolated  danger,  safe  water, 
special purpose and emergency wreck marking (OCS 
2014). The  bulk  of  eAtoN  characteristics  exist  in  the 
form of data object  representations  in  the domain of 
the authorized service provider.  In  the United States 
this  is  the  Coast  Guard  and  NOAA.  These 
characteristics  include  the Light List number,  type of 
aid, name, position, class,  inspection dates and other 
information. 
eAtoN performance characteristics are determined 
in part by  the  specifications  for  each  specific device. 
From  a  practical  perspective  for  operational 
verification they either work as specified (operational) 
or  don’t  work  (not  operational)  in  much  the  same 
fashion as a racon installed on AtoN.   
4.3 Data Object Characteristics 
Recently  efforts  have  been  undertaken  by  IALA  to 
define a common structure resulting in the creation of 
a Product Specification  for AtoN  Information  (IALA 
PS1).  This  specification  is  intended  to  include 
information about lights, buoys, beacons, racons, AIS 
and sound signals and can also form the basis for the 
exchange  of  virtual  AtoN  information.  Figure  1a 
summarizes the key elements of the AtoN application 
schema  in  its current  form while  figure 1b  integrates 
the essential elements of virtual eAtoN.   
Critical  to  this  schema  is  the  establishment  of 
single  and  group  virtual  eAtoN  that  can  share 
geospatial  model  point,  curve  and  surface  data  to 
provide new capabilities for virtual eAtoN operation. 
This is accomplished through inheritance of attributes 
between  group  virtual  eAtoN  and  the  individual 
constituent  virtual  eAtoN  elements.  Included  is  a 
capability  for  live  comparison  between  known 
hydrographic  data  used  for  chart  production  and 
single‐beam  echosounder  data  obtained  from  own 
vessel sensors to help determine the validity of GNSS 
positioning  information.  Additional  capabilities  can 
include  automated  verification  of  virtual  eAtoN 
watching  properly, which may  also  be  extended  to 
physical and AIS eAtoN.   
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Figure 1.  Virtual  eAtoN  application  schema  embedded 
within the IALA AtoN      Information Product Specification 
1XX, draft 0.0.5 – June 2013.   
4.4 Virtual eAtoN Adoption 
Examples of virtual eAtoN realized as beacons, areas 
and  limits,  and  tracks  and  zones  in  the  text  that 
follows  are  provided  to  illustrate  functions  that  are 
possible.  The  capabilities  described  to  employ  these 
functions  are  also  illustrative,  as  are  the  specific 
characteristics  that  have  been  described  for 
implementation.  Determination  of  virtual  eAtoN 
adoption for future test, evaluation and/or operational 
use must  be made  by  competent  national  authority 
after the development and validation of the processes 
required  to  assure  their  performance  and  technical 
viability  have  themselves  have  been  validated.  A 
discussion of these concepts follows. 
5 VIRTUAL EATON LIFE CYCLE 
CONSIDERATIONS   
There  is  a dual  responsibility  for  the ultimate  safety 
and  efficiency  of  vessel  traffic  and  protection  of  the 
environment  by  competent  national  authority.  A 
simplified flow of  tasks performed by each authority 
is  illustrated  in  figure  2.  The  first  responsibility 
involves  performing  hydrographic  surveys  to 
determine  the  configuration  of  waterways  and  the 
development of nautical charts that accurately portray 
survey  results.  The  second  responsibility  has  to  do 
with  the  design,  provisioning  and  maintenance  of 
AtoN systems based upon these surveys. Historically 
under  normal  circumstances  these  authorities 
perform their tasks accurately and efficiently.   
 
Figure 2.  Virtual  eAtoN  life  cycle  representing  roles  of 
national hydrographic and AtoN authorities.   
However, the rapid expansion of vessel navigation 
in  the  Arctic  has  exposed  deficiencies  of  existing 
capabilities  to  perform  hydrographic  surveys, 
produce  updated  nautical  charts  and  design  AtoN 
systems  to  keep  pace  with  this  expansion.  For 
example the original NOAA Arctic Nautical Charting 
Plan  published  in  2011  proposed  the  creation  of  14 
new charts. As of the 2015 update to this plan three of 
these charts have been produced and released for use 
by the public with no definite schedule to produce the 
remaining  11  charts  identified  in  the  Plan  (NOAA 
2015).   
There  are  many  ways  that  new  technology  and 
virtual  eAtoN  can  contribute  towards  enhancing  the 
safety  of  navigation.  This  includes  the  gathering  of 
high  resolution,  full bottom hydrographic data  from 
3‐dimentional  forward  looking  sonar  (3D‐FLS) 
equipped vessels of opportunity to supplement scarce 
national  hydrographic  resources  to  help  in  eAtoN 
positioning.  The  expansion  of  capabilities  provided 
by  physical  AtoN  through  the  use  of  AIS  eAtoN 
technology can also be further accelerated through the 
deployment of virtual eAtoN in areas not suitable for 
physical  AtoN  or  AIS  eAtoN.  This  would  also 
embrace new eAtoN concepts  such as  the display of 
recent transits by  icebreakers within a set time frame 
as  well  as  the  real  time  detection  of  hazards  to 
navigation  for display on ECDIS on a momentary or 
transient basis while  the hazard exists. Discussion of 
these  concepts  in  terms  of  the  AtoN  development 
lifecycle is provided in the paragraphs that follow. 
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5.1 Establishment of Requirements 
Determination  of  requirements  for  traditional AtoN, 
AIS  eAtoN  and virtual  eAtoN  is  based  jointly upon 
the  results  of  hydrographic  surveys  and  the  needs 
associated  with  vessel  navigation.  The  factors 
comprising  each  of  these  needs  are  assessed  by 
different  independent  organizations  according  to 
different  regulations.  Coordination  and  cooperation 
between  national  authorities  for  hydrography  and 
buoyage  is essential to effect comprehensive national 
systems.  Adequate  representation  and  participation 
by  national  representatives  in  activities  and 
committees  of  the  International  Hydrographic 
Organization  (IHO)  and  International  Maritime 
Organization  (IMO)  can  help  ensure  effective 
implementation  and  compliance  with  international 
standards. 
5.1.1 5.1.1  Hydrographic Survey   
Decisions  regarding  the  performance  of 
hydrographic  surveys  are  made  by  competent 
national  authority  based  upon  guidance  provided 
through  the  IHO  concerning  how  hydrographic 
surveys are performed, the products of these surveys 
and  the  methods  by  which  survey  and  AtoN 
information  is  depicted  in  nautical  charts.  For  the 
purposes  of  this  discussion  reference  is  made  to 
shallow water surveys in areas of less than 100 meters 
in  depth  in  accordance  with  IHO  Standards  for 
Hydrographic  Surveys  (IHO  SP44).  Specifically,  this 
refers  to  Order  1a  surveys  intended  for  harbors, 
harbor  approach  channels,  recommended  tracks, 
inland  navigation  channels  and  coastal  areas  with 
high  commercial  traffic density. Many hydrographic 
survey  projects  require  the  use  of  multibeam 
echosounders  capable  of  obtaining  hundreds  more 
soundings  per  unit  time  than  single‐beam  systems 
and  cover  a  wide  swath  of  the  sea  floor.  Other 
methods include the use of side scan sonar systems to 
assist  in  detecting  objects  that  project  from  the  sea 
floor.  Both  of  these  systems  provide  nearly  100 
percent  bottom  coverage  of  the  sea  floor,  greatly 
enhancing  the ability  to detect hazards undiscovered 
by less modern surveys. 
An  alternative  form  of  multibeam  sonar  that 
appears  suitable  for hydrographic  survey  is  3D‐FLS. 
Some systems are capable of scanning wide swaths of 
the sea floor with up to 100 percent coverage. Rather 
than being aimed athwartships at  right angles  to  the 
path of transit, 3D‐FLS is aimed directly ahead of the 
vessel  and  is  used  as  a  navigation  sonar  to  avoid 
vessel  grounding  on  uncharted  shoals  and  to detect 
hazards to navigation that reside below the waterline 
both  attached  to  the  bottom  and  floating within  the 
water column. With a  range of up  to 1,000 meters, a 
60  degree  conic  projection  and  vertical  range  to 
depths  of  up  to  50 meters, widespread  use  of  such 
equipment  by  vessels  in  uncharted  regions  such  as 
the  Arctic  and  sharing  of  this  data  through 
independent sourcing could well supplement national 
hydrographic  survey  resources  in  these  areas. 
Although  research  into  the use of  this  technology  to 
supplement  surveys  is  in  the  earlier  stages  and 
generally related to autonomous underwater vehicles 
(see  i.a.  Zhang  et  al,  2008  and  Suman  et.  al,  2015); 
Wright  and Zimmerman  (2015) determined  that  full 
sea floor swath data obtained using 3D‐FLS  is useful 
for  nautical  chart  development  and  virtual  eAtoN 
placement. The  availability of detailed hydrographic 
sensor data through any or all of these resources  is a 
first  step  towards  determining  locations  suitable  for 
establishing  waterways  regardless  of  whether 
traditional AtoN or eAtoN are intended for use. 
5.1.2 AtoN Requirements 
The  identification  of AtoN  requirements  is  based 
upon the combination of hydrographic survey results 
and  the  needs  of  vessel  navigation.  The  main 
objectives  to  be  achieved  in  defining  requirements 
include  assisting  navigators  in  identifying  their 
position, determining a safe route of transit, warning 
of dangers and obstructions, promoting  the  safe and 
economic movement of commercial vessel traffic and 
the  safe  and  efficient  movement  of  military  vessel 
traffic and cargo of strategic military importance. This 
includes  reasons  for  rejecting other obvious or more 
economical  solutions  to  the  problem  that  might  be 
indicated  from  an  examination  of  the  relevant 
nautical  chart  such  as,  for  example,  physical  AtoN 
and  AIS  eAtoN.  As  much  as  practical,  AtoN  are 
established within the confines of the lateral system to 
mark channels and other areas of safe water as well as 
hazards  to  navigation  and  wrecks  (USCG  2005b, 
2005c).   
The process used  to define  requirements  in  terms 
of initial  justification based upon user needs, benefits 
accrued and the cost to achieve these benefits remains 
unchanged.  Justification  is accomplished on a site by 
site  basis,  and  general  guidance  for  accomplishing 
this  for virtual eAtoN  is provided  later  in  the  text  in 
the discussion on design. However, the availability to 
use  virtual  eAtoN  as  an  option  to  fulfill  AtoN 
requirements  becomes  apparent  as  new  capabilities 
are  created  in  previously  inaccessible  locations. 
Characteristics associated with the implementation of 
virtual  eAtoN  are  defined  based  upon  the  same 
criteria as for traditional AtoN, but may be moderated 
in  terms  of  guidance  and  advisories  rather  than 
regulatory  requirements.  This  may  be  especially 
warranted,  for  example,  to  reduce  or  eliminate 
warnings from ECDIS due to close proximity to buoys 
rather than reporting points. 
5.2 Design   
The design of virtual eAtoN systems and the selection 
of individual elements thereof is performed to define 
the  data  constructs  and  types  that  comprise  the 
characteristics of  the digital data object  illustrated  in 
figure 1. The original IALA AtoN application schema 
is modified  to  incorporate  abstraction,  encapsulation 
and  inheritance  properties  required  to  implement 
geospatial  characteristics  that  comprise  essential 
elements of the concept. However, there is nothing in 
this  modified  schema  that  is  necessarily  unique  to 
virtual  eAtoN.  Both  physical AtoN  and AIS  eAtoN 
can  also  take  advantage  of  these  characteristics  to 
bolster  the  automated  verification  of  their watching 
properly and to obtain the same benefits of immunity 
to disruption of GNSS and AIS services. The concepts 
of  individual  and  group  virtual  eAtoN  are  also 
introduced  that  enable  the  inheritance  of 
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characteristics  of  individual  virtual  eAtoN  amongst 
the  group  virtual  eAtoN  in  this  system  of  systems 
implementation.  The  products  of  design  should  be 
tested  using  simulations  and  through  emulation  of 
the  processes  used  in  the  creation  of  the  design  to 
determine  compliance  with  and  traceability  to 
requirements  and  to  detect  potential  deficiencies  in 
implementation and use.   
An  example  of  a  permanent  implementation  of 
virtual  eAtoN  is  where  the  individual  system 
elements  (VirtualAtoN)  consisting  of  green  and  red 
lateral  marks  correctly  depict  the  conventional 
direction of buoyage along a channel. The IALA AtoN 
Information  Product  Specification  convention  is 
followed with the addition of two new characteristics 
one  of  which  points  to  a  geospatial  surface 
(GM_Surface),  curve  (GM_Curve)  or  point 
(GM_Point)  of  the  area  in  the  vicinity  of  the  virtual 
eAtoN  within  the  ENC.  A  second  characteristic 
identifies a live single‐beam echosounder digital data 
stream obtained via a vessel’s sensor bus (e.g., NMEA 
2000  or  equivalent)  that  is  compared  to  the  ENC  to 
provide  automatic,  real‐time  checking  of GNSS  and 
AIS  functionality  along  with  verification  that  the 
virtual  eAtoN  are  watching  properly.  The  system 
comprising  a  channel  (GroupVirtualAtoN)  includes 
each  individual  (VirtualAtoN) element and points  to 
a  geospatial  surface  model  (GM_Surface)  that 
corresponds  to  the overall group. This  group model 
exceeds the sum of individual virtual eAtoN elements 
as  it  also  includes  areas  of  transition,  allowing  for 
seamless  verification  of  each  element  of  the  system 
and the entire system itself. 
An  example of  a permanent  and  complex hybrid 
system  is  a  traffic  separation  scheme  (TSS)  that 
contains  AIS  eAtoN  and  virtual  eAtoN  combined 
with  communication  reporting  points  along  two 
distinct  transit  corridors  separated  by  a  boundary 
between  them.  Rather  than  using  green  and  red 
lateral marks, special purpose TSS buoys can be used 
to represent the port and starboard sides of the traffic 
lanes. However, the same process in accordance with 
the modified  IALA AtoN application schema  is used 
in defining each individual element of the system and 
the entire system of systems. 
Another example of a permanent virtual eAtoN is 
where  soundings data  along with  the  boundaries  of 
the useful data are delineated using multiple  special 
purpose marks  in an area  that  contains  sparse or no 
soundings data at all. A  likely origin for such data  is 
envisioned  to be  the result of  independently sourced 
inputs promulgated via  cognizant national  authority 
from  a vessel of  convenience  equipped with  3D‐FLS 
capable of providing a swath of full bottom coverage. 
Such  data would  undergo  several  stages  of  quality 
checking  based  upon  compliance with  product  and 
process verification standards prior to issuance. 
The  permanent  dynamic  marking  of  coaxial 
channels  using  virtual  eAtoN  is  accomplished 
through  the  introduction of additional characteristics 
that  describe  vessel  draft  and  speed  in  combination 
with the geospatial surface model (GM_Surface). One 
of  two  or  more  distinct  group  virtual  eAtoN 
(GroupVirtualAtoN) models are selected  in real  time 
based upon  assurance  of  adequate  bottom  clearance 
considering vessel draft,  turning  requirements based 
upon  vessel  speed  and  momentum,  and  other 
relevant criteria. 
A much simpler design of a temporary individual 
virtual  eAtoN  is  comprised  of  a  set  of  curves 
(GM_Curve) that correspond to the boundaries of the 
no‐transit  zone.  The  symbols  for  no‐entry  can  be 
dynamically placed on ECDIS and dependent on  the 
scale  to which  the  system  is  set,  affecting  both  the 
number of symbols and the density in which they are 
displayed. The actual effective  times  for  the area can 
be encoded within the ENC and updated periodically 
as revisions become available.   
The AIS track that comprises a portion of a virtual 
eAtoN  depicting  the  recent  path  of  an  icebreaker  is 
another  example  of  a  temporary mark.  AIS  data  is 
correlated with  the  ENC  geospatial  curve model  to 
create  a  soundings  representation  for  the  track used 
with  live  single‐beam  echo  sounder  data  to  verify 
virtual  eAtoN  are watching  properly  and  not  being 
spoofed or interfered with through the interruption of 
AIS and/or GNSS services. The useful duration of the 
track  can  be  determined  by  cognizant  national 
authority  based  upon  contemporary  observations  of 
environmental  and  other  conditions  and  encoded 
within the AIS data and/or the (VirtualAtoN) feature 
itself. 
A new virtual eAtoN capability is also introduced 
for marking transient or momentary potential hazards 
to navigation. Available only as a result of enhanced 
situational awareness of the underwater environment 
made possible using 3D‐FLS, these represent hazards 
affixed  to  the  bottom  that  include  reefs  and  ledges, 
and hazards present within the water column such as 
growlers,  shipping  containers  and  whales.  An 
example is where one or more Isolated Danger marks 
are displayed on ECDIS at positions  that correspond 
to the hazard locations. A similar capability using 3D‐
FLS  is  already  integrated  into many  existing  ECDIS 
installations  via  a  vessel’s  sensor  bus  network,  but 
this  must  be  further  refined  in  terms  of  display 
features, symbols and operator training to become an 
effective means of alerting watchstanders to real time 
hazards to navigation.   
5.3 Implementation 
Once  the AtoN  requirements  and design  tasks  have 
been completed,  the products of  these  tasks must be 
forwarded  to  cognizant  authority  for  inclusion  into 
nautical charts. This  is accomplished  in parallel with 
preparing  to  deploy  virtual  eAtoN  through  the 
performance  of  local  surveys  to  confirm  positioning 
and other tasks as may be deemed necessary prior to 
their  introduction.  In  all  implementation  tasks  it  is 
vital  ensure  that  the  processes  used  during 
requirements definition and design ensure the correct 
virtual  eAtoN  aid  is  created  and  translates  into  a 
proper implementation of the aid.   
Feasibility  of  the  approach  is  enhanced  through 
the  identification  of  challenges  encountered  during 
development  and  testing,  the  implementation  of 
contingency  plans  in  recognition  of  these  potential 
challenges,  and  maximizing  possible  opportunities 
that result throughout the development life cycle. An 
example  of  such  a  challenge  includes  the 
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identification  of  differences  between  the  conditions 
represented by the most recent survey, which may be 
years  out  of  date,  and  present‐day  conditions  that 
reflect a different bottom configuration as a  result of 
storm activity and bottom shifting due to currents.   
Achievability  is  heightened  through  the 
identification  and  management  of  significant  risk 
elements  throughout  the  development  process. 
Metrics  are  needed  to  determine  development 
progress  and  overall  system  effectiveness.  This  is 
accomplished  by  continually  reassessing  the  virtual 
eAtoN implementation plan and deviation from plan 
for  resource  use  (human,  facilities,  etc.)  and  risk 
assessment  in  terms  of  task  achievement,  effort 
indicators  and  milestone  fulfillment.  Requirement 
and  design  modification  processes  need  to  be 
established  along  with  tracking  of  changes  needed 
throughout development to facilitate metric reporting 
of  requirement,  design  and  implementation  of  both 
ENC  and  virtual  eAtoN.  Metrics  focusing  on  risk 
assessment  of  the  quality  and  structure  of  the 
schedule,  work  breakdown  structure  consistency, 
critical  path  analysis  and  the  identification  of  high 
risk  activities  and  events,  and  risk  mitigation 
scenarios should also be identified. 
The system is complete when all steps necessary to 
implement  the  virtual  eAtoN  system  have  been 
identified  and  metrics  established  to  ensure 
measurable  progress  indicates  completion.  This 
approach  will  ensure  virtual  eAtoN  feature  and 
capability  traceability  to  product  specification  and 
design,  system  configuration  stability,  adequacy  of 
testing, and overall system maturity. 
5.4 Verification 
The  same  processes  and  procedures  used  to  verify 
physical  AtoN  and  AIS  eAtoN  characteristics  in 
determining  they  are  watching  properly  can  be 
applied  to  virtual  eAtoN.  However,  additional 
procedures  are  required  in  verifying  virtual  eAtoN 
across three levels that include:   
 Data object, 
 Technical performance, and 
 Physical characteristics 
Data  object  verification  involves  a  continuous 
process  used  by  cognizant  authorities  and  service 
providers  to  examine  AtoN‐related  data  across 
multiple  databases  to  detect  errors  and 
inconsistencies  inherent  to  database  operations  as 
well as hacking and infiltration. Verification of virtual 
eAtoN technical performance focuses on determining 
that  the  system  is  operational  and  performs  the 
required  functions.  Verification  of  physical 
characteristics  for  establishing  and  verifying  virtual 
eAtoN  is based upon references to  features  that exist 
within the local environment.   
Further  insight  into  verifying  physical 
characteristics of virtual eAtoN was demonstrated by 
the authors in experiments under nominal conditions 
as well as when precise positioning  information  that 
should  normally  be  available  using GNSS, AIS  and 
other  sources  was  unavailable  due  to  a  variety  of 
manmade  and  natural  events  (Wright  and  Baldauf 
2015). Under nominal conditions experimental results 
indicated  that  live  sensor  measurements  coincided 
with  expectations  in  terms  of  local  physical 
environmental  features  represented  by  a  geospatial 
surface model  of  ENC  soundings  and  echosounder 
depths indicating a high level of confidence of proper 
positioning. Under  conditions  simulating  GNSS/AIS 
unavailability,  denial  of  service  and  spoofing, 
discrepancies  were  found  between  vessel  position 
sensor  measurements  and  local  physical 
environmental  features  that provided a high  level of 
confidence that virtual eAtoN could not be verified as 
watching  properly.  Environmental  feature 
discrepancies  were  also  identified  as  well  as 
differences  between  depths  represented  by  ENC 
soundings  and  depths  reported  by  the  echosounder 
after  compensating  for  tide  levels,  hull  depth  and 
transducer  offset.  Differences  were  also  detected 
between  the  bottom  slope  derived  from  ENC 
soundings  and  bottom  slope  derived  from 
echosounder  readings.  An  additional  measure  was 
examined where significant differences were detected 
between  the  rates  of  change  of  the  bottom  slope 
derived  from  the echosounder readings as compared 
to the ENC. An example of this process is provided in 
paragraph 7 of the text. 
5.5 Maintenance 
The  use  of  independently  sourced  3D‐FLS  data 
obtained  from  vessels  of  opportunity  can  provide 
significant advantages to the update and maintenance 
of  all  AtoN  (physical,  AIS  and  virtual)  as  well  as 
nautical  charts  on  a  continual  basis,  and  can 
supplement  existing  hydrographic  survey  resources. 
No  significant  differences  are  anticipated  in  the 
maintenance  of  databases  and  the  installation  and 
operation  of  virtual  eAtoN  beyond  the  normal 
evolution and enhancement of the methods, processes 
and  procedures  already  established  by  cognizant 
national authority for physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN.   
6 LIMITATIONS AND VULERABILITIES 
Potential  limitations  and  vulnerabilities  associated 
with  the  implementation  of  eAtoN  technology  exist, 
some  of  which  are  described  below.  With  careful 
planning  and  diligent  design  and  implementation 
practices  these  limitations  may  be  managed  and 
overcome  to  ensure  their  reliable  and  verifiable 
operation is achieved.   
6.1 AIS Broadcast Range 
The  range  of AIS  broadcasts  in  the VHF  Frequency 
spectrum  is  limited  to  line  of  sight  based  primarily 
upon  the height of  the base  station  transmitting and 
vessel receiving antennae. The range of VHF signals is 
estimated at nominally 20 miles at  sea  (USCG 2015). 
This  limits  the  placement  of  AIS  eAtoN  to  achieve 
reliable performance at other than remote locations to 
a  distance  of  less  than  20  miles,  especially  inland 
where  terrain  and  ground‐based  structures  can 
interfere with signal propagation (Baldauf 2008). 
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AIS  is  also  subject  to  the  effects  of  Tropospheric 
ducting  that can propagate VHF signals hundreds of 
miles  from  their  origin  (Biancomano  1998).  Such 
effects  can  introduce  interference  sources  to  signals 
from AIS  stations within  the  nominal AIS  reception 
range and can result in performance reduction of AIS 
both ashore and on vessels (ITU 2007). 
6.2 AIS Spoofing and Jamming 
The  ability  to  spoof  and  jam  AIS  broadcasts  has 
particular  significance where AIS  eAtoN  signals  are 
used for vessel navigation. A lack of security controls 
can  facilitate  a  ship  being  diverted  off  course  by 
placing  eAtoN  in  undesirable  or  even  dangerous 
locations  inadvertently,  for  hijacking  or  for  other 
nefarious purposes (Simonite 2013).   
The vulnerabilities of AIS have also resulted in its 
use  by  criminals  to  an  attempt  to  evade  law 
enforcement  (Middleton 2014). Another report  found 
that AIS  data  is  being  increasingly manipulated  by 
ships  that  seek  to  conceal  their  identity,  location  or 
destination  for  economic  gain  or  to  sail  under  the 
security  radar,  and  concludes  that  this  is  a  fast 
growing,  global  trend undermining decision makers 
who  rely,  unknowingly  and  unwittingly,  on 
inaccurate  and  increasingly  manipulated  data 
(Windward 2014). 
6.3 GNSS Spoofing and Jamming   
Similar  to  AIS,  Global  Navigation  Satellite  System 
(GNSS)  signals  can  also  be  spoofed  and  jammed 
causing  unreliable  and  even  deceptive  navigation 
signals to be received by vessels (Forssell B. 2009). A 
recent  example  is  an  experiment  by  a  group  of 
University  of  Texas  at  Austin  researchers  where  a 
yacht  was  driven  well  off  course  and  essentially 
hijacked using  spoofing  techniques  (Zaragoza  2013). 
This  phenomena  was  also  the  subject  of  a  recent 
article  in  the  US  Coast  Guard  Proceedings 
acknowledging  this  as  being  of  concern  beyond  the 
maritime industry to include the transportation sector 
as a whole  (Thompson 2014).  Jamming  can have  the 
same  effects  as  an  outage,  as was  demonstrated  in 
2010  when  numerous,  low  power  personal  privacy 
jammers  were  detected  as  interfering  with  GPS 
involving  airport  operations  at  Newark,  NJ 
(Grabowski 2012). 
6.4 GNSS Outages 
The  worldwide  GNSS  is  comprised  of  the  United 
States GPS, Russian GLONASS, European Galileo and 
Chinese BeiDou  systems which are at various  stages 
of  completion.  These  multiple  systems  imply  that 
backup  capabilities  exist  if  one  or  more  of  these 
systems were  to go out of service, either  temporarily 
or  on  a  permanent  basis.  This  was  demonstrated 
during  the  ten‐hour GLONASS outage  that occurred 
on  1  April  2014  where  a  Broadcom  47531  receiver 
performing  the  simultaneous  tracking  of  GPS, 
GLONASS,  QZSS  and  BeiDou  signals  was  able  to 
successfully  identify and  remove  the bad GLONASS 
satellite  positions  (Gibbons  2014).  Multiple  GNSS 
receivers  are  only  beginning  to  come  into  the 
commercial  marketplace.  Under  normal  conditions 
the performance of these systems is likely to equal or 
exceed existing, single technology systems.   
All  GNSS  regardless  of  technology  used  are 
subject  to  the  same  atmospheric  and  signal 
propagation  limitations, multipath  interference, orbit 
errors, satellite geometry and orbital debris. One or a 
combination  of  such  factors  may  degrade  GNSS 
signals to reduce their accuracy or make their signals 
unreliable  or  unusable.  With  the  discontinuance  of 
Loran  and  no  commitment  to  establish  any  backup 
system  to  GNSS  using  a  fundamentally  different 
positioning  technology  such  as  that used by  eLoran, 
there  is  presently  no  alternative  available  for 
navigation  other  than  that  provided  by  traditional 
aids  to  navigation.  The  georeferencing  of  eAtoN  to 
bottom features may help to reduce the overall effect 
of GNSS outages. 
6.5 Database Hacking 
One  of  the  greatest  vulnerabilities  of  eAtoN  is  their 
primary  existence  as  data  objects  in  cyberspace, 
without  having  a  traditional  physical  presence  to 
provide  backup  in  the  event  of  their  electronic 
corruption  or  disappearance.  This  property  makes 
them  susceptible  to  hacking  and  denial  of  service 
attacks  that  can  render  them  useless  or  even 
detrimental and hazardous to navigation. 
Widespread  corruption  can  occur  at  the  source 
databases within which  eAtoN  objects  reside  at  the 
authorized service provider. In the United States this 
responsibility  is shared between  the Coast Guard  for 
AtoN  and  the  Light  List,  and NOAA  for  ENC  that 
form  the  nation’s  navigation  charts.  Corruption  can 
also  occur  at  the  local  level,  where  individual  or 
groups of eAtoN  in  the same geographical area may 
be corrupted.   
Initiatives  exist  at  both  the  Coast  Guard  and 
NOAA aimed at defending  their computer networks 
from  attacks  (Radgowski  2014;  NOAA  2014).  Both 
initiatives acknowledge  the  threats  involved and  are 
steps  in  the  correct  direction  to  manage  and  even 
overcome  the  adverse  effects  on  national  security 
imposed by these threats. Issues that pertain to eAtoN 
design,  development  and  implementation  cross 
agency  lines,  barriers  and  firewalls;  making  the 
solution to these problems even more difficult. 
7 METHODS FOR VERIFICATION 
There are  three  levels at which verification of eAtoN 
must be considered. The  first  level  focuses on where 
they are represented in electronic form as data objects. 
Numerous  vulnerabilities  can  exist  ranging  from 
simple  data  entry  errors  to  the  intentional  hacking, 
manipulation  or  destruction  of  the  data  content. 
Compounding  the  severity  of  the  problem  is  that 
eAtoN  data  is  represented  in multiple  data  systems 
across Government  agencies  that may  be  altered  or 
modified from their original content, making the ENC 
a product of collaborative datasets. 
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The  second  level  of  verification  is  the  actual 
technical  performance  of  the  eAtoN  device  and 
mechanisms  themselves.  The  third  level  involves 
verification  of  the  physical  eAtoN  characteristics  as 
manifest at the deployed location on ECDIS. 
7.1 Data Object   
A data  object defined  as  an  item  or  group  of  items, 
regardless  of  type  or  format  that  a  computer  can 
address  or  manipulate  as  a  single  object  implies 
characteristics  contained  within  the  database  are 
highly  correlated  with  the  unique  eAtoN  object  it 
represents.  The  corruption  of  these  data  can 
fundamentally alter the behavior, functionality and/or 
performance  of  eAtoN.  Such  corruption  can  occur 
throughout  the  lifecycle  of  the  object  from  the 
characterization of data as requirements, design of the 
structure  in which  these  data  reside,  initial  entry  of 
the data  into the data structure, process of extracting 
the data, its fusion with other data to effect a process 
or outcome using a navigational display, and the final 
representation  of  the  data  in  its  intended  use  for 
navigation.   
The process  flow depicted  in  figure  3 provides  a 
simplified  example  of  a  generic  verification  process 
that could be used on a continuous basis by cognizant 
service  provider(s)  to  examine  the  contents  of 
multiple  databases  to  detect  errors  and 
inconsistencies caused by database hacking as well as 
errors inherent to database operations. This approach 
is  conceptually  aligned  with  the  United  States 
Department  of  Homeland  Security  Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program designed 
to protect government networks and their data.   
7.1.1 Database Structures 
Multiple databases and data structures distributed 
geographically  across different  government  agencies 
host  the  data  required  to  create,  implement  and 
support  eAtoN  operations.  These  include  legacy 
systems  already  supporting  AtoN  characteristics 
modified  to  support  eAtoN  and  the  equivalent data 
requirements within  the ENC, with  legacy processes 
used  to  integrate  these  data  and  create  their  final 
products. The  implementation and hosting of eAtoN 
data representations exists on different data platforms 
and host software, with diverse formats and timing of 
system  updating  and maintenance. How  these  data 
and  relevant metadata  are  shared,  the  flow  of  these 
data  managed,  and  the  processes  and  frequency 
through  which  this  occurs  is  the  focus  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Marine  Transportation  System 
(CMTS),  a  Federal  interagency  coordinating 
committee  in  the  United  States.  This  should  be 
accomplished  in  a  manner  that  coincides  with  the 
update and revision cycles of the contents of the data 
structures  independent  of  the  development  of 
products  derived  from  the  data  contents.  This  also 
requires  proper  filtering  and  assurance  that  the 
destination  system  and  associated  processes  be 
sufficiently robust so as not to be overwhelmed by the 
volume of data received.   
 
Figure 3. eAtoN Data Object Verification Process. 
7.1.2 Data Normalization 
Prior  to  initiating  data  object  verification  it  is 
necessary  that  the  contents  of  the  data  streams  be 
processed  and normalized  from  their native  formats 
contained within  the  source databases  to  a  common 
format ensuring proper comparisons of the data may 
be  accomplished.  This  includes  data  for  both AtoN 
and eAtoN since they are integrated together into the 
same  legacy  systems;  ensuring data  objects  for  both 
forms  are  verifiable  and  can  be  verified  using  the 
same  process.  This  also  requires  that  inputs  of 
metadata,  human  interface  and  guidance,  a  priori 
data,  and  other machine  data  necessary  to  perform 
verification  are  prioritized  and  properly  associated 
with the data for subsequent processing. 
The  product  of  the  data  normalization  stage 
represents  the  totality  of  the  data  from  all  sources 
necessary to accomplish verification: 
DEeAtoN(n) = {DeAtoN(n), EeAtoN(n)}  (1) 
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where D=AtoN/eAtoN; and E=ENC data objects. Note 
that the process flow of figure 3 has been simplified to 
show  eAtoN  data,  however  both  AtoN  and  eAtoN 
data  objects  from  the  same  data  sources  can  be 
verified  using  this  same  technique.  These  data  are 
provided  at  a  rate  sufficient  to  process  changes  in 
synchronization  with  the  data  at  their  source 
databases. 
7.1.3 Verification Process 
Verification of normalized data  is accomplished with 
the knowledge of changes  that are supposed  to have 
occurred and  the  implication  that any other  changes 
that may be detected are therefore discrepancies. Each 
individual  normalized  AtoN/eAtoN  data  object  is 
compared to the change list to determine whether it is 
contained within the set of changes expected for  that 
specific individual process: 
DEeAtoN(n)   ∈ {DEeAtoN(Δ)}  (2) 
If the data object is part of the set of changes then 
the  characteristics  of  the  normalized  data  object  are 
compared to those on the Change List to ensure their 
proper implementation: 
DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(nΔ)  (3) 
where an affirmative result causes a determination of 
the  AtoN/eAtoN  as  a  verified  data  object  and  a 
negative result causes a determination of a data object 
discrepancy.     
If  the data object  is not part of  the set of changes 
then  the characteristics of  the normalized data object 
are compared to those of the previous revision (n′) of 
the data object: 
DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(n′)  (4) 
where an affirmative result causes a determination of 
the  AtoN/eAtoN  as  a  verified  data  object  and  a 
negative result causes a determination of a data object 
discrepancy.     
Completion of individual data object verification is 
achieved  with  a  determination  of  verified  or 
discrepancy, wherein metrics are generated  followed 
by the examination of the next data object: 
DEeAtoN(n) → MetriceAtoN(n)  (5) 
DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(n+1)  (6) 
Upon detection of  the  last data object, data object 
verification  for  this  process  run  is  completed  and 
initiation  of  Technical  Performance  is  then  followed 
by Physical Characteristics verification. 
7.1.4 Metrics 
Data  object  examination  is  complete when  steps 
necessary  to  determine  verification  or  discrepancy 
have  been  achieved. Metrics  to measure  verification 
progress  and  resultant products must be  established 
to  indicate  process  completion  and  performance 
scores  are  created  to  indicate  product  quality  and 
deficiency  levels.  Such  metrics  must  also  ensure 
feature  and  capability  traceability  to  product 
specification  and  design,  stability  of  software 
configuration,  adequacy  of  depth  and  breadth  of 
testing,  and  overall product maturity. Configuration 
controls and trouble reporting procedures need to be 
established  to  track  the  rate,  type  and  severity  of 
discrepancies as well as required changes to software, 
processes,  design,  and  requirements  resulting  from 
discrepancies found and corrected. 
7.2 Technical Performance 
Verification  of  the  technical  performance  of  AIS 
eAtoN lies primarily in determining that the system is 
operational  and  performs  the  required  functions. 
General guidance on this subject may be found in the 
appropriate  IALA  guidelines  (IALA  G1028). 
Guidance on verification of AIS equipment should be 
found  in  the  technical  specifications,  acceptance  test 
procedures  and  maintenance  test  procedures 
appropriate for specific equipment configurations. 
7.3 Physical Characteristics 
The existence of eAtoN as data objects without having 
a  traditional  physical  presence  does  not  necessarily 
preclude  their  verification  using many  of  the  same 
physical  parameters  as AtoN.  This may  provide  an 
ideal  opportunity  to  demonstrate  the  use  of 
technology to resolve doubts and concerns regarding 
navigation  strictly  by  electronic  means  rather  than 
traditional  methods  by  using  live  environmental 
sensor  data  to  obtain  fixes  to  known  landmarks, 
structures, bottom terrain features and buoys.   
Many  of  the  physical  characteristics  of  physical 
and  synthetic  AIS  eAtoN  are  shared  with  their 
associated AtoN. Characteristics  unique  to  physical, 
synthetic  and  virtual  eAtoN  include  type,  position 
and operational  status as well as  the presentation of 
these  characteristics  on  navigational  displays,  e.g., 
radar  and  ENC/ECDIS.  The  highest  priority  is 
depiction of position, which is closely followed by the 
other characteristics. 
7.3.1 Position 
The easiest and most risky means of verifying the 
eAtoN  characteristic  associated  with  position  is 
though  the  use  of  GNSS  to  compare  the measured 
position  with  the  charted  position.  In  the  case  of 
physical and synthetic eAtoN there is a physical AtoN 
present  at  the  location  as  well  as  an  AIS/ECDIS 
representation to corroborate the GNSS fix, assuming 
that  verification  of AtoN  position  has  already  been 
accomplished. Prudence would dictate  that  bearings 
to physical  landmarks  and  features  be  also made  to 
further confirm the reliability of the fix. 
For AIS and non‐AIS virtual  eAtoN,  the problem 
becomes more complicated since  there  is no physical 
AtoN  presence  at  all.  A  fix  developed  based  upon 
bearings  taken  to  physical  landmarks  and  features 
would  be  a  suitable  method  for  verifying  location 
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only in the case where such features were visible and 
not  obscured  or  out  of  visual  or  radar  range. 
However,  there  is  another means  to  take  such  a  fix 
through  reference  to  ground.  This  may  be 
accomplished,  again  using  modern  technology, 
through verification using known  surface  landmarks 
(radar  bearings  to  known  landmarks,  etc.).  This  can 
include  bottom  features  obtained  through wireform 
and/or point cloud ENC models compared to live 3D‐
FLS  and/or  echosounder  measurements  made  over 
time  intervals using running averages and derivative 
trend  information.  ENC  information  is  already  on 
board vessels in the charting equipment (e.g., ECDIS) 
and requires  the proper resolution and correlation  to 
determine bearings, produce  the necessary  fixes  and 
generate  warnings.  Such  capabilities  are  possible 
through  the  use  of  the  IHO  S‐100  Universal 
Hydrographic  Data  Model  that  supports  a  wider 
variety  of  hydrographic‐related  digital  data  sources 
and  products  than  the  IHO  S‐57  IHO  Transfer 
Standard for Digital Hydrographic Data. Specifically, 
this  includes new spatial models  to support  imagery 
and  gridded  data,  3‐D  and  time‐varying  data,  and 
new  applications  beyond  those  of  traditional 
hydrography.   
Fix  and  bearing  information  to  known  physical 
environmental  features  for  each  eAtoN  can be  taken 
during  initial  installation  and  encoded  as part  of  its 
characteristics. These characteristics can then be used 
anytime thereafter to verify position accuracy during 
normal  use  and  subsequent  verification.  Data 
encryption of position characteristics can also be used 
to ensure their security and validity. 
Such methods can also be used to detect the effects 
of  AIS  and  GNSS  jamming  and  spoofing  since  the 
presumed  location based upon GNSS  is  likely  to not 
coincide  with  environmental  features.  Used  with 
inertial  backup,  it would  also  be  possible  to  verify 
position  in  the event of GNSS outage. Data obtained 
from  echo  sounder  measurements  using  this 
technique on ground tracks 1, 2 and 3 shown in figure 
4 may appear similar to that shown in table 1.   
Transit  of  the  intended  track  (Track  2)  is 
dependent  upon  accurate GNSS  position  correlation 
with chart  location data. Should either AIS or GNSS 
spoofing  or  jamming  occur  resulting  in  inaccurate 
positioning, differences  in both  the depth and/or  the 
rate of change of depth profiles between the intended 
and actual transited courses would be detectable. For 
example,  should  spoofing  occur  where  the  vessel 
believes  itself  to  be  on  the  intended  Track  2  based 
upon AIS/GNSS sensor readings yet follows either of 
error Tracks 1 or 3, deviation from the proper course 
will  be  detected  through  comparison  of  derived 
bottom feature and contour data illustrated in table 1 
with  independently  obtained  echo  sounder  readings 
even  though AIS  and/or ECDIS  is  falsely displaying 
the intended course. Should GNSS jamming or outage 
be encountered, these same bottom reference data can 
be  used  with  inertial  system  backup  to  continue 
navigation and accurately update the vessels position.   
 
   * Track 1    + Track 2    # Track 3 
Figure 4. Divergent Ground Tracks 1 and 3 Compared to the 
intended Ground Track 2. 
Table  1. Difference  and Rates  of Change  of  Error  Track  1 
and Error Track 3 from Intended Track 2 shown in Figure 2. 
 
7.3.2 Other Characteristics 
Once  verification  of  accurate  eAtoN  positioning 
has  been  accomplished,  verification  of  additional 
characteristics  that  include  eAtoN  type,  name,  etc., 
would be performed by examining the contents of the 
AIS/ECDIS information on the navigation display. For 
example, the type indication should correlate with the 
proper  valid  symbol  for  cardinal marks  (N/E/S/W), 
lateral marks (IALA A/B port and starboard), isolated 
danger,  safe  water,  special  purpose  or  emergency 
wreck marking as published  for  that  location. eAtoN 
name  and  other  characteristic  verification would  be 
accomplished using the same method. 
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7.3.3 Metrics 
Physical  characteristic  examination  is  complete 
when all steps necessary  to determine verification or 
discrepancy  have  been  accomplished. Metric  results 
provide  traceability of verification and  identify areas 
where  further  product  and  process  maturation  is 
needed. Data collection  for many metrics can also be 
automated,  ensuring  measurable  progress  in 
completing  verification  and  generating  performance 
scores to aid in their understanding. 
8 PRESENT STAGE OF MATURITY 
eAtoN  technology  is very much  in  an  early  stage of 
development  with  only  a  handful  of  AIS  virtual 
eAtoN deployed in experimental evaluation program 
locations  worldwide.  Non‐AIS  virtual  eAtoN 
configurations  are  even  less  mature  as  theoretical 
concepts and implementations have yet to materialize 
outside  the  laboratory. Participation  of  the maritime 
community  is  being  actively  solicited  by  cognizant 
authorities and authorized service providers to ensure 
progress is constructive and meeting user needs. This 
is  evidenced  by  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers 
(USACE),  NOAA,  and  Coast  Guard  invitations  to 
maritime  stakeholders  to  participate  in  Future  of 
Navigation Public Listening Sessions and Navigation 
Information Days  throughout  the  country  to  collect 
comments  and  feedback  regarding  requirements  for 
navigational information and service delivery system 
needs  (Smith  2014;  NOAA  2014a).  Additional  AIS 
eAtoN  installations  are  being  deployed  throughout 
the United States in an attempt to fulfill a wider set of 
maritime needs. 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
Installation of AIS‐based  eAtoN  system  facilities  are 
continuing  as  operational  experience  and  results 
showing their utility are documented. A critical need 
exists  for  non‐AIS  eAtoN  technology  for  use  in 
remote  and  sensitive  environments  as  described. 
Further  research  and  development  should  be 
encouraged in this area.   
Significant  limitations  and  vulnerabilities  exist  in 
the AIS  and GNSS  technologies  that  support  eAtoN 
operations. Spoofing and denial of service attacks will 
accelerate due to the  lack of security  in both of  these 
areas  as  states  and  criminal  organizations  gain 
experience  in using and misusing  these  technologies. 
Opportunities  exist  using  currently  available  data 
fusion  and  sensor  technology  to  mitigate  these 
problems  and  reduce  the  severity  of  and  even 
eliminate  their  effects,  increasing  marine  safety  in 
general and specifically  the safety of navigation. The 
techniques  proposed  for  verification  of  eAtoN  can 
also be applied to  improve and automate portions of 
existing  verification  practices  for  all AtoN:  physical, 
AIS and virtual. 
Potential  also  exists  for  expanding  IMO  e‐
Navigation capabilities through integration of 3D‐FLS 
technology  as  a means  for  enhancing  the  safety  of 
navigation. One aspect of  this  is  that  the Polar Code 
should  be  amended  to mandate  3D‐FLS  as  an  echo‐
sounding device having  forward‐looking  capabilities 
as  a  vessel  carriage  requirement  in  the  Arctic. 
Alternatively,  3D‐FLS  should  qualify  as  one  of  the 
two  already  required  independent  echo‐sounding 
devices.   
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ABSTRACT
Areas of theworld where the physical environment is relatively unknown in
terms of hydrographic surveys and nautical chart content are under
pressure from increasing vessel transits as well as tourism and exploration
for natural resources. These areas include the Arctic, Antarctic, and even
remote tropical regions. Research efforts are described that are intended to
exploit the capabilities of commercial off-the-shelf 3-dimensional forward-
looking sonar installed on expeditionary and other vessels of opportunity
that operate in these regions. This approach can provide high-resolution
full-bottom survey data to supplement the assets of national hydrographic
survey authorities in exploring and charting these regions.
KEYWORDS
Charting; coastal zone; digital
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Introduction
The world’s frontier is represented by the Arctic, Antarctic, and some tropical regions, where
comparatively few have ventured and many dangers lurk in the paths of those who are ill-
equipped and unprepared to deal with the risks and consequences inherent to operating there.
This includes mariners engaged in such operations as well as those whose mission is to rescue
them. In these regions hydrographic surveys to modern standards are rare and charts are unreli-
able. It is advantageous for a vessel to be equipped with sensors to detect bottom terrain ahead of
the vessel rather than to transit an area blind as to the perils that lie ahead. This topic has taken on
greater significance as Arctic waters open up to increased vessel traffic between ports that exist
within the region, as well as transits between Asia and Europe to reduce route distances and ship-
ping times. This is demonstrated as Arctic Sea ice coverage reached the lowest recordedminimum
in 2012, averaging a rate of decline of 13.3% per year between 1981 and 2010 (NASA 2015). The
minimum sea ice coverage for 2015 was the fourth lowest of all previous satellite observations
(Vi~nas 2015). In 2015, maximum sea ice coverage was the lowest on record (NOAA 2015a).
The present state of Arctic hydrography
According to the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the Arctic is severely deficient in many of the capabilities extended to the rest of the Nation
CONTACT R. Glenn Wright glenn@gmatek.com World Maritime University, PO Box 500, Malm€o, SE 20124, Sweden.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/umgd.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
MARINE GEODESY
2016, VOL. 39, NO. 6, 439–457
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01490419.2016.1245226
as there is virtually no geospatial infrastructure for accurate positioning and elevations;
sparse tide, current, and water-level prediction coverage; obsolete hydrographic data; and
poor nautical charts (NOAA 2011). Large gaps are acknowledged in the information that
NOAA does have, illustrated by empty white space on nautical charts of the region. Most
Arctic waters off of Alaska that are charted were surveyed with obsolete technology dating
back to the 1800s.
The Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) are the two primary
transit routes through the Arctic as shown in Figure 1. The portion of the NWP that crosses
the top of the United States includes the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and the Bering Strait.
Figure 2 illustrates one of many areas in the Arctic, where soundings effectively do not exist
across a large portion of an official NOAA chart. Similar conditions exist on the Canadian
portion of the NWP where it was reported in 2009 that less than 10% of the Arctic in Canada
was surveyed to modern standards (Arctic Council 2009). Arctic survey coverage along the
NSR in Russia appears more comprehensive than the NWP, where recent efforts focused on
survey of the route’s least-studied areas encompassing over a 31,000 square km area of the
Figure 1. Arctic routes: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP). Source: Arctic Marine
Transport Workshop, 28-30SEP2004, U.S. Arctic Research Commission. Annotations for Clipper Adventurer
and Hanseatic by Authors.
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sea floor (AMSA 2013). In addition to its use in the development of nautical charts, proper
hydrographic survey at high resolution with full-bottom coverage is essential to the place-
ment of physical aids to navigation (AtoN) such as buoys that are used visually or by radar
to assist vessel navigation. However, AtoN are difficult to place and maintain in the Arctic
due to the large distances involved and the movement of ice.
Increased traffic in the Arctic
Despite these difficulties, vessel traffic is increasing with the transit of 30 vessels through the
NWP in 2012 as compared to 2–7 vessels completing this transit each year from 1990 to
2006 (Macfarlane 2012; NTDENR 2015). NSR traffic saw 46 vessels transiting in 2012
increasing to 53 in 2014 (NSRIO 2012, 2014). The potential exists between 2040 and 2059
for non-ice-classed vessels to navigate previously inaccessible areas of the Arctic without ice-
breakers (Sullivan 2013). Challenges posed by the environment, the lack of hydrographic
information, and AtoN by which vessels navigate increase the risk to vessels operating in the
Arctic. Shipping casualties in the region have risen from approximately one per year, with a
total of seven occurring during the period between 2002 and 2007, to an average of 45 per
year between 2009 and 2013 (Allianz 2014). Total losses experienced in the Arctic regions of
Russia, Canada, and Alaska were 46 (3.1%) of the 1,462 total losses worldwide between the
years 2002 and 2011. This increased to 6 (5.1%) of 117 total losses in 2012 and 4 (4.3%) of
94 total losses in 2013 (Allianz 2014, p. 12).
Greater consequences of Arctic groundings
Unintentional groundings can occur with greater frequency in areas such as the Arctic where
water depths are unknown, and represented the leading worldwide cause of oil spills of
greater than 700 tons between the years 1970 and 2009 (Butt et al. 2012; Nicolas-Kopec
2012; NMD 2011; TSB Canada 2013; Zhu et al. 2002). Even when not sustaining a total loss,
groundings have serious implications in terms of casualties to life, property, and the environ-
ment due to physical impact and chemical spills. Increasing vessel traffic engenders more
severe consequences of grounding in remote regions, where harsh weather and a lack of
resources exists for search and rescue, salvage, pollution remediation, and support
Figure 2. Portion of NOAA chart 16161 for Kotzebue Harbor, Alaska with large areas of unsurveyed waters
shown in solid blue and without soundings.
MARINE GEODESY 441
infrastructure. One example is M/V Clipper Adventurer that grounded in 2010 with 128 pas-
sengers on an uncharted shoal in Coronation Gulf, Nunavut in Canada along the Northwest
Passage, also illustrated in Figure 1. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada concluded
the route followed was inadequately surveyed, consisting of a single line of soundings in an
area where the depths were virtually unknown (TSB Canada 2012). Another example is the
grounding of Hanseatic in the Simpson Strait, Canada, in August 1996. The accident investi-
gation report states that the ship ran aground when the Master was relying on a critical navi-
gational buoy that had previously been moved by ice from its original position (TSB Canada
1996). Despite the eventual safe outcomes of both accidents there was significant risk and
potential for adverse consequences.
Dramatic and highly publicized groundings continue to occur throughout the world
resulting in many lives lost, pollution of the seas and shorelines, salvage costs that have
been enormous, and incalculable damage to ecosystems and wildlife. The names of the
vessels involved have become infamous and include Exxon Valdez, Petrozavodsk, Rena,
USS Guardian, and Costa Concordia. Although accidents of such magnitude in the Arc-
tic have yet to occur in the modern era, the combination of increased vessel traffic in
the region, poor charts, harsh environment, and lack of infrastructure only increases
the potential that such a catastrophe will eventually take place in the region at an
unprecedented and calamitous cost.
Three-dimensional forward-looking sonar solution
The approach presented describes an opportunity to expand the scope and coverage of envi-
ronmental data captured from vessels of opportunity plying these waters to help reduce the
many limitations of products available to mariners in the region. This is accomplished from
the perspective of using 3-dimensional forward-looking sonar (3D-FLS) as a means to navi-
gate poorly-charted and unknown waters.
Previous research has investigated the use of relatively short-range FLS systems for use in
underwater obstacle detection and avoidance for use by autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUV) and remotely operated vehicles (Fallon et al. 2013; Ferreira et al. 2014; Koh et al.
2009; Martin et al. 2000). Others have considered the techniques of implementation and
image analysis using 2-dimensional FLS (Berdnikova et al. 2010; Hurtos et al. 2012). Recent
research in the area of 3D-FLS addresses both the technical aspects of such systems as well
as their use in obstacle avoidance by AUVs and ships (Assalih 2013, Yakubovski et al. 2014).
However, the use of 3D-FLS for hydrographic survey has received little attention by industry
or in academic research.
3D-FLS technology is relatively new to commercial shipping with range capabilities now
suitable for use by larger vessels. It is not designated as a requirement for carriage by vessels
of any sort by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or national authorities. 3D-
FLS capabilities are currently judged based upon manufacturers’ performance specifications,
and their limitations are relatively unknown except for rules of thumb based upon range in
terms of depth. Yet the benefits that result from its use may be enormous. Experiments are
described where results help to determine the accuracy of 3D-FLS with respect to the Elec-
tronic Navigation Charts (ENC) required for vessel navigation. Additional experiments are
described using 3D-FLS to identify bottom topography characteristics useful in verifying
position. The successful accomplishment of these experiments can form a basis to consider
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the data acquired from 3D-FLS as an independent means to supplement existing hydro-
graphic resources worldwide for chart making and other maritime uses.
Objectives
Two different sets of experiments have recently been accomplished to explore the usefulness
and versatility of 3D-FLS to carry out different tasks. The first focused on determining its
accuracy in representing the physical environment in which it operates, and the second
involved its capability to provide data of sufficient resolution to assist in verifying position
using geographical features of the bottom. Based upon the results obtained in completing
these two objectives, an initial assessment was attempted to determine whether the quality
of such data may be useful to expand the corporate body of hydrographic knowledge for
poorly surveyed regions. Although embodying different requirements, our expectations are
that high-quality 3D-FLS with suitable range, regardless of manufacturer, should be capable
of providing data necessary to accomplish these objectives as follows:
(1) Comparing 3D-FLS full-bottom coverage measurements with an ENC derived from
hydrographic survey data. The expected result is a number representing a sounding
derived from 3D-FLS that can be compared with a sounding for the same location as
indicated on an ENC.
(2) Establishing geographical references to assess the feasibility of verifying positions of
virtual AtoN as being correct as part of a determination of their watching properly.
The expected result involves the calculation of several measures used to determine
whether or not a vessel’s apparent position is different from the expected position.
Modern 3D-FLS technology is designed to aid vessel navigation by creating a representa-
tion of the underwater environment enabling detection of bottom features forward of the
bow out to a distance of up to 1,000 m. This is contrasted with multi-beam sonar which is
used primarily for hydrographic survey by specialized vessels and not for navigation. With
both systems using similar technologies, the 3D-FLS transmitter is aimed forward instead of
downward. Bottom features, objects, and soundings are detected by determining range, azi-
muth, and elevation information using a sonar signal steered across and ahead along the
path of the vessel, or by creating a single ping from which snapshots of the environment are
obtained. It is presently available as a commercial off the shelf product and can directly and
significantly reduce the risks of passage by those operating in Arctic waters.
Integral to these experiments are factors associated with bottom conditions and sea water
salinity. Bottom conditions can greatly influence sonar horizontal range, which can extend
from eight to twenty times the depth ahead. Sea bed topographies that slope upwards with
targets that are large and consist of hard rock and/or coral provide much better acoustic sig-
natures than sandy bottoms covered by grass or vegetation or bottoms that slope downward.
Salinity can be highly variable, especially in the Arctic (Serreze et al. 2006). These experi-
ments represent initial attempts to explore the effect of such factors on accomplishing the
objectives.
Two different locations, illustrated in Figure 3, were chosen to conduct these experiments
based in part on the availability of each system for use, sea bottom characteristics and the
properties of the water column. Narragansett Bay near Newport, Rhode Island, US was the
location of experiments conducted during 2014 and 2015 and is included in NOAA ENC
US5RI22M using a scale of 1:20,000. This area is open to the Atlantic Ocean with salt water,
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and the bottom consists primarily of mud and rock. It was surveyed by the National Ocean
Service between the years 1990 and 2011 with full bottom coverage. The Chesapeake Bay in
the vicinity of Annapolis, Maryland, US included in NOAA ENC US5MD22M was the loca-
tion of experiments that were conducted in 2015. The scale of this chart is 1:25,000. This
area contains brackish water and was surveyed by the National Ocean Service between the
years 1940 and 1969 with partial bottom coverage. The bottom generally consists of mud
and sand with large areas of grass.
The first objective was accomplished in the Narragansett Bay using System “A,” 500-m-range
3D-FLS system. The investigation examined sonar data accuracy, refresh rate, and span of geo-
graphic coverage to help assess the potential to supplement hydrographic survey efforts (Wright
and Zimmerman 2015). This system represents the latest technological state-of-the-art capable of
installation on vessels from approximately 10 m to the largest of vessels using one transducer
mounted at the bow, and is very similar to their other product having range capability to 1000 m.
These 3D-FLS systems are priced relatively near the top of the range for such equipment. This sys-
tem was installed on the research vessel Cap’n Bert, owned and operated by the University of
Rhode Island Department of Fisheries, Animal andVeterinary Sciences.
Figure 3. Survey sites near Newport, Rhode Island (shown in Figure 4) and Annapolis, Maryland (shown in
Figure 5). Source: NOAA chart 13003.
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The second objective was accomplished in the Chesapeake Bay using System “B” 200 m
range 3D-FLS. This investigation focused on detecting bottom topography and features to
facilitate georeferencing as a means to determine position under compromised GNSS and
AIS conditions (Wright and Baldauf 2015). This system is suitable for installation on smaller
vessels of approximately 7–30 m in size, uses two transducers mounted at the stern of the
vessel and is priced an order of magnitude less than System “A.” System “B” system was
installed on a research vessel and test bed leased to GMATEK, Inc.
Specifications for both 3D-FLS systems are summarized in Table 1. Each transmits single
pings to create a mosaic representing a swath of the bottom topography and specific targets
ahead as the vessel progresses along its course. The systems chosen are representative of 3D-
FLS technology that is commercially available, albeit with different capabilities at widely
divergent prices. A significant difference between these two systems is their data recording
capabilities. System “A” records high-resolution data from an array of hydrophones approxi-
mately every 1.6 seconds corresponding to each sonar ping. Bottom topography may be
reproduced both numerically and graphically in imagery using these data. System “B” does
not record depth measurement data in electronic format that is available for later analysis,
with the only available information provided live through the user interface.
Methodology
When evaluating the capability of 3D-FLS as a means to navigate by providing visibility into
the undersea environment, it is necessary to have a practical, reliable, and traceable baseline
for data against which comparisons may be made. For the purposes of this study there are
two possible criteria: The ENC that mariners are required to use for navigation, and multi-
beam sonar data obtained during hydrographic surveys from which ENC are created.
The legal requirement for all ship navigation irrespective of size is stipulated in IMO and
national regulations that nautical charts and nautical publications are required to plan and
display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot and monitor positions through
the voyage (SOLAS 2011). Authorization for all the U.S. vessels to use ENC in fulfillment of
chart carriage requirements was issued by the U.S. Coast Guard in February 2016 (NVIC
01–16). According to NOAA specifications, the highest resolution that hydrographic data
can support is rarely needed, resulting in the use of a compromise grid resolution between
the highest resolution possible and a resolution required for navigation products (NOAA
Table 1. Comparison between forward-looking sonar system specifications.
Specifications System “A” System “B”
Maximum detection depth (m) 50 100
Operating frequency (kHz) 61 200
Maximum detection range (m) 500/1,000 200
Vertical coverage () 60 90
Horizontal field of view () 60 or 90 60
Maximum transmit power (Wrms) <1,500 Not specified
Angular accuracy () 1.6 Not specified
Roll/pitch compensation () §20 Not specified
Roll/pitch accuracy () 0.5 Not specified
Maximum vessel speed (kts.) 25 Not specified
Screen refresh rate (seconds) »1.6 1–2
Equipment price ($US) » 140,000 » 11,000
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2015b). Grid resolution generally increases from the open ocean to coasts and embayments
to better represent sea floor complexity and shallow water features. The nautical chart is
then produced from scale-appropriate generalizations of the navigation surface elevation
model created from the survey data. For example, where multiple soundings of the same
value exist across a portion of the sea floor, one or more of the soundings may not be shown
on the chart. These generalizations are needed to create a visual chart representation of
soundings and other information that is suitable for viewing by mariners. Otherwise, nauti-
cal charts and the ENC that provide information for display on vessel Electronic Chart Dis-
play and Information Systems (ECDIS) used would be densely crowded with overlapping
numbers and symbols that would render the display unintelligible.
The legal standard by which ships are required to navigate are the ENC derived
from hydrographic surveys and not the hydrographic data itself. Comparisons in our
experiments were made between 3D-FLS data representing the undersea environment
and the ENC corresponding to the areas of transit where the experiments were con-
ducted. This is consistent with the customary use of a single-beam echo sounder to
determine water depths corresponding to an ENC while a vessel is underway as a
means to ensure safe passage. Neither the 3D-FLS nor the single-beam echo sounder
perform speed of sound or salinity measurements to calibrate their performance to
International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) hydrographic survey standards. How-
ever, crowd sourcing of single-beam echo sounder data is currently being considered to
address a significant lack of bathymetric data by IHO (NGDC 2016). The results
achieved in pursuing the objectives of these experiments will help determine the viabil-
ity of independently sourced 3D-FLS data for this same purpose.
Experimental procedures
Objective 1
The vessel on which System “A” was installed transited a course of 180 (§2) at a speed of
5 kts. along a bottom that slopes downward from depths ranging from approximately 60 ft
(18.3 m) to 80 ft (24.4 m). This track is shown in Figure 4 spanning a distance of 0.41 nauti-
cal miles (0.76 km) with four prominent soundings laying along and abeam the track within
a range of 5–45 m from the track centerline. The charted locations a, b, g, and d were then
correlated with the closest position from which sonar ping data were available and where
sonar data provide coverage of the depth soundings locations (Positions A, B, C, and D).
Full-bottom coverage measurements were made at Positions a, b, g, and d along the transit
path. Positions 1–4 were identified on the NOAA chart as being the closest pings at right
angles to the depth soundings (Positions A through D) marked by “X” representing points
ahead of the vessel on the same distance arc abeam to where the ENC soundings lie that are
circled.
Data acquisition was performed at a rate of 1.6 seconds per ping resulting in full-bottom
image sampling every 13 ft (4 m) and accumulating 190 samples along the centerline of the
90 arc of sonar coverage along the entire transit route. Bearings were taken at four locations
along the transit route from the transducer location at the bow to the locations of four
soundings that appear on the ENC. Depth measurements made at each of the four sounding
locations were noted, adjustments were made based upon transducer offset and tides, and
subsequently compared with the soundings shown on the ENC.
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Objective 2
The vessel on which System “B” was installed transited four different tracks from south to
north at a speed of 10 kts. along a bottom whose depth ranged from approximately 9 to 20 ft
(3–6 m). Data acquisition was accomplished by capturing raster screen images at a rate of
approximately once every 5 seconds resulting in sampling every 90 ft (27.4 m) and accumu-
lating 14 samples along the centerline of the 60 arc of sonar coverage along each of the tran-
sit routes. Bottom topography data were acquired and compared with ENC soundings data,
with similarities noted between the sonar imagery and the ENC using the visual display. The
four tracks depicted in Figure 5, one of which (Baseline) passed directly over a wreck
depicted on an ENC and the other three tracks (Error West, Error Middle, and Error East)
transited along parallel courses that did not pass over the wreck. A simulated AIS virtual
AtoN was also placed over the wreck location in the ENC. Each track covers a distance of
approximately 0.2 nautical miles (370 m). The Baseline Track establishes a reference where
navigation was accomplished using valid Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data,
while Error Tracks West, Middle, and East simulate navigation using erroneous GNSS data
Figure 4. Portion of research vessel transit near Newport, Rhode Island along a track to assess 3D-FLS
accuracy, with soundings in feet (Wright and Zimmerman 2015).
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as may result from spoofing and denial of service attacks caused by jamming or other nefari-
ous deed.
The process shown in Figure 6 was followed to create a soundings model near a wreck
appearing on the ENC and in the Light List that contains a list of lights, sound signals, buoys,
daybeacons, and other aids to navigation (Light List V2). This was accomplished by producing
a surface elevation model of System “B” soundings data through conversion of raster image
attributes to vector values in a machine-readable layer supplementing the original ENC
soundings (Pendleton andWright 2002). The technical approach integrated feature extraction
using edge detection algorithms and optical character recognition. In addition to soundings,
depth information is represented in part by lines and edges that interrupt relatively large uni-
form regions of the raster image. Methods used exploit a multiresolution analysis scheme
with the underlying principle being that the edges and lines of the sonar display features (e.g.,
soundings, contours, etc.) within the raster image contribute most of the information, while
numeric characters provide context. Data were also acquired from a single-beam echo
sounder installed on the research vessel during transit of the Baseline Track and traced over
the corresponding path in an ENC using GNSS. Data gathered were tested using the measure:
1. Depth soundings contained in an enhanced ENC comparison to single-beam echo
sounder depth measurements (D) adjusted for tide, transducer offset, and other rele-
vant factors.
The research vessel transited the Baseline Track using correct GNSS data, and then Error
Tracks West, Middle, and East as a result of GNSS signals simulating spoofing that indicated
the vessel appeared to be transiting the Baseline Track. These paths were traced over the bot-
tom terrain using a single-beam echo sounder and compared to values expected for the
Figure 5. Wreck mark for simulated AIS virtual AtoN verification by georeferencing near Annapolis,
Maryland showing correct track (Baseline Track) and error tracks (Error Tracks West, Middle, and East)
transited as a result of GNSS spoofing. Depths are in feet (Wright and Baldauf 2015).
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Baseline Track in the full-bottom coverage ENC machine-readable soundings layer using
two additional measures that include:
2. Change of bottom slope represented in an enhanced ENC comparison to single-beam
echo sounder depth measurements (Dm).
3. Rate of change of bottom slope represented in an enhanced ENC comparison to single-
beam echo sounder depth measurements (Dma).
Results
Objective 1: Compare 3D-FLS full-bottom coverage measurements with an ENC
The measurement results accomplished during transit along the track shown in Figure 4 are
illustrated in Table 2. Vertical uncertainty averaged just less than 1.4 ft (0.4 m) and horizon-
tal uncertainty approached 5 m using Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) Global
Positioning System (GPS) sensors. The elapsed time to transit the route was just under
5 minutes during which information from 190 sonar pings were obtained resulting in 2.1
gigabytes of data collected. Additional experiments were conducted at two other nearby loca-
tions in the survey area using the same methods, with similar results.
This scenario compares depth soundings obtained from the System “A” 3D-FLS with
soundings present on ENC of the same area. After compensating for vessel offsets and envi-
ronmental factors, the differences in soundings measured by System “A” 3D-FLS and the
ENC ranged from 3 to 4.4 ft (0.9–1.3 m) at measurement depths ranging from 57 to 74 ft
(17.4–22.5 m), or 3–7% of the ENC soundings value. The measurements obtained are gener-
ally in line with expectations. Under ideal conditions, the differences in these measures would
be zero. In practice, anomalies due to bottom irregularities, offset tolerances, equipment
Figure 6. Process for virtual AtoN wreck mark verification by georeference, using a machine-readable
soundings (depths) layer in the ENC.
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accuracies, and changes to the environment that may have occurred since the survey was per-
formed on which the ENC was based. These measurements indicate that soundings measured
using System “A” 3D-FLS generally correspond to ENC in an area where recent survey has
been performed. One assertion that may be made given these results is that, in the absence of
soundings on an ENC that is blank, the soundings shown on System “A” are likely to be simi-
lar to that of an ENC had hydrographic survey been performed. Further study in this area is
needed to establish a sufficiently large sampling to definitively substantiate this assertion.
Objective 2: Establishment of navigational references based upon bottom features
and characteristics
Measurement results for transit along the Baseline Track shown in Figure 5 reflects accurate
GNSS positioning and transit on three Error Tracks, where GNSS positioning is compro-
mised based upon simulated spoofing or denial of service conditions. The elapsed time to
transit the routes was approximately 5 minutes during which information from 49 sonar
Table 2. Comparisons between charted depths and 3D-FLS depths.
Charted depth FL-sonar depth Vertical uncertainty Difference
Location (ft) (m) (ft) (m) (§ft) (§m) (ft) (m) (%)
Position A 57 17.4 59 18.0 1.0 0.3 3.0 0.9 105
Position B 64 19.5 67 20.4 1.2 0.4 4.2 1.3 107
Position C 74 22.5 75 22.9 1.3 0.4 2.3 0.7 103
Position D 74 22.5 77 23.5 1.4 0.4 4.4 1.3 106
Figure 7. Measures of depth and slope of research vessel transit along a track, with soundings in feet
(Wright and Baldauf 2015). The horizontal axis corresponds to consecutive soundings measurement loca-
tions from south to north for each track shown in Figure 5. (a) ENC soundings and echosounder depths
comparisons (ft); (b) ENC soundings and echosounder depths comparisons (%); (c) bottom slope compari-
sons between reference and alternative tracks; and (d) bottom slope rates of change between reference
and alternative tracks.
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pings were obtained resulting in 100 megabytes of data collected. Comparisons between
measured values for these tracks are illustrated in Figure 7.
Baseline track
Depth soundings (D) and the differences in depth soundings were calculated between the
Baseline Track echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable soundings layer
obtained using the System “B” 3D-FLS. For the Baseline Track in Figure 7a the extremes of
the measurements obtained ranged from a low value of ¡1 ft to a high value of 2 ft (¡0.3 to
0.6 m).
Change of bottom slope (Dm) between the Baseline Track echo sounder measurements
and the ENC machine-readable soundings layer obtained using System “B” for the Baseline
Track ranged from ¡135 ft/nautical mile (nm) to 68 ft/nm (¡22.2 to 11.2 m/km). Rate of
change of bottom slope (Dma) between the Baseline Track echo sounder measurements and
the ENC machine-readable soundings layer obtained using System “B” for the Baseline
Track ranged from a value of ¡0.120 to 0.080 ft/sec2 (¡0.019 to 0.013 m/sec2). These values
in themselves are not particularly significant except when compared to the Error Tracks, as
discussed below.
This scenario represents the case where GNSS measurements correspond to the
actual desired ground track being followed. The measurements obtained for the three
measured parameters: D, Dm and Dma, are generally in line with expectations. Under
ideal conditions the differences in these measures would be zero. In practice, anomalies
due to bottom irregularities, offset tolerances, equipment accuracies, differences in the
methods by which single-beam and multi-beam echo sounder measurements are per-
formed and inaccuracy attributed to the raster to vector process that was used can con-
tribute towards these results.
The values obtained are slightly better than expected but still in line with other measure-
ments taken at different survey locations in the same area when repeating this experiment.
These results indicate an apparent correlation exists between ENC soundings and sonar
measurements along a known track, a critical finding that indicates proceeding with the
computation of additional measures for verifying positioning is warranted.
Error tracks
Depth soundings and the differences in depth soundings (D) between Error Tracks West,
Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable soundings
layer for the Baseline Track are shown in Figures 7a and 7b. These values ranged from ¡4 to
7 ft (¡1.2 to 2.1 m) between the single-beam echo sounder readings and the bottom topogra-
phy. This represents 5–78% of the depths of between 9 and 21 ft (3–6 m) as a result of fol-
lowing terrain that was different from the ENC soundings model.
Differences in the change of bottom slope (Dm) are shown in Figure 7c between Error
Tracks West, Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable
soundings layer for the Baseline Track. These values ranged from ¡270 to 473 ft/nm (¡44.4
to 77.8 m/km) as a result of following terrain that was different from the ENC soundings
model. Differences in the rate of change of bottom slope (Dma) shown in Figure 7d between
Error Tracks West, Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-
readable soundings layer for the Baseline Track. These values ranged from ¡0.160 to 0.120
ft/sec2 (¡0.022 to 0.019 m/sec2) as a result of following terrain that was different from the
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ENC soundings model. Additional experiments were conducted at two other nearby locations
using non-AIS virtual AtoN lateral marks and the samemethods, with similar results.
This scenario represents the case where a lack of correspondence exists between GNSS
and the actual ground track being followed since GNSS measurements are purposely being
spoofed and altered to show a false course. The measurements obtained for the three mea-
sured parameters: D, Dm, and Dma, are again generally in line with expectations. Specifi-
cally, significant differences in bottom contours are being detected at the actual route of
transit as compared to the desired route. Under ideal conditions, the differences in these
measures would be anything but zero, with the actual difference dependent upon the bottom
characteristics. However the effect of bottom characteristics resulting from transiting an
incorrect route would be cumulative to these anomalies as shown in Figure 7.
Differences between the Baseline Track and Error Track data sets positively indicate the detec-
tion of GNSS and/or bottom topography anomalies suggesting the location of the vessel and/or
the environmental conditions deviate from the expected. In terms of the positioning of virtual
electronic AtoN and determining whether it is watching properly, the implications of these find-
ings may include that the AtoN is in the wrong position, or the geographic location where the
AtoN is located may no longer be suitable due to changes in bottom configuration due to storms,
currents, or other natural phenomena since AtoN deployment.
Discussion
Inputs and results
Data from System “A” system originated directly from the transducer hydrophones and was
obtained through the system computer independent of the user interface. These results
appear to be repeatable based upon the measurements performed at two different locations
as well as at the same locations on different days. They also appear to be accurate for naviga-
tion purposes based upon comparison to the baseline ENC used in fulfilling objective (1).
Data obtained in pursuing objective (2) was acquired from System “B” system indirectly
from the transducer hydrophones as interpreted and represented to the user through the ras-
ter interface since direct access to these data was not possible. The results obtained were
repeatable and also appear to be accurate within the specified range when compared to the
ENC and the measurements obtained using single-beam echo sounder in this experiment.
Clearly indicated in this outcome is that a vessel following Error Tracks West, Middle, or
East rather than the intended Baseline Track would be able to identify a position error with-
out the use of GNSS or AIS, or with the use of GNSS/AIS that was not indicating the proper
position. This is significant in that such capabilities could have detected poorly surveyed bot-
tom and possibly help to prevent incidents such as the 1992 grounding of Queen Elizabeth 2
off Martha’s Vineyard, Rhode Island and the incorrect positioning that led to the 1995
grounding of Royal Majesty near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts in the United States
(MAIB 92, NTSB MAR97/01). The bottom configurations for both areas are similar to those
featured in these experiments in that bottom terrain depth and slope varied along the routes
of transit. Evaluation of this approach in areas with steady bottom depths across the entire
experiment setting has not yet been accomplished.
In both of these experiments, comparisons were made between the 3D-FLS and the
ENC with which mariners are legally obligated to use for vessel navigation. The next
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test of the precision of these measurements should be accomplished through compre-
hensive experiments designed to compare 3D-FLS data against hydrographic survey
data obtained using multibeam sonar, the baseline from which ENC themselves are cre-
ated, corrected for speed of sound and salinity. These experiments should be performed
simultaneously with 3D-FLS data acquisition under controlled conditions and to the
same requirements as for hydrographic surveys in general. Plans are currently being
prepared to accomplish this at several locations along the Arctic coast of Alaska. How-
ever, the results obtained thus far provide a basis to demonstrate the feasibility of such
experiments.
Field of view and area measurement
System “A” has a maximum range of 500 m given ideal depths and bottom configura-
tions. However, assuming nominal sound propagation conditions and a distance to
depth ratio of 8:1 for estimating sonar range, a depth of 50 m can serve as a safety
margin for which grounding may become a concern in costal navigation. At this depth
an effective range can be estimated at 400 m along the centerline of the sonar. Given a
60 arc of coverage ahead of the bow, a swath of approximately 430-m width is possi-
ble. With a 90 arc of coverage a swath of 800-m width is possible. However, with the
most frequently sampled areas within these arcs being toward the centerline, a conser-
vative estimate of effective swath coverage may be achieved by halving these values to
215 and 400 m, respectively. These values are within the same range of values (195–
390 m) for maximum swath width typically available for multibeam sonars from vari-
ous manufacturers. The primary difference is that 3D-FLS may enhance safety of navi-
gation by providing watchstanders with visibility ahead of the bow by which hazards to
navigation may be avoided, while traditional multibeam sonar is directed downward
toward the bottom and provides no indication as to what lies ahead.
Sound speed measurements
The measurement of sound speed propagation through the water is a routine and necessary
practice in the performance of modern hydrographic surveys. Such measurements were not
performed during the experiments described as this is not practiced while using forward-
looking navigation sonar, which is intended for grounding and allision avoidance. Nor is
this practiced while using single-beam echo sounders to measure water depth. IMO man-
dates an echo sounder as a carriage requirement on vessels conforming to the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) convention as a means to verify water depths below the keel. It is used in
conjunction with nautical charts and ENC in planning and executing voyages. The post
processing of data obtained from independently sourced single-beam echo sounder and 3D-
FLS to improve accuracy through consideration of speed of sound factors should be further
investigated. However, this limitation should not preclude the use of the high-resolution
data products obtained from 3D-FLS to independently supplement existing multibeam sonar
sources of hydrographic data. Further, the coverage and consistency of 3D-FLS data are
more precise with orders of magnitude greater geographical coverage than single-beam echo
sounder data that are currently becoming widely available in the public domain through
crowd sourcing initiatives.
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Process for verification by georeference
The process illustrated in Figure 6 was used to acquire 3D-FLS data, normalize the data into
a common format, and insert these data into a machine-readable ENC layer. This same pro-
cess can be used with traditional multibeam sonar data to achieve the same result. Addition-
ally, this verification process using georeferencing could also be used to verify whether
physical, AIS radio-based, and virtual AtoN are watching properly.
International hydrographic organization S-100 universal hydrographic data model
Reference has been made repeatedly in the text regarding “full bottom coverage ENC
machine-readable soundings layer.” This experiment was envisioned with the S-100 Univer-
sal Hydrographic Data Model in mind that supports a wider variety of hydrographic-related
digital data sources and products than the IHO S-57 IHO Transfer Standard for Digital
Hydrographic Data. Specific reference is made to new spatial models to support imagery
and gridded data, 3D and time-varying data, and new applications beyond those of tradi-
tional hydrography. Further potential also exists for expanding IMO e-Navigation capabili-
ties through the integration of 3D-FLS technology.
Additional study limitations
Additional uncertainty exists within the experimental results as statistical processing of the raw
data correlated to a gridded depth product was not accomplished and a validated uncertainty
model does not presently exist in relation to ENC. The next logical step in this research is follow-
ing an approach considering these criteria as may be achieved with the additional use of multi-
beam sonar with measurement of sound speed, salinity, and other environmental factors in
conjunction with 3D-FLS. Further research in these areas is planned.
Conclusions
The results obtained in the performance of experiments to accomplish the two objectives of
this research appear to support the following conclusions:
1. Apparent correlation was found to exist between the data acquired from 3D-FLS and the
ENC mandated for use in vessel navigation at the two separate geographical locations
described, as well as at other locations examined during these experiments. It is notable
that these results were obtained from two systems with different capabilities and character-
istics produced by different manufacturers. Results were found to be repeatable and consis-
tent at different times and locations using the described methodology.
2. Salinity and bottom slope and consistency in terms of rocky bottom versus sandy and
grassy bottom does not seem to have been a significant factor in these experiments as
strong sonar returns were evident and consistent at the survey sites using both 3D-FLS
systems. This may be attributed to the relatively shallow depths surveyed at both loca-
tions. However, shallow areas are those of most interest to this study. Further explora-
tion of these factors will take place in future experiments.
3. The data obtained from 3D-FLS appear sufficiently comprehensive to support the objec-
tives of national hydrographic authorities in surveying unknown waters such as found in
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the Arctic and contributing to nautical chart development as independently sourced data
under present standards as well as under the IHO S-100 Universal Hydrographic Data
Model. Further study of post-processing methods to enhance 3D-FLS measurement values
to integrate speed of sound and other factors should be performed. Innovation is desirable
in the design of sensors to measure sound of speed that may be integrated with 3D-FLS
and echo sounder equipment to further enhance the accuracy of these systems.
4. Based upon the results of these two sets of experiments an assertion can be made that
the use of 3D-FLS in areas such as the Arctic can provide watchstanders with a useful
and accurate tool to determine the depths of water ahead of the bow to fulfill IMO
requirements to maintain an effective watch. Further, it can be an invaluable resource
to detect uncharted and unmarked shoals, reefs, shelves, rocks, and other underwater
hazards to navigation that may jeopardize safe vessel navigation.
5. Future research should only consider 3D-FLS systems that provide direct access to
hydrophone data through a suitable electronic interface. The raster-to-vector conver-
sion process that was used with System “B” system provides an unnecessary layer of
overhead that can introduce error and inaccuracies in the data. This lack of data inter-
face stymies data collection for subsequent hydrographic use.
6. In addition to the positive outcome achieved for hydrographic survey, the authors see
potential for the use of FL-sonar onboard vessels as part of an integrated bridge envi-
ronment. Although integration of 3D-FLS into ECDIS has occurred in several instan-
ces, further research into standard symbology and user interface issues, operator
training and vessel outfitting requirements is warranted. Contributions to improve-
ment of navigator situational awareness may be investigated and established by further
experimental studies using bridge simulators and analyzing the behavior of navigators.
A useful side benefit may be the collection of useful hydrographic data.
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Abstract  Research results are described that explore technological innovation to 
reduce ship groundings and collisions by significantly increasing watchstander 
situational awareness to environmental conditions below the waterline. This is 
especially relevant to ship navigation in the Arctic requiring transit through 
shallow, draft-constrained coastal and archipelago waters that are relatively 
uncharted, lack aids to navigation, without adequate search and rescue facilities, 
and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation. Add to these risks 
the potential for satellite service outages, denial of service and spoofing along 
with hacking and possible terrorism in various forms. Such conditions and events 
create excessive risk to life and property through grounding and greatly expose the 
environment and wildlife to pollution damage through oil and chemical spills. 
Results of research accomplished to date are provided and strategies developed to 
enhance ship owner and operator diligence in better preparing for Arctic transits. 
Recommendations for future work in related capacities are also provided for 
enhancing the Polar Code, International Maritime Organization (IMO) carriage 
requirements and the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and 
Watchkeeping (STCW). 
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1 Introduction 
According to statistics of accident investigation reviews issued from various 
sources ship groundings are the leading cause of large oil spills, yet human error 
remains one of the main reasons for their occurrence. The underpinnings of 
groundings contributed to or even caused by direct human error can in many cases 
be traced to the watchstander simply being unaware that grounding was about to 
occur. This illustrates an extraordinary lack of situational awareness regarding the 
specific underwater terrain in which the vessel was operating and a loss of 
orientation toward ongoing events [1,2]. Such occurrences may be due to the fact 
that the only direct knowledge available to the watchstander regarding the 
physical environment below the waterline being a two or three-digit number 
provided by an echo sounder that represents depth immediately beneath the keel – 
and nowhere else. Deduction of grounding implications based upon such scanty 
sensory inputs is problematic at best, and is easily overlooked if the watchstander 
is distracted by another task. Modern Integrated Navigation Systems according to 
IMO Performance Standards [3] provide alarm facilities that can be configured to 
warn of crossing a safety depth contour that may assist in avoiding groundings. 
However, these alarms do not work properly where few if any soundings exist 
within the electronic navigation chart (ENC) data, and in areas exhibiting rapid 
changes in depths as warning is likely to come far too late to avoid rising bottom 
terrain.  
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Research is presently underway leading to the invention and application of new 
technology that can aid in reducing vessel groundings. One focus specifically 
chosen for this research is the Arctic, where new inroads are being made to 
explore this pristine frontier and make it accessible to pioneers ready to exploit 
claims to natural resources and to open new trade routes. The geological and 
ecological aspects of the Arctic as represented by the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
and the Northwest Passage (NWP) are described to illustrate the unique 
characteristics of these routes that make them particularly vulnerable to grounding 
events, and why the consequences of groundings in these areas are intensified. 
Also discussed are the vulnerabilities of technology used routinely in worldwide 
ship navigation that are accentuated in the Arctic environment, considering both 
the limitations of equipment as well as susceptibilities to human factor 
deficiencies and man-made interference and disruption. The potential for this 
research to contribute towards building new infrastructure in areas where the 
establishment of traditional infrastructure is difficult or impossible is identified. 
Accomplishments achieved to date are also cited that illustrate the potential to 
approach the goal of increasing watchstander situational awareness of the 
underwater environment along the route of transit, along with problems 
encountered and limitations identified in this work.  
2 New Technology to Navigate a New World 
The navigation capabilities of modern vessels plying the world’s oceans include 
ENC representing the latest in multibeam full coverage hydrographic surveys 
contained within and displayed to watchstanders using Electronic Chart Display 
Information Systems (ECDIS). Vessel positioning is accomplished to accuracies 
of a few meters using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) integrated with 
a growing number of sophisticated sensors and tracked by other vessels and land-
based operators, service and support organizations using terrestrial and space-
based Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers. Physical aids to 
navigation (AtoN) are supplemented with AIS-based AtoN capable of being 
placed where physical aids cannot.  
Unfortunately, little of this is true in the Arctic. Navigation charts are in many 
cases blank or are inaccurate. Hydrographic surveys rarely exist and, if they do, 
are likely to be decade’s old and performed using obsolete technology. Satellite 
positioning systems and communications can be unreliable. Physical AtoN cannot 
be placed throughout much of the Arctic due to ice movement and AIS-based 
AtoN lack infrastructure required for their use.  
It is quite possible for mariners today to be in much the same situation as the 
explorers of the 15th and 16th centuries when aiming their bows towards the 
unknown. However, research is currently underway to help reduce this problem, 
the timing of which is especially significant in that the Arctic is experiencing 
increasing vessel activity resulting from the development of natural resources as 
evidenced by the 22 July 2015 granting by the U.S. Bureau of Safety and 
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Environmental Enforcement of final approval for drilling by Shell Oil at the 
Burger Prospect in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska [4]. Transit shipping across the 
Arctic is also dramatically increasing to take advantage of shorter routes between 
Europe and Asia. This is made possible in part due to diminishing sea ice 
coverage opening shipping routes that have previously been impassible. These 
routes include the NSR across the top of Russia and Norway, and the NWP along 
Denmark (via Greenland) and through Canada and along the United States that 
span thousands of nautical miles across shallow coastal seas and archipelagos 
where the potential risk for grounding is high. Accentuating these risks is the 
harsh climate that can cause the breakdown of machinery vital to safe vessel 
operation. The lack of adequate hydrographic survey and accurate nautical charts 
providing sparse depth information along much of this route can also render 
modern ECDIS equipment ineffective and unreliable.  
3. The Arctic Routes 
A series of different sailing lanes, the NSR covers some 2,200 to 2,900 nautical 
miles depending upon ice conditions. Likewise, the NWP covers a distance of 
about 1,300 nautical miles from Baffin Island to Banks Island plus another 1,000 
nautical miles from Banks Island to the Bering Strait. These routes are illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
 
Source: Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 28-30SEP2004, U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 
Fig 1.  Arctic Routes: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP) 
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A great variety of wildlife can be found in the Arctic including over 35 species 
of mammals such as whales, seals and walrus, and other carnivores that include 
polar bears [5]; over 200 different species of birds that occur in marine and coastal 
areas [6]; over 65 species of fish that include salmon, cod, herring, flatfishes, 
halibut, whitefish, pollock and sharks [7]; and many species of invertebrates that 
include sea urchins, anemones, jellyfish, crabs and worms [8]. 
3.1 Northern Sea Route 
The NSR encompasses all routes across the Russian Arctic coastal seas from Kara 
Gate (at the southern tip of Novaya Zemlya) to the Bering Strait [9]. Shallow 
waters generally characterize the length of the coastline from the Norwegian-
Russian border in the west (in the Barents Sea) to the Bering Strait where average 
depths of the East Siberian and Chukchi seas are 58 meters and 88 meters 
respectively, the Laptev Sea where 66 percent of its area along the coast is in 
depths of 100 meters or less, the Kara Sea with an average depth of 90 meters and 
the Barents Sea with 10-100 meter depths along the coast in the southeastern 
region sloping to depths of 200-300 meters to the northwest [10]. Depth 
limitations at various straits along the route result in an overall controlling depth 
of 12.5 meters [11]. Approximately thirteen million seabirds nest along Russia’s 
Arctic coastline [12]. Wrangel Island is home to the most important onshore 
denning habitat for polar bears in the Arctic and the largest site for a Pacific 
subspecies of walrus. Laptev walrus is a subspecies endemic to Russian waters 
while the Barents and the Kara Seas play a pivotal role in maintaining populations 
of the endangered Atlantic walrus. The White Sea is the breeding area for the 
entire Northeast Atlantic population of the harp seal, the keystone species in the 
pelagic ecosystem now affected by the climate change. Six of the sixteen Large 
Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) defined as areas of heightened ecological significance 
in the Arctic exist along the NSR [13]. 
3.2 Northwest Passage 
The NWP is comprised of the marine routes between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans along the top of North America that span the straits and sounds of the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago and along the northern slope of Alaska in the United 
States [9]. This archipelago is comprised of approximately 36,000 islands with 
variable depths, especially as the continental landmasses and islands are 
approached, providing a highly complex geography for vessel navigation [14]. 
The overall controlling depth is 10 meters [11]. The Alaska portion of the NWP 
north of the Bering Strait is bordered by sea ice in the winters of all years and 
pack ice may be just offshore all summer. Most of the coastline is sedimentary and 
portions have extensive barrier islands and lagoon-forming spits. Beach ridges 
surrounding aquatic habitats, serpentine barrens, limestone outcrops, marshes, 
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sloughs and other ecologically important and fragile regions in the arctic and 
western coasts provide habitat for many unique species of plants and animals [15]. 
Four of the sixteen LMEs defined as areas of heightened ecological significance in 
the Arctic exist along the NWP [13]. 
4. Increasing Arctic Groundings 
The increase in shipping activity in the Arctic engenders corresponding increases 
in groundings that comprise a significant percentage of shipping casualties. Data 
depicting such a trend indicates shipping casualties in Arctic waters increased to 
45 per year between 2009 and 2013 from only 7 during 2002-2007. Damage to 
machinery caused a third of these incidents, higher than the average elsewhere, 
reflecting the harsher operating environment [16]. When viewed in terms of total 
losses, the Russian Arctic/Bering Sea and the Canadian Arctic/Alaska experienced 
46 (3.1%) of the 1,462 total losses worldwide in the ten year period between 2002-
2011; increasing to 6 (5.1%) of 117 total losses worldwide in 2012 and 4 (4.3%) 
of 94 total losses worldwide in 2013 [17]. The potential environmental impact of 
groundings may include containers lost overboard from vessels aground but 
otherwise intact that wash up in the Arctic. An incident occurred in 2004 when a 
container tank filled with plastic polymers was lost from a vessel enroute to Korea 
from South Africa four months earlier that washed up close to a remote Russian 
community in the Commander Islands in the Bering Sea [18]. Attempts to move 
the container led to spilling about 15 tons of the chemical. Local residents were 
poisoned and the community did not understand how to handle such an emergency 
[19]. Ståle Hansen, President and CEO of the Skuld Property and Indemnity (P&I) 
Club, recently cited cost estimates of $500 million to remove the wreck of the 
container ship M/V Rena that grounded in New Zealand and stated that the 
potential cost of such incidents in the Arctic would almost certainly be 
significantly higher [20]. 
Groundings involve a moving navigating ship either under command, under 
power, or not under command that are drifting, striking the sea bottom, shore or 
underwater wrecks [21]. Casualty data shows groundings are consistently at or 
near the top of the most frequent types of shipping accidents [22-25]. Where 
accidents resulted in oil spills over 700 tons in the years 1970 to 2009, grounding 
was the leading cause at 36%, followed by collisions at 29% [26]. Although not all 
groundings result in a total loss, the consequences of groundings can result in a 
serious accident in terms of cost to the safety of crew, vessel and cargo and 
damage to the environment due to physical impact and chemical spills.  
The causes of groundings are many and include loss of machinery (e.g., engine, 
rudder, propeller and/or anchor); poor hydrographic surveys and nautical charts 
that fail to accurately depict bottom contours and identify hazards to navigation;  
human factors such as fatigue, errors in properly operating and interpreting ship 
sensors, indicators and alarms, and poor voyage planning. A recent report 
assessing probabilities for groundings based on accident reports indicates 
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inadequate communication and cooperation on the bridge is the most significant 
contributing factor in a grounding accident [27]. In 2008 poor hydrographic 
surveys were cited by the Helsinki Commission as a contributing factor to an 
increase in groundings in the Baltic, particularly in the shallow waters around 
Denmark [28]. These are just two of several factors that are of greater significance 
in the Arctic environment for ships that are poorly prepared and ill-equipped in 
terms of physical machinery, navigation equipment as well as crew training and 
experience that contribute towards the increase in accidents.  
5. Challenges of Arctic Navigation 
There are many operational, logistical and technical challenges to ship navigation 
in the Arctic. Those challenges having to do with expanding watchstander 
environmental situational awareness center on navigation charts, aids to 
navigation and sensors that provide direct insight into the environmental factors 
relevant to transit. Another factor is the potential for terrorism, an occurrence from 
which the Arctic is not immune. In the Arctic, infrastructure is minimal and 
knowledge of the underwater environment is imprecise at best and wholly without 
survey in many areas. The risks and consequences of grounding dramatically 
increase due to potentially long rescue times and a lack of assets for salvage and 
environmental remediation in the event of casualty. This risk extends to both 
civilian and Government operations. Adm. Paul Zukunft, Commandant of the U.S. 
Coast Guard, when speaking about icebreaker capacity recently stated that the 
United States currently has no self-rescue capability in the higher latitudes [29]. 
5.1 Navigation Charts 
 
According to the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) charting data in much of the Arctic is inadequate or nonexistent [30]. 
The U.S. Coast Pilot states that much of the Bering Sea area is “only partially 
surveyed, and the charts must not be relied upon too closely, especially near shore. 
The currents are much influenced by the winds and are difficult to predict; dead 
reckoning is uncertain, and safety depends upon constant vigilance” [31]. The 
overall status of charts and hydrographic survey for United States Arctic waters 
may be described as: 
“The Arctic is severely deficient in many of the capabilities that NOAA 
extends to the rest of the Nation. The region currently has virtually no 
geospatial infrastructure for accurate positioning and elevations; sparse tide, 
current, and water-level prediction coverage; obsolete shoreline and 
hydrographic data; poor nautical charts; insufficient weather and ice forecast 
coverage; inadequate oil spill response capacity; and poor understanding of 
baseline conditions for existing ecosystems. There are large gaps in the 
information that NOAA does have, illustrated by empty white space on 
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nautical charts of the region and limited capabilities for modeling spills in ice 
conditions. Most Arctic waters that are charted were surveyed with obsolete 
technology, some dating back to the 1800s, before the region was part of the 
United States. Most of the shoreline along Alaska’s northern and western 
coasts has not been mapped since 1960, if ever, and confidence in the nautical 
charts of the region is extremely low” [32]. 
NOAA has expanded the deployment of survey ships to improve navigational 
safety in the Arctic, conducting surveys of the ocean floor to measure water depths 
and search for navigational dangers and increasing Arctic charting activities in 
anticipation of growing vessel traffic in the region. Hydrographic projects for 
Alaska in 2015 cover an area of 2,800 square nautical miles, plus the 12,000 linear 
nautical miles for a potential Arctic shipping route from Unimak Island to the 
Chukchi Sea [33]. The NOAA Arctic Charting Plan providing information about 
existing, recently added, and proposed new ENC coverage in U.S. Arctic waters 
was recently released for public comment [34]. 
Most of Canada’s Arctic waters have not been surveyed to modern standards 
except for Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, the Beaufort Sea, Amundsen Gulf, and 
the approaches to settlements and some mining sites. Spot soundings through the 
ice or reconnaissance track soundings are the only survey data available in much 
of the Arctic. In the Beaufort Sea, a route through the area with a large number of 
pingos has been surveyed in greater detail [35]. It was reported the Canadian 
Hydrographic Service says that 10% of the Canadian Arctic has been surveyed to 
modern standards [36].  
Russian Arctic survey coverage along the NSR, illustrated in Figure 2, appears 
more comprehensive than the NWP. The Russian Federation’s Hydrographic 
Service reported to the Arctic Council since 2011 the Northern Sea Route’s least-
studied areas are being surveyed over a 31,000 square km area of the sea floor. 
Survey results have been digitized and developed into electronic navigation charts. 
Sixty-eight marine electronic navigation charts were issued based on the survey 
results. In 2012 two hundred charts were developed [37].  
Overall, of a total of 7,018,392 linear nautical miles (LNM) in the Arctic across 
the waters of Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and the United States; 
4,989,368 LNM (71.1%) of the depths remain unassessed by hydrographic survey 
[38]. Navigation charts depicting these areas are often blank and/or contain 
soundings that should not be relied upon. Of further concern are navigation charts 
for the Arctic that have been created according to different datums used to define 
the heights, depths and locations of hydrographic features. This requires extreme 
diligence to ensure accurate positioning when transiting areas using a chart with a 
datum different from that of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) in 
use, and when transiting areas from one chart to another where the charts were 
compiled using different datums. 
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Fig 2.  Survey Coverage of the Arctic Based on the Systematic Sounding Data [39] 
5.2 Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) 
ENC include a Category of Zone of Confidence (CATZOC) rating that indicates 
the level to which the data meets minimum criteria in terms of position and depth 
accuracy [40]. Except for ENC that contain the most recent modern surveys most 
Arctic charts do not have an assigned CATZOC value. This condition has direct 
implications on voyage planning and monitoring activities in terms of deriving 
keel depth and beam clearance safety margins when planning route(s) of passage. 
Safety contour and depth alarms required to be triggered by ECDIS would not be 
available in areas exhibiting a lack of soundings. Where soundings do exist on 
charts without an appropriate CATZOC rating, reliance upon them to set alarms 
would be foolhardy as the soundings should be assumed to be unreliable. In 
addition, incorrect setting of own-ship safety depth to a value greater than the 
current setting may provide an ECDIS display that omits any obstructions and 
shallows that may be present in the ENC. 
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5.3 Aids to Navigation (AtoN) 
The inability to place navigational aids and buoys in constantly changing ice 
conditions produces increased risk in vessel navigation activity in the Arctic and 
sub-Arctic regions. This has resulted in there being few, if any physical aids to 
navigation existing along the coast and outside of heavily trafficked areas nearby 
and within ports. Buoy placement and maintenance activity in sensitive ecological 
areas is also problematic, and underdeveloped regions lack assets and 
infrastructure needed to provide navigation services. The absence of physical aids 
to navigation also eliminates the potential to use radar navigation to identify 
physical aids during times of poor visibility. 
This shortcoming may be alleviated somewhat in the near term through the use 
of AIS-based AtoN at some locations in the Arctic. Deployment of this technology 
is currently being accomplished across the rest of the United States to supplement 
physical AtoN in areas where additional aids are beneficial to navigation. Their 
use in the Arctic is limited to areas where infrastructure exists to install and 
maintain these aids, and by the line of sight to their deployment locations due to 
very-high frequency (VHF) radio transmission characteristics.   
5.4 Communications 
The ability to reliably communicate in the Arctic region will become much more 
important over time as vessel activity increases. One factor that affects reliable 
communications is the large distances involved that favor the use of satellite and 
high frequency (HF) communications over shorter range VHF and ultra-high 
frequency (UHF) communications that is generally limited to the line of site. The 
negative influence of atmospheric effects on HF and satellite communications can 
make these methods unreliable during magnetic storms initiated by solar flare 
events. Heavy precipitation and antenna icing can also interfere with satellite 
communications. VHF and UHF communications is useful for communications 
between vessels, for tactical control and for emergency communications with 
mariners operating in the local area. Further research in the Arctic is needed to 
evaluate system coverage limitations and create improved signal modeling 
techniques. 
There is also a lack of reliable navigation safety information to help mariners 
identify, assess, and mitigate risks the in Arctic region due to minimal Maritime 
Safety Information infrastructure in the region. The U.S. Coast Guard currently 
does not own any of its own electronic Maritime Safety Information (eMSI) 
infrastructure in Alaska, and is examining the use of existing AIS infrastructure to 
demonstrate the delivery of critical eMSI information to local mariners and 
ultimately improve navigational safety [41]. Similar efforts are also underway 
elsewhere including the European MonaLisa project that aims to integrate 
environmental sensitivity data and dynamic route planning within Maritime 
Spatial Plans, and the Accessibility for Shipping, Efficiency Advantages and 
Sustainability (ACCSEAS) project for improving maritime access to the NSR by 
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developing and implementing eNavigation regional services and to prototype 
novel marine navigation and communication concepts. 
5.5 Environmental Sensing 
Several technologies such as GNSS, radar and sonar fulfill mandatory carriage 
requirements on-board modern vessels worldwide, provide vessel positioning 
information and offer navigation assistance by directly sensing the immediate 
physical environment. However, each of these technologies exhibit specific 
limitations as a result of their use in the Arctic. For example, special challenges to 
GNSS exist at high latitudes due to low elevation with satellite inclination (55° for 
GPS). Limited services like Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and 
dynamics associated with the auroral region and polar cap also make it difficult to 
predict ionospheric corrections and integrity [42].  
The use of radar as a means to fix vessel position is also limited in the Arctic. 
Absent the presence of short range AtoN, radar piloting that relies on these aids 
while in inland, harbor and approach, and coastal navigation is not possible. Using 
radar to determine bearing and distance to known objects and land features is 
possible where islands are present at sea and mountains extend along the 
shoreline. However, much of the Arctic landscape is regular and featureless, 
sloping gradually from the shoreline with low and grassy inland terrain making the 
detection of natural features difficult at best. Since much of the area is 
uninhabited, there is also a lack of manmade objects from which bearings may be 
taken. 
Sonar technology may be used to identify bottom features, gradients and depth 
contours useful to navigation. The echo sounder provides instantaneous depth 
information directly below the keel that can reassure the mariner there is sufficient 
water at the present time to avoid grounding. However, there is no assurance that 
the depth immediately forward of the bow is sufficient for continued navigation. 
Little navigational assistance is provided through the comparison of live echo 
sounder readings against navigation charts containing no or few soundings. 
5.6 Terrorism 
The potential exists in the Arctic for deliberate vessel grounding as an act of 
terrorism, with much greater effectiveness in terms of negative economic and 
ecological impact than would be the case in most other parts of the world. This 
can be caused by launching service denial and spoofing attacks on both GNSS as 
well as AIS that are relied upon for vessel navigation. The ability to spoof these 
services is well documented, taking advantage of inadequate security inherent in 
their system architectures. In 2013 scientists from the University of Texas 
successfully spoofed the GPS on a yacht, directing it on a parallel path hundreds 
of meters off course while the chart display showed only a straight line [43]. Such 
attacks could easily be accomplished to target vessels, mobile offshore drilling 
units and other maritime assets using small boats as well as highly mobile 
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unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Small platforms such as these that are 
capable of supporting sensors and required technology can easily achieve such 
attacks designed to mislead and misdirect vessels into believing their position is 
other than their actual position.  
At present there is little capability to reduce these threats in terms of detection 
and establishing countermeasures against such operations. Much of today’s focus 
targets terrorism using the Arctic as a means to traffic in arms, weapons of mass 
destruction as well as for the transportation of terrorists [44]. In 2009 the United 
States identified fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist 
attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United 
States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region [45]. Although denial of 
service and spoofing attacks have not yet been documented in the Arctic, acts of 
eco-terrorism are on the increase. An incident occurred in April 2015 when 
Greenpeace activists from their ship Esperanza boarded the Royal Dutch Shell oil 
drilling ship Blue Marlin bound for Alaska, and previously in 2013 when the 
group occupied a Russian oil rig resulting in the arrest and imprisonment of over 
30 activists [46]. Subsequently Russia passed amendments in a federal law on the 
protection of oil and gas objects and infrastructure that allow Russian oil 
companies to establish their own protection units against hostile action and 
terrorism [47]. The Canadian military has also routinely deployed a counter-
intelligence team in the Arctic to guard against possible spying, terrorism and 
sabotage [48].  
6. Enhanced Environmental Situational Awareness 
The basis for an innovative means of vessel navigation in the world’s uncharted 
frontier involves original research in the progression and integration of three 
seemingly unrelated technologies: forward looking sonar, Virtual (non-AIS) 
AtoN, and georeferencing. The approach described is eminently suitable for Arctic 
service in terms of usefulness, ease of deployment and low cost for installation 
and maintenance. 
6.1 3-dimensional Forward Looking Sonar 
This research is based upon the assertion that own ship sensors should be adequate 
to detect soundings and bottom configuration both at its current position as well as 
forward of the vessel in the path of transit sufficient to ensure safe navigation. 
Such capability is especially appropriate where soundings and bottom 
configuration are inaccurate or not available due to poor or lack of accurate 
hydrographic survey. This is possible through the use of 3-dimensional Forward 
Looking Sonar (3D-FLS), which is a variation of the multibeam echo sounder that 
detects bottom features and objects within the water column forward of the bow. 
Despite its usefulness and the availability of this technology in the commercial 
marketplace for over two decades, it is rarely included within the ships’ 
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complement of navigation sensors. Historically, this is likely due to a lack of 
suitable range, low vessel speed of use requirements and confusing 2-dimensional 
displays. There is also no IMO carriage requirement for 3D-FLS at present.  
The detection of bottom features, objects and soundings by determining range, 
azimuth and elevation information uses methods that can generally be described as 
variations on transmitting a steerable sonar signal ahead along the path of the 
vessel or by transmitting a single ping from which snapshots of the environment 
are obtained. Through this process a mosaic of the bottom topography and specific 
targets is created as the vessel proceeds on its course. 3D-FLS systems have been 
developed with different capabilities supporting both unmanned undersea vehicle 
and vessel applications. Of those designed for use on vessels, most are intended 
for pleasure and small fishing boats. There are systems with range and resolution 
that make them suitable for use on larger vessels such as workboats, offshore 
service vessels, merchant and passenger vessels. However, operational constraints 
may create limitations on their usefulness. For example, effective range may be 
limited by tradeoffs in transducer design to minimize water resistance and drag.  
At present, 3D-FLS is capable of detecting and displaying the underwater 
environment looking ahead as much as 1,000 meters forward of the bow at speeds 
up to 25 knots. In shallower waters the range of 3D-FLS can extend from eight to 
twenty times the depth ahead, depending on bottom and target conditions [49,50]. 
It is most effective when the bottom topography slopes upwards, and when targets 
are large and consist of hard rock and/or coral that provide good acoustic 
signatures. 
The research focuses on the enhancement of 3D-FLS capability to survey the 
sea bottom as well as to detect hazards attached to the bottom and floating in the 
water column to aid in Arctic navigation, where soundings on charts rarely exist 
and the vast majority of hazards to navigation have yet to be discovered. The 
utility of this technology as a means to avoid such hazards has been explored in a 
simulation of the M/V Costa Concordia disaster [51]. Its use as a means to 
perform hydrographic survey has also been discussed in terms of International 
Hydrographic Office (IHO) standards [52,53]. The potential exists to accomplish 
complete survey coverage with 3D-FLS for the transit route with horizontal and 
vertical accuracies within IHO standards using this approach. Such data can 
supplement national hydrographic organizations’ efforts in the collection of 
survey data in remote parts of the world and in areas lacking recent survey. 
6.2 Virtual Aids to Navigation 
Virtual AtoN based upon AIS technology are rapidly being deployed on a 
worldwide basis as a supplement to physical AtoN. While this is a valuable 
technology, the use of AIS-based AtoN is severely restricted in the Arctic due to 
lack of existing infrastructure to provide power and communications for health 
monitoring, access for maintenance and VHF radio range limitations. The research 
focuses in the creation of (non-AIS) Virtual AtoN, defined by the International 
Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) as something that “does not 
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physically exist but is a digital information object promulgated by an authorized 
service provider that can be presented on navigational systems” [54]. Methods 
used for the creation of Virtual AtoN have been described in a real-time, 
shipboard implementation of this technology [55,56].  
Virtual AtoN technology represents a major step beyond the capabilities of 
existing AtoN, although critical limitations exist that are inherent in their design 
and implementation. Qualifying as short range AtoN, Virtual AtoN appear neither 
visually nor directly on radar. AIS-based virtual AtoN appear on an AIS radar 
overlay and also on ENC/ECDIS displays. However, verification techniques to 
ensure AIS and ENC/ECDIS positions coincide have yet to be developed. Virtual 
AtoN may appear only on ENC/ECDIS displays. Such implementations can result 
in a potential “single point of failure” scenario that may cause false conclusions 
and possible system failures that may go undetected. A comprehensive Virtual 
AtoN verification approach to help overcome this deficiency and ensure virtual 
AtoN (AIS and non-AIS) are watching properly after deployment is possible using 
georeferencing techniques. 
 
6.3 Georeferencing 
Georeferenced navigation using terrain features and manmade object recognition 
has been in use for many years as a means of cruise missile and other unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) navigation across the landscape. This has been made 
possible through highly detailed millimeter-resolution radar and laser-surveys of 
the land areas from aircraft and satellites, whereas the ocean depths are presently 
surveyed to a maximum resolution of about 5 kilometers [57].  
This research utilizes a novel implementation of georeferencing based upon the 
extraction of features from both multibeam sonar and 3D-FLS data represented in 
the ENC, and correlation between vessel position indications and physical 
environmental features to verify that Virtual (and physical and AIS) AtoN are 
watching properly. Comparison between ENC soundings and echo sounder depths 
along the path of transit can be performed even if precise positioning information 
normally acquired using GNSS, AIS and other sources are unavailable due to a 
variety of manmade and natural events. The techniques used to accomplish this 
have been discussed based upon the results of a series of experiments conducted at 
sea [53,58]. Environmental features are identified in terms of bottom depth 
soundings for the ENC and echo sounder as well as the difference between these 
two sources, differences in bottom slope and differences in the rate of change of 
bottom slope resulting in new capabilities to automatically detect discrepancies in 
either bottom conditions or GNSS positioning that may require additional caution. 
7. Grounding Avoidance Strategies 
An overall strategy to reduce the potential for grounding in the Arctic must 
originate during vessel preparation and outfitting for Arctic operations, continue 
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through voyage planning, be implemented throughout the entire voyage to monitor 
its progress, and result in products that preserve the information and knowledge 
acquired during transit useful for crew debriefing. Such products should also 
support the subsequent application of the information and knowledge gained to 
benefit future mariners who transit the same areas. Strategies must be developed 
in accordance with a Safety Management System that acknowledges the special 
circumstances of Arctic navigation and includes provisioning appropriate for 
correct vessel outfitting and crew training. Specific concepts that may be useful in 
developing strategies to avoid groundings are illustrated using the incidents cited. 
Applications and advantages that 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN may provide in such 
circumstances are also discussed. 
Official reports commonly include accounts of groundings that have occurred 
due to a seeming lack of environmental situational awareness regarding the 
proximity of the keel of a vessel with the sea bottom. In several cases the 
watchstander was not even aware that grounding had occurred even several 
minutes after it happened. Descriptions of incidents extracted from the Nautical 
Institute’s Mariners' Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS) include: 
• Chart corrections while navigating contribute to grounding (Report 201528) 
• ECDIS unassisted grounding (201505) 
• Self-induced fatigue contributes to grounding (201451) 
• Fog bound grounding under pilotage (201420) 
• Vessel strikes island (201356) 
• Unpublished draft restrictions lead to grounding (201335) 
• Improper bridge procedures and ECDIS use caused grounding (201257) 
• Grounding in channel (200657) 
• Cross checking positions lead to grounding (200524) 
• Near grounding due to permanent highlighting of charts (200109) 
These are a few of many examples of groundings in non-Arctic areas; many of 
which are highly travelled, well charted and represent the best of circumstances in 
terms of information and sensor availability. The Arctic is generally less than 
optimal in these terms. Groundings and their consequences can be considerably 
more serious in the Arctic where harbors of refuge are few, search and rescue 
facilities are scarce or non-existent, and salvage capabilities may take weeks or 
months to arrive on-scene due to weather and sea conditions. Several detailed 
accounts of groundings follow that will be used to illustrate grounding avoidance 
strategies based upon the results of research accomplished to date.  
7.1 M/V Clipper Adventurer 
On 27 August 2010 the cruise chip Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Coronation 
Gulf, Nunavut in the Northwest Passage on a shoal discovered in 2007, published 
in Canadian Notices to Shipping but not officially charted until June 2012. The 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada report concludes that the vessel ran 
aground after the bridge team chose to navigate a route on an inadequately 
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surveyed single line of soundings, as shown in Figure 3 [59]. This occurred in an 
area where the depths of the waters were virtually unknown. 
  
Fig 3. Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Clipper Adventurer Grounding  [59] 
Analysis: M/V Clipper Adventurer was proceeding on autopilot at a speed of 13.9 
knots when the vessel ran aground on hard rock shelf [60]. Bottom depth directly 
before the shelf, illustrated in Figure 3, exceeded 100 meters. Using 3D-FLS with 
a 1,000 meter range, at a speed of 13.9 knots the vessel would have had 
approximately 128 seconds or 2.1 minutes advance warning before the grounding 
would have occurred based upon the following equation:  
Advance Warning (sec) = 
MDR (m) - SRR (sec) - APT (sec) - WRT (sec)
Vs )( m sec
(1)
 
where logical arguments may be made to establish values for each of these 
parameters: 
 Speed of Vessel (Vs) = 13.9 knots 
 Screen Refresh Rate (SRR) = 2 sec 
 Maximum Detection Range (MDR) = 1,000 meters  
 Alarm Processing Time (APT) = 4 sec 
 Watchstander Response Time (WRT) = 5 sec 
 1 m/s = 1.9438 knots 
The Marine Investigation Report identifies that 3D-FLS was indeed installed 
on Clipper Adventurer, however it was not operational and in an unserviceable 
condition. This unit had a maximum detection range of 500 meters and, if 
operational and the vessel was operating at 6 knots, the report concluded the crew 
would have had approximately 2 minutes advance warning of the shelf [61]. In 
either case there may not have sufficient sea room to halt all forward motion of the 
vessel. However a reduction in speed and course change may have altered the final 
circumstances such that the grounding may have been avoided or the severity of 
the grounding may have been lessened. 
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Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of the shelf would have been visible 
on ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course 
and speed to avert grounding. 
7.2 M/V Exxon Valdez 
On 24 March 1989 the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez loaded with 1,263,000 barrels 
of crude oil ran aground on Bligh Reef while departing the traffic separation 
scheme (TSS) to avoid ice. Approximately 258,000 barrels of oil spilled resulting 
in damage to the vessel and cargo estimated at $25 million and a cost for 
environmental cleanup in 1989 at $1.85 billion [62]. There was no indication in 
the report to contradict that the area was well surveyed and accurately depicted on 
nautical charts. The probable cause of the grounding was listed as failure to 
properly maneuver the vessel because of fatigue and workload along with several 
other factors. 
 
X
 
Source: [63] Source: NOAA Chart #16708.       (in fathoms) 
Fig 4. Exxon Valdez - Glacial Ice Intrusion into Traffic Lanes; Bligh Reef Navigation Chart 
Analysis: Exxon Valdez was proceeding at night on autopilot at a speed of 16 
knots when the vessel ran onto Bligh Reef [63]. The depth of the hard bottom 
before the reef, illustrated in Figure 4, averaged 30 fathoms sloping to 50 fathoms 
before rising to 4 fathoms at the reef. Neither 3D-FLS nor ECDIS existed at the 
time of this grounding. A vessel transiting this same course today using 3D-FLS 
with a 1,000 meter range at a speed of 16 knots would have had several minutes 
advance warning that they were in trouble before the grounding. First significant 
indication (other than the depth was half what is should have been in the inbound 
lane of the TSS) would have occurred around 1,000 meters out as the bow was 
directed towards Reef Island, where a solid wall to the water’s edge directly in the 
path of the vessel would have been displayed. The second and final indication 
would have occurred after the turn away from Reef Island towards Bligh Reef, 
where another solid wall to the water’s edge directly in the path of the vessel 
would have been displayed. Conceivably, 3D-FLS might have been useful to 
navigate the channel between Reef Island and Bligh Reef once they found 
themselves in this situation.  
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of Bligh Reef, Reef Island and/or 
the channel between the two would have been visible on ECDIS, providing 
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warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and speed to avert 
grounding. 
7.3 M/V Rena 
On 4 October 2011 the container ship Rena bound for the New Zealand port of 
Tauranga ran aground on Astrolabe Reef (illustrated in Figure 5) at a speed of 17 
knots. The master authorized the watchkeepers to deviate from the planned course 
lines on the chart to shorten the distance and expedite their arrival. Instead of 
passing two nautical miles north of Astrolabe Reef the second mate reduced the 
distance to one nautical mile to save time. He then made a series of small course 
adjustments towards Astrolabe Reef to make the shortcut. As a consequence Rena 
made a ground track directly for Astrolabe Reef. About 200 tons of heavy fuel oil 
were spilled in the accident, and a substantial number of cargo containers were 
lost overboard [64]. 
  
Source: New Zealand Chart #541  Data from WASSP 160F multibeam system. 
   www.oceanDTM.com (used by permission) 
Fig 5. Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Rena Grounding 
Analysis: Rena was proceeding at night on autopilot at a speed of 17 knots when 
the vessel ran onto Astrolabe Reef [65]. The depth of the bottom before the reef, 
illustrated in Figure 5, averaged 80 fathoms rising to 4 fathoms at the reef. Were 
Rena equipped with 3D-FLS with a 1,000 meter range at a speed of 17 knots the 
vessel would have had approximately 1.7 minutes advance warning before the 
grounding. The approaches to the reef would have been evident before then. 
Although paper charts were being used, Virtual AtoN placed to mark the 
perimeter of Astrolabe Reef would have been visible on ECDIS, providing 
warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and speed to avert 
grounding. 
7.4 M/V Costa Concordia 
On 13 January 2012 the passenger ship Costa Concordia with 4,229 persons on 
board while in navigation in the Tyrrhenian Sea off the coast of Italy collided with 
Scole Rocks adjacent to Isle de Giglio, as illustrated in Figure 6. The ship had 
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recently departed the port of Civitavecchia and was enroute to Savona, Italy. The 
hull was breached, thirty-two souls are dead or missing and the vessel was lost 
[66]. Human error is cited as a primary cause for this accident [67]. Specifically, a 
chart of inadequate scale was used to superficially plan and execute a maneuver at 
night that was unsuitable in terms of distance from the coast and adjacent rocks 
and outcrops as well as depth below the keel. This grounding became the most 
costly maritime salvage event in history. 
  
Source: MCIB [68] Source: http://blog.maxsea.com/  (used by permission) 
Fig 6.  Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Costa Concordia Grounding 
Analysis: Costa Concordia was proceeding at night at a speed of 16 knots when 
the vessel ran onto Scole Rocks. The position marked 2000 on the chart to the left 
lies approximately 1,100 meters from Scole Rocks with depth in excess of 100 
meters with a mud bottom. The 100 meter bottom contour is approximately 500 
meters further along the course, with upslope bottom rising to the 10 meter bottom 
contour at the maximum range of the 3D-FLS off the starboard bow. The bottom 
is also transitioning from mud to rock, with a resultant increase in acoustic 
reflectivity of the bottom material. Clear indications of the approaches to Scole 
Rocks would have appeared off the starboard bow on the 3D-FLS display. Even 
with the switched off ECDIS alarms, such an indication potentially should have 
initially alerted the Master to the existence of a problem since the appearance of 
Scole Rocks would have been expected off the port bow based upon the passage 
planning. Furthermore, the depth contour displayed on the 3D-FLS would clearly 
indicate insufficient depth in an unexpected location. Approximately 1.8 minutes 
advance warning could have provided of the pending grounding showing the 
approaches to Scole Rocks culminating with a wall extending up to the water’s 
edge. Up until 150 meters prior to grounding, an escape path to clear water would 
have been evident off the starboard bow. Baldauf and Wright [69] provides a 
concept for triggering anti-grounding warnings taking into account simulation-
based prediction of the ship’s maneuvering behavior according to the prevailing 
circumstances of the concrete situation. 
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the approaches to Scole Rocks would have been 
visible on ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter 
course and speed to avert grounding. 
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7.5 MSV Fennica 
On 3 July 2015 the MSV Fennica, while enroute between Dutch Harbor Alaska 
and the Shell Oil drilling field in the Chukchi Sea, was holed when it traveled near 
a previously uncharted rocky shoal [70]. The nautical chart of the inadequately 
surveyed area indicated several meters clearance to the bottom existed along the 
route, and tides were favorable. However, a deeper route of transit was available 
nearby that could have easily been used as an alternative to the shallower route 
actually taken. 
X
Source: NOAA Chart #16530  (Soundings in fathoms) 
Fig 7. Navigation Chart: Location where MSV Fennica was Holed 
Analysis: At the time of this writing the official investigation into the grounding 
had just begun. The speed of the vessel at the time it was holed is unknown. The 
depth of the bottom, illustrated in Figure 7, averaged 7-10 fathoms then around 15 
fathoms until rising to 4 fathoms at the previously undetected shoal. Were MSV 
Fennica equipped with 3D-FLS with a 1,000 meter range its useful range would 
have been restricted due to the shallow waters of the area to between 8 to 20 times 
the depth, or approximately 150 to 350 meters range. At a speed of 10 knots the 
vessel would have had approximately 20 to 60 seconds advance warning before 
the vessel was holed, possibly providing sufficient time to lessen the severity of 
the incident. The approaches to the shoal would have been evident before then. 
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of shoal would have been visible on 
ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and 
speed to avert the incident. 
7.6 M/V Petrozavodsk 
On 11 May 2009 the 1,250 gt. refrigerated cargo ship Petrozavodsk ran aground in 
heavy fog on the southern tip of Bjornoya (Bear Island) in the Arctic between 
Norway and Spitzbergen. Satellite tracking shows the ship held a steady course 
straight towards the shore and ran aground at a speed of 10 knots. The ship was 
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declared a total loss. There were no injuries but up to 60 tons of fuel and other 
pollutants were spilled into the sea in an area with major sea bird populations. 
Many dead and injured seabirds were found along the coastline. The master and 
mate were reported to have high blood alcohol levels resulting in the vessel 
entering a protected area and running aground. Both were charged, convicted and 
sent to prison in Tromso, Norway [71]. 
Analysis: This grounding is included to illustrate there is no fool-proof 
technological solution to prevent any situation where the master and mate are 
intent on criminally-negligent behavior that imperils the lives and safety of the 
crew and vessel.  
8. Safety Management System  
The unique risks and limitations associated with navigation in the Arctic 
necessitates a vessel safety management system that fulfills all appropriate 
company policies, port state regulations and IMO carriage requirements; as well as 
the COLREGS, the STCW convention, the Polar Code and other requirements that 
apply to the voyage. However, this is still not enough. The results of eNavigation, 
development of new carriage requirements and implementation of IMO initiatives 
take years to achieve fruition. A risk-adverse strategy must be followed towards 
equipping Arctic-bound vessels with 3D-FLS in a manner that will increase their 
potential to successfully complete their voyage in this risk-prone environment.  
The Arctic is a frontier that requires initiative, innovation and forethought to 
anticipate circumstances and events that are not likely to occur at lower latitudes 
and in areas more frequently traveled. This concept applies specifically to 
technology that may assist mariners today in reducing risk to navigation, yet no 
carriage requirements exist for their installation or use on vessels. One such 
example of progress in this area is the use of an Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
as a means to supplement GNSS positioning where atmospheric and other 
phenomena may interfere with reception. Many vessels in the Arctic and 
elsewhere are presently equipped with INS as a result of prudence and proper 
planning despite the absence of any specific requirement to do so. In many parts 
of the world eLORAN capabilities also exist and vessels are equipped with 
receivers as a means to supplement GNSS positioning. 3D-FLS should be amongst 
this equipment on the bridge. The adoption of truly Virtual AtoN and their 
verification through the use of georeferencing techniques that would be immune to 
interference and spoofing attacks would also be a logical extension of this 
progress. 
9. Conclusions 
The technologies described provide new opportunities to increase maritime safety 
in the poorly-charted frontiers of the Arctic, the benefits of which would be 
Arctic Environment Preservation through Grounding Avoidance 22 
 
applicable worldwide. 3D-FLS technology is not yet sufficiently tested or 
integrated on a widespread basis directly into existing navigation systems in its 
present form. Merely adding yet another sensor and display system to an already 
complex bridge environment without adequate engineering, planning and training 
is likely to make matters worse rather than improving them, and may result in 
increased risk to navigation similar to that which occurred upon the initial 
introduction of radar that lead to the collision between the M/Vs Andrea Doria 
and Stockholm [72]. Adequate training for watchstanders in the use of 3D-FLS by 
manufacturers should be mandated in anticipation of future enhancements to the 
STCW convention. Further, the Polar Code should be amended to stipulate the 
requirement for a second echo sounder is fulfilled using 3D-FLS. 
However, it is also abundantly clear that payback in terms of cost avoidance of 
even one grounding requiring rescue or resulting in oil and/or chemical spillage in 
the Arctic would far outweigh any investment necessary to equip vessels with this 
equipment and technology. This will enable masters and crews alike to become 
familiar with operating and using the described technology as well as enjoy the 
benefits and enhanced safety provided by its capabilities.  
Disclaimer 
The opinions, conclusions and recommendations within this paper are solely those 
of the authors and do not represent any official position or endorsement of the 
United States Coast Guard, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration or any Government or non-governmental organization or entity. 
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ABSTRACT: Collisionsandgroundingsarethetwotypesofcasualtiesinshippingthatoccurmostoftenandcauseserious
damage.At alltimesOfficersoftheWatch(OOW)mustbeawareoftherisksofcollisionandgroundingandcomplywith
rulesandregulationsasestablished,forexample,intheConventionontheInternationalRegulationsforPreventing
CollisionsatSea(COLREGs),GuidelinesforVoyagePlanning(InternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO) resolution
A.893(21»andtheProceduresManualofa ship'sSafetyManagementSystem(accordingtotheInternationalSafety
Management(ISM) Code).Maritimeeducationandtrainingsupportscompliancewiththelegalframeworkbyproviding
knowledgeandskillsandsupportingapplicationofbestpractice.Thispaperdescribesstudiesintotheuseofbridgealerts
andaninnovativeapproachtotriggeralarmsusingforward-lookingsonar.Thedevelopmentoftheconceptandbasic
functionalandtechnologicalstructuretosupportenhancedsituationalwarenesswill beexplainedanddiscussedfromthe
perspectiveofthegroundingofM/V CostaConcordia.Suggestionsandrecommendationsforsimulation-basedt stand
trainingscenariosarealsopresented.
1.0 NOMENCLATURE
Symbols,abbreviationsandacronymsusedwithinthispaperareidentifiedasfollows:
ATON
COLREGS
AidstoNavigation
InternationalRegulationsforPreventing
CollisionsatSea,1972
ElectronicAidtoNavigation
ElectronicChartDisplayand
InformationSystem
ElectronicNauticalChart
Forward-lookingsonar
HMI
HtoN
IMO
INS
M/V
OOW
STCW
HumanMachineInterface
HazardtoNavigation
InternationalMaritimeOrganization
IntegratedNavigationSystems
MotorVessel
OfficeroftheWatch
StandardsofTraining,Certificationand
Watchkeeping
eATON
ECDIS
ENC
FL-sonar
2.0 INTRODUCTION
An importantaspectofbasicandenhancedtraininginshiphandlingandnavigationcoursesisthefamiliarizationwithand
handlingofequipmentincludingtransferringknowledgeandexperienceonthecapabilities,functionalitiesandconstraints
ontheiruse.Bridgenavigationalequipmentencompassesmanyanddiversesystemstosupportsafeandefficientnavigation
andprotectionofthemarinenvironment.Thepresentsituationischaracterizedbyanincreasinglevelof integrationof
sensors,technicalsystems,displaysandsophisticateddecisionsupportsystemscombinedwithcomplexalertstoensure
sufficientsituationalwarenessofthebridgeteam.However,despitethepresenceofsuchsophisticatedsystemsaccidents
intheformofgroundingsandcollisionstillhappen.Regardlessof thebehaviour,theactionstakenornottakenbythe
bridgeteam,thegroundingofCostaConcordiaequippedwithverymodernintegratedbridgenavigationalsystemscanbe
seenasanotherprominentcasewherealertsimplementedinmostmodernandhighlysophisticatednavigationsystems
failedtoraisetheattentiontotakeactiontoavoidanaccident.
TheCOLREGsandtheInternationalConventiononStandardsofTraining,CertificationandWatchkeepingforSeafarers
(STCW)requireanadequatewatchbemaintained.[1,2]However,thereispresentlynoestablishedmeanstomaintainwatch
belowthewaterlinetodirectlydetecthepresenceofhazardstonavigation.A keyassertionoftheresearchpresentedinthis
paperisthatbridgewatchstandersaregenerallyprovidedonlywithindirectand/orsecondaryinformationfromwhich
safety-criticaldecisionsareroutinelyformulated.AlthoughthetragicgroundingofCostaConcordiaormorerecentlythe
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groundingofMN MarcoPoloinNorwegianfjordsprovideconvenientandfreshexamplestoillustratethisassertion,the
problemhasandcontinuestoexistonadailybasisduringvirtuallyeveryvesseltransit.Forexample,nauticalchartsand
evenmostmodemECDISprovidenavigationinformationasasecondaryreferencecreatedbysurveyatsometimeinthe
pastthatwasaccurateatthetimeitwasmadebutnotnecessarilyreflectingactualconditionsatthetimeofpassage.Radar
indicatesonlythosenearbytargetsfromwhichtheproximitytounderwaterhazardstonavigationshouldbededuced.A
traditionalechosounderprovidesdepthdirectlybelowthekeel,butnoindicationofdepthdirectlyforwardofthebow.
TheseandothermethodsuchasGNSSmerelyinferpositionalrelationshipstogeographiclocationsof interestand
concern,butnonearecapableofdirectlydetectingthephysicalunderwaterhazardtonavigation(HtoN)consistingofScole
Rocksoff IsledelGiglio,oranyothersuchhazardpriortogrounding.Additionaltothis,therearefloatinghazardsto
navigationthatcannotbechartedsuchasdriftingshippingcontainers,debrisfields,whales,etc.,havinglittleornopresence
onradarorothernavigationsensors.
Anotherassertionisthatthetechnologyneededtodetecthazardstonavigationi realtimeatandbelowthewaterline
currentlyexistsintheformofFL-sonarandisavailableascommercialoff-the-shelfequipmentreadytobeinstalledon
vesselsatthenextscheduledrydocking.Thisdoesnotimply,however,thatthistechnologyissufficientlytested,capable
ofbeingintegrateddirectlyintoexistingnavigationsystemsin itspresentform,oradequaterainingexistsforitsuse.
Merelyaddingyetanothersensoranddisplaysystemtoanalreadycomplexbridgeenvironmentwithoutadequate
engineering,planningandtrainingis likelytomakemattersworseratherthanimprovingthem,resultinginincreasedrisks
tonavigation.Thisis illustratedwiththeintroductionof radarthatleadtotheradar-assistedcollisionbetweenMNs
StockholmandAndreaDoria.Lackofpropertrainingintheoperation,useandinterpretationf radarequipmentcombined
withalackofproceduresforimplementingcorrectiveactionsbaseduponradarindicationscreated.ascenariowhere
establishedproceduresfornavigatinginrestrictedvisibilitywerenotfollowed,resultinginthecollision.[3]
Thecapabilitiesandlimitationsofforward-Iookingsonartechnologyarediscussedintermsoftheirscopeandcapabilityto
detecthazardstonavigation,alongwithitssuitabilityintermsofvesseltype,speedandinstallationrequirements.Also
coveredisthecomplexityofusingFL-sonarforvesselnavigationdescribingpresentcapabilitiesaswellasfuture
requirementsintermsofstandardsforintegratednavigationsystems(INS)andbridgealerts.Thisincludestheintroduction
ofelectronicaidstonavigation(eATONs)asameanstodisplayhazardstonavigationonelectronichartdisplayand
informationsystems(ECDIS).Integraltothisprocessistheuseofsimulationtechnologiestotest,verifyandvalidate
systemprocesses,proceduresandtrainingrequirementswellinadvanceoftheintroductionof thistechnologytovesselsby
theintroductionofcarriagerequirementsthroughtheIMO.
3.0 FORWARD-LOOKING SONAR TECHNOLOGY
Activesonar,commonlyreferredtoasanechosounderbytheIMO, isusedbyvesselsindeterminingthedepthbetweenthe
keelandthebottom.[4]A variationof theechosounderisforward-lookingsonarusedtodetectbottomfeaturesandobjects
withinthewatercolumnforwardofthebow.Despiteitsusefulnessandtheavailabilityofthistechnologyinthecommercial
marketplaceit israrelyincludedwithintheships'complementofnavigationsensors.
1.1 SPECIFICATIONSAND CAPABILITIES
Themethodsusedfordetectingbottomfeatures,objectsandsoundingsbydeterminingrange,azimuthandelevation
informationcangenerallybedescribedasvariationsontransmittingasteerablesonarsignalaheadalongthepathof the
vesselortransmittingasinglepingfromwhichsnapshotsoftheenvironmentareobtained.[5-8]A mosaicof thebottom
topographyandspecifictargetsisthencreatedasthevesselprogressesonitscourse.
TherangeofFL-sonarcanextendfromeightotwentytimesthedepthahead,dependingonbottomandtargetconditions.It
ismosteffectivewhenthebottomtopographyslopesupwardsandwhentargetsarelargeandconsistofhardrockand/or
coralthatprovidegoodacousticsignatures.FL-sonarproductsareavailablethatprovideboth2-aswellas3-dimensional
representationswhichprovideamorerealisticportrayalofthecourseahead.
FL-sonarsystemshavebeendevelopedwithdifferentcapabilitiessupportingbothautonomousnderwatervehicleand
vesselapplications.Ofthosedesignedforuseonvessels,mostareintendedforpleasureandsmallfishingboats.Thereare
systemswithrangeandresolutionthatmakethemsuitableforuseonlargervesselsuchasworkboats,offshoreservice
vessels,merchantandpassengervessels.However,operationalconstraintsmaycreatelimitationsontheirusefulness.For
example,effectiverangemaybelimitedbytradeoffsintransducerdesigntominimizewateresistanceanddrag.A
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summaryandexamplesofseveralFL-sonarsystems,presentlyavailableonthemarketandeachutilizingadifferenttypeof
transducer,andtheirspecificationsareillustratedinTable1.
Specifications
MaxirT\um D",t",c:~ion[)",pt~:
c:>p",ratirlgFrequel1cy:..
Maximum Detection Range (MDR):
Vertical Coverag.e:
Horzontal Field of View:
m.................................................................................................
Maximum Tramsnit Power:
... . ............................
Angular Accuracy:
Rolljpitch C()rT\pensation:
m~()!!!f>itc:~~c:c:lJE~c:y:m
Maximum Vessel Speed:
Screen Refresh Rate:
Advance Warning at MDR @ 10kts.:A
A:"Calculationbyauthor.
EchoPilot 3D FLS [91
:l()Om (328 ft)
200 kHz
200 m (656 ft)
900
600
.......................................................
not specified
100 m (328 ft)
180 kHz
. ... .............
800 m (2.500 ft)
1800
3600
............................
800W
ified
ecified
ecified
10 kts
seconds
.........
FarSounder 1000 1.111
50mJ169ft)
61 kHz
1,000 m (3,200
600
600
..................................................
<1500W,m.
. ..m1:60 mmm..
:1:200
0:50
25 kts
2 seconds
.........
139 sec. (2.3 min.) 183 sec. (3.1 min.)
1.2 CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO ESTIMATES OF ADVANCE WARNING AFFORDEDBY FL-SONAR
As averyfirstbasicstepforestablishingandfurtherdevelopmentofdefmitiveparametersfortheissuanceofwarningsto
watchstandersusingFL-sonar,certainguidingprinciplesmaybecitedtoachieveanestimateusefulforbroadguidanceon
thesubject.Forexample,acalculationoftherelativetimeaffordedavesseltobegincorrectiveactionsuchasaltering
course,reducingspeedorotherwisereactingtoanalarmgeneratedbyaFL-sonarwouldbebased,atminimum,uponthe
followingfactors:
MDR (m) - SRR (see)- APT(see) - WRT(see)
AdvanceWarning (see)= m (1)
Vs (see)
wherelogicalargumentsmaybemadetoestablishvaluesforeachoftheseparameters:
SpeedofVessel(Vs)= toknots
ScreenRefreshRate(SRR)= 2sec,orasnoted
MaximumDetectionRange(MDR)= obtainedfromTable1
AlarmProcessingTime(APT)=4 sec
WatchstanderResponseTime(WRT)= 5sec
1m/s= 1.9438knots
Althoughsomesystemscanperformatmuchhigherspeeds,avalueof 10knotswasselectedfortheSpeedofVessel(Vs)to
provideacommonbasisforevaluatingthereactiontimetoFL-sonarsystemalarms.A valueof twosecondsforScreen
RefreshRate(SRR)onthedisplaywasassumedbaseduponsystemperformancespecifications.However,SRRforthe
FurunoCH-270systemmaybeashighaseightsecondsormoreasthissystemprovidesgeneralcoveragethatextends
beyondtheareadirectlyaheadofthebow.ThevalueforMaximumDetectionRange(MDR) isobtainedfromthe
performancespecificationsoftheindividualFL-sonarunits.
AlarmProcessingTime(APT) isthespeedatwhichFL-sonardatacanbeevaluatedbysignalprocessingandalarm
generationalgorithmstodeterminewhetheraconditionexiststhatbreachespredeterminedvessel-specificsafetycontours
anddepths.Thisincludesdraft,course,Maneuveringcapabilities,lateralclearancemarginsandotherfactorspertinentto
safetyofnavigation.As assumptionismadethatsuchcriteriaforFL-sonararelikelytobesimilartothoseestablishedby
IMO forECDIS.[12]Integraltothisfactoraretimedelaystopreventnormaloperatingconditionsfromcausingfalsealerts
becauseofnormaItransientsthatmayexistintheFL-sonardata.[13]Thiscanaddanadditionalonetoseveralsecondsto
ensuretargetpersistence,liminatingthegenerationofanalarmduetoasingleoccurrenceorshortdurationortransient
target.A valueof foursecondswasselectedbaseduponFL-sonarefreshratesaswellasestimatesofprocessingtimesfor
interfaceandcommunicationssystemshandlingsoftwarethatmayberequiredbyINS.
WatchstanderResponseTime(WRT)isthatneededfortheOOWtoacknowledgeanalertandtakeappropriatecorrective
actionbaseduponthenatureof thealarm.Thismustakeintoaccounttimelagsnecessarytoassessratesofchangein
processessuchaschangingvesselcourseagainsttargets'movements.[14]ThetimerequiredfortheOOWtoconferwith
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otherbridgewatchstandersandlookoutsandtoissueorderstothehelmsmanmustalsobefactoredintothiscalculation.
Addtothistheeffectsof fatigueandvariousotherhumanfactorelements,onecaneasilyseethatthisfactoristhemost
subjectiveandimpreciseintheequation.A valueoffivesecondswaschoseninpartbasedupontheauthor'sdirect
observationsofbridgepracticesusedonseveralvesselsundersimilarconditionsusingECDIS andradarindications.
UsingthesecriteriatheEchoPilot3DFL-sonarprovidedapproximatelyYz-minutewarning,theFurunoCH-270provided
approximately2Y4-minutewarningandtheFarSounder1000providedapproximatelya3-minutewarningwhenconsidering
theirmaximumdetectionrange.Thespeedof 10knotsmayappearsomewhatslowformostvesselswhileunderway.
However,if avesselisoperatinginunknown,poorlychartedorknown-hazardouswatersit isprudenttoincreasesafety
marginsbyproceedingataslowerthannormalpace.
It shouldbenotedthatsuchadvancewarningcalculationsgenerallyprovide"bestcase"scenariosunderidealconditions,
andthatactualconditionsandresponsetimesmustbeexpectedtoreducethesemargins- significantlyinsomecases.
Actualconditionsmustalsotakeintoconsiderationbothhumanandtechnologicalfactorsthatcanresultinmajordeviations
fromtheseresponsetimes.Technologicalfactorscanincludewaterturbidity,pooracousticreflectionqualitiesofpotential
HtoNandevengrowthonthehullthatmayreduceFL-sonarsensitivity.Humanfactorscanrangewidelyfromdistractions
onthebridge,unfamiliaritywiththeequipmentandgenerallackof training,proficiencyorcurrencyinwatchkeeping
procedures.
1.3 INSTALLATION
To achievethemostreliableandaccurateperformanceFL-sonartransducer(s)mustbelocatedonanareaofthehullthatis
freeof turbulencefromobstructionslocatedforwardof themountingposition.Eachtransducermustbeprovidedan
unobstructedviewbothhorizontallytowardsthebowandverticallyfromthewaterlinetothebottomtoachievethebest
accuracyandeffectiveness.
TheEchoPilot3DForwardLookingSonarusestwotransducersmountedathwartships,oneeithersideequidistanttothe
keel- ideallyontherearthirdof thevesselTheinteriorinstallationofthesetransducersa visualizedfromwithinthehull
is illustratedinFigurela.
TheFarSounder1000NavigationSonarusesonetransducermountedonthebowwitha fairingtubeinsertedwithinan
existingorstandardbulb,orasaseparateinstallation.Theexteriorinstallationof thistransducerasseenfromaheadof the
bowis illustratedinFigurelb.
a.DualEchoPllotTransducersMountedAthwartships b.SingleFarSounderBow-MountedTransducers
Figure1:FL-SonarTransducerInstallations
TheFurunoSearchlightSonar,ModelCH-270(notpictured)usesasingletransducerthatcanbeloweredfromandretracted
intothehullatspeedsabove10knots.Thisunitmaybemountedanywhereonthevesselwhereanunobstructedview
horizontallythrough3600isavailable.
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4.0 GROUNDING OF COSTA CONCORDIA
On 13January2012CostaConcordiawith4,229personsonboard(3,206passengersand1,023crewmembers)whilstin
navigationintheTyrrhenianSeaoffthecoastofItalycollidedwithScoleRocksadjacenttoIsledeGiglio.Theshiphad
recentlydepartedtheportofCivitavecchiaandwasemoutetoSavona,Italy.Thehullwasbreached,thirty-twosoulsare
deadormissingandthevesselwaslost.[15]
Humanerroriscitedasaprimarycauseforthisaccident.Specifically,achartof inadequatescalewasusedtosuperficially
planandexecuteamanoeuvreatnighthatwasunsuitableintermsofdistanceITomthecoastandadjacentrocksand
outcropsaswellasdepthbelowthekeel.Radarindications,hadtheybeenobserved,wouldhaveclearlywarnedofthe
vessel'sunacceptablycloseproximitytothecoastaswellastheoutcroppedrockshowingabovethewaterline.Theseare
justafewof thefactsthatcameoutoftheofficialinquiry,andmanymistakesinnavigationwereinevidence.
An attemptismadetodepictinformationandalarmsthatwouldhavebeenavailabletothebridgewatchonCosta
ConcordiawereFL-sonarinstalled,operationalndintegratedintotheINS.Mistakesinnavigationplanningcanbemade,
alarmsdeactivated,andwatchstanderscanbedistractedandpoorlycommunicate.However,perhapstheactivationofan
alarmbasedupondirectdetectionof thepresenceofanimminentHtoNwouldprovidegreatersignificancethananalarm
requiringinferenceofHtoNbaseduponindirectmethodsandsecondarydatasources.
4.1 DETAILS OF NAVIGATION
A chronologyof eventsleadingtothegroundingofCostaConcordiarelevanttothisdiscussionisasfollows:
21:34:36
21:39:30
21:40:00
21:40:48
21:41:40
21:42:07
21:42:48
21:43:08
21:43:33
21:43:44
Masterarrivesonthebridge
Masterordershelmsmantoturnto300°
...increaseto16knotsandturnto310°
...turnto325°
vesselisatpositionA inFigure2
...turnto330°
vesselisatpositionB inFigure2
...turnto335°
...turnto340°
...turnto350°
21:43:52vesselisatpositionC inFigure2
21:44:11...starboard10(10degreestostarboard)
21:44:15...starboard20
21:44:20...hardtostarboard
21:44:36...midship« 150metersScoleRock
21:44:43...port10
21:44:45...port20
21:45:55vesselisatpositionD inFigure2
21:45:05...hardtoport
21:45:07CONTACT
Fromthischronologyit appearsthattheMaster,"vhohadjustcometothebridgeminutesearlierat21:34:36,exhibits
somesenseof situationalawarenessat21:39:30byhischangeof courseto300°"HO'\\o'"ever,h seemstobecompletely
unaV\rareof thegravenatureof thecircumstanceshehasencounteredat21:40:00(fiveminutesbeforethegrounding)
whenheorderedanincreasein speedto 16knots.Beginning48secondslaterat21:40:48theMasterorderedthefirstof
twelvecoursechangesoverthenextfourminutes.Clearlyatsomepointhehadtobecomeconsciousof thegravityof
thesituation,yetnoattemptwasevermadeto stopthevessel,reducespeedorevenexecuteahardturntostarboardto
achievea smallyawradiusearlierintheincidentchronology.Indeed,grolUldtrackinformationindicatesthevesselwas
acceleratingin speedduringthese:finalsegmentsof thevoyage.
4.2 INSIGHT AVAILABLE FROM FL-SONAR
SimulationofthecircumstancesncounteredbyCostaConcordiaisattemptedthroughextractionofthegroundtrackusing
theAIS datarecord,thenoverlayingFarSounder1000FL-sonarconecoverageontothegroundtracktoidentifYkeyevents
thatmayhaveprovidedopportunitiestoenhancesituationalwareness.Fournoteworthypositionsinthetransitjustpriorto
groundingidentifiedasA, B, C andD areillustratedinFigure2 andrecordedintotheabovechronology.
1.4.1 GroundTrackPositionA (10°56'32"E, 42°20'41"N; Speed:15.3knots;Course325°,approx.)
Thispositionliesapproximately1,600metersITomScoleRockswithdepthin"excessof 100meterswithamudbottom.[16]
ThislocationisoutsidetherangeofFL-sonartodetectbottominformationandisnotlikelytohaveprovidedany
informationofsignificancetonavigation.
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1.4.2 SegmentA toB (ElapsedTime:00:01:08,RateofYaw: llo/min)
Duringmostof thissegmentthebottomdepthwouldhaveremainedinexcessof 100meterswithamudbottom.However,
justpriortoarrivingatPositionB themaximumrangeoftheFL-sonarwouldhavecrossedthe100meterbottomdepth
contourdirectlyaheadandtoportofthecentrelineandit ispossiblethatearlyindicationsofanupslopebottommayhave
beenabletobedetected.Notethatduringthissegmenttherateoftumisapproximately11degreesperminute.
1.4.3 GroundTrackPositionB (10°56'15"E, 42°20'52"N; Speed15.6knots;Course335°,approx.)
Thispositionliesapproximately1,100metersITomScoleRockswithdepthinexcessof 100meterswithamudbottom.The
100meterbottomcontourisapproximately500metersfurtheralongthecourse,withupslopebottomrisingtothe10meter
bottomcontouratthemaximumrangeof theFL-sonaroffthestarboardbow.ThebottomisalsotransitioningITommudto
rock,witharesultantincreaseinacousticreflectivityofthebottommaterial.
Clearindicationsof theapproachestoScoleRockswouldhaveappearedonthestarboardbowontheFL-sonardisplay.
ThisprobablywouldhaveinitiallyalertedtheMastertotheexistenceofaproblemsincetheappearanceof ScoleRocks
wouldhavebeenexpectedofftheportbowbaseduponhispassageplanning.[17] Furthermore,thedepthcontour
displayedontheFL-sonarwouldclearlyindicateinsufficientdepthinanunexpectedlocation.
...:orN
1,000meters
S«mt 1 101)00
I'OOm
Summaryof thetrack(extractedbytheAIS datarecord)
Source: MarineCasualtiesInvestigativeBody,CruiseShipCostaConcordia,Reportonthesafetytechnical
investigation,Pg.61,MinistryofInftastructuresandTransports(Italy).
Figure2:GroundTrackofCostaConcordia,AnnotatedwithCoveragefor Forward-LookingNavigationSonar
1.4.4 SegmentB toC (ElapsedTime:00:01:04,RateofYaw: 100/min)
DuringthissegmentbottomdepthissteadilydecreasingacrosstherangeoftheFL-sonarITominexcessof 100metersto
thesurface.ThebottomconsistencyalsochangesITommudtosolidrock,resultingina largeacousticreflectionand
indicationsof strongtargets.
Theappearanceofasolidwallleadinguptothesurfaceandcontinuouslydecreasingindistancewouldhaveloomed
prominentlyontheFL-sonaruntilit consumedtwo-thirdsofthedisplayITomfarporttostarboardofcentre.Despiteorders
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fromthemastertoturnfrom330°to350°throughouttheoneminutesegmentduration,therateof turnappearstohavebeen
halfthatat10degreesperminute.
1.4.5 GroundTrackPositionC (10°56'01"E, 42°21'05"N; Speed16.0knots;Course340°?)
Thispositionliesapproximately530metersfromScoleRockswithdepthof95metersjustpasthe100metercontourwith
arockbottom.Thebottomcontourwouldreflectanupslopebottomrisingtothesurfacearound500metersahead.Less
thanone-thirdofthedisplayoffthestarboardbowwouldshowclearwater.Therewouldbeverylittleroomtomanoeuvre
atthispoint.
1.4.6 SegmentC toD (ElapsedTime:00:01:03)
Thisistheterminalsegmentofthevoyage.Bottomconsistencyissolidrockresultinginalargeacousticreflectionand
indicationsof strongtargets.Theappearanceofasolidwallleadinguptothesurfaceandcontinuouslydecreasingin
distancewouldhavecontinueduptothepointof impact.
1.4.7 GroundTrackPositionD (10°55'40"E, 42°21'21"N; Speed15.3knots;Course???O)
Thispositionliesapproximately30metersfromScoleRockswithtwelvesecondsremainingbeforecontact.
1.4.8 Hypotheticourseofevents-ApplyingFL-Sonar
Usingaspeedof 16knotsobtainedfromthechronologyinparagraph4.1asthevalueforSpeedofVessel(Vs)inequation
(1),FL-sonarcouldhaveprovidedapproximately1.8minutesadvancewarningtotheMasterofCostaConcordiaofthe
pendingHtoNconsistingoftheapproachestoScoleRocks.Thewarningwouldhavebeenissuedwhenthevesselwasjust
pastpositionB showninFigure2.
HadFL-sonarbeeninstalledandoperationalonthebridgeasdiscretenavigationalequipmentwithoutbenefitof inclusion
withinINS, visualindicationswouldhaveshownanunmistakablewalldirectlyinthepathofthevessel.Existingalarms
availablebothintegralandexternaltotheequipmentwouldhavealsobeenactivated,furthereinforcingtheseverityof the
situation.Consistently,atallnotedpositionsonthefinalapproach(Figure2:positionsA throughD) theFL-sonarwould
haveindicatedclearwaterwaspresentoffthestarboardbow.
It isassumedthatthe1.8minutespriorwarningwouldhaveprovidedsufficientadvancenoticetoplanandexecutevasive
manoeuvresthatmayhavelessenedtheseverityofthegroundingoraverteditentirely.Haltingtheforwardmomentumof
thevesselwouldnothavebeenpossibleasthiswouldrequirearound1,300meterswiththevesselmovingat16knots,and
thisdistancewasnotavailable.[18]However,slowingthevesselcombinedwithexecutingahardturntostarboardupon
receivingthewarningcommencingapproximately800meterspriortoScoleRockswouldhavesignificantlyreducedthe
damageincurredintheeventofgroundingsuchthatthevesselmayhaveremainedafloatandlivesmayhavebeensaved.
Indeed,andevenhypotheticaLtheaccidentmaynothavehappenedatall.
5.0 BRIDGE ALERTS AND ALARM GENERATION
TheinformationavailablefromtheFL-sonarcanbeusefulinalertingwatchstandersa topotentialHtoNpresentinthepath
directlyaheadofthebow.VisualindicationsseenontheFL-sonardisplayareoneformofalertingmechanism.However,
thisdatamayalsobesharedaspartof anintegratedapproachusingECDIS aswellastheAlertmanagement,moduleC of
anINS accordingtolatestIMO PerformanceStandards.ThiscoincideswithexistingSTCWtrainingrequirementsand
couldutilizeexistingalarmmechanismswithwhichwatchstandersarealreadyfamiliar.
Analysisof informationavailablefromFL-sonarcanbeusedtotriggeralertswithdifferentlevelsofpriority.In accordance
withthedefinitionsprovidedbyIMO performancestandardsthelowestlevelof suchanalertis acautiontojustraise
awarenessofthebridgeteamtoacertainunusualsituation.In respecttotheintegrateduseofFL-sonarinformationthis
couldbeasituation,whereanobstacleisdetectedatalargerdistanceahead,e.g.duetoacrosstrackerror.
Triggeringwarning,thesecondprioritylevelofalertandrequiringimmediateattentionbythebridgeteam,couldbelinked
tocriteriawithintheusualManeuveringrangeof theshiptoavoidcontacttoanydetectedHtoN.Thetimeframeistobe
configuredastoallowtheOOWtoadditionallychecktheFL-sonardisplaybutalsomatchwithavailableECDIS
information(e.g.toproofapproachingashallowwatersarea,awreckorrock,island).
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Finallyevenanalarmcouldbetriggered,characterizingconditionsrequiringimmediateactione.g.theshipisapproaching
thelowerManeuveringlimit(e.g.anemergency,hardrudderactionwouldberequired)inordertoavoidthecontactwithan
FL-sonardetectedobject/HtoN.
Thecapabilitytoprovidethosewarningsandalarmscanbeevenindependentofoperatorinterpretationa dbebasedupon
analysisof theinformationobtainedfromtheFL-sonar.ThisappearstobeavailableonlyfromtheFarSoundersystem.
Takingintoaccountthecharacteristicsoftheseaarea(e.g.approachingcoastalwaters,navigatinginiceetc.)theoperator
canconfigureparameterswithintheareabeingobservedbysettingalarmvaluesbydepth,minimumrange,maximum
range,andfield-of-viewanglewidthasillustratedinFigure3.[19]Thealarmvolumeisshowninred.Anadditionalsetting
isthenumberofhitsdetectedbeforetriggeringthealarm.
Figure3: Forward-LookingSonarAlarm VolumeSetting
Watchstandersareprovidedbothvisualandaudiblenotificationse.g.announcedviathecentralizedCAM-HMI and
supportedbypresentationi FL-sonartargetoverlayinanECDIS assuggestedinthefollowingfigure,whichtakesinto
considerationa dappliesrequirementsandstandardssimilartointegrationof informationandradaroverlays.
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Figure4:FL-SonarENC Overlay
FulfillingtheserequirementsisaccomplishedthroughthefusionofdataacquiredirectlythroughstandardNMEA-OI83
interfaceswithexternalnavigationsensorsthatincludethevessel'sGNSS,headingsensorandechosounderviathehost
computer'sCOM ports.[20]A numberof3rdpartymanufacturershaveimplementedtheirownFarSounderclient
capabilitiesaspartoftheirECDIS/ENCsoftwareproducts.
6.0 SIMULATION PRIOR TO INTEGRATION
Theuseofsimulationtoaccomplishtesting,verificationandvalidationtoassimilateFL-sonarintotheINS environmentisa
vitalfactortowardsensuringsystemsareproperlyintegratedandmarinersareadequatelytrainedpriortotheintroductionof
thetechnologyintowidespreaduseandasIMO carriagerequirements.
Besidetechnicalaspects,imulationtrialsarealsotobedesignedandtobeconductedtospecificallyaddressandstudythe
impactofnewtechnologiesonthehumanoperators.Thereforesimulationtrialsarealsoespeciallyaimingatgathering
informationaboutgoodpracticetoproperlyfamiliarizeuserswiththehandlingofequipmenttosafelyandreliablyhandle
suchinnovativesystemsduringroutineoperationsbutalsoincaseofsafety-criticalsituations.
Thefollowingtableprovidesanexampleforasimulationscenariofirstlytobeusedforthepurposesofresearchingthe
effectsof integratedFL-sonaronthesituationalwarenessofOOW. Secondly,the:fTameworkcanbefurtherdevelopedto
alsomakeuseintrainingexercisesrelatedtoicenavigationtoo.
Simulationstudieswill beconductedtocollectandanalysedatainordertosupportthatsystemrequirementsand
specificationsareproperlydefmedatthelevelof theFL-sonar(componentlevel)aswellastheINS (systemlevel).Human
ElementrelatedstudiesaretodefineoptimalHumanmachineinterface(HMI) andadaptalertmanagementtoendusers'
needsandrequirements.
Ontheotherhand,properlyimplementedsimulationscanalsoserveasameanstomitigatefuturetraininglagtimesthrough
theparalleldevelopmentandintegrationof trainingcurriculawithnewsystemtechnology.Dataavailablecanbeusefulto
assistinmarinecasualtyinvestigationse peciallyinthecasesofgrounding,aIIision,collisionandevasivemaneuversthat
comprisesomeof thetopmarinecasualtyevents.Indeed,thesamehardwaredeployedonshipsfornavigationcanbeused
fortraining.Theentiresuiteoftestcriteria ndtestcasesusedinsystemverification,validationandtestcancomprisea
foundationforfuturecomprehensivetrainingtoolandsimulatorscenariodevelopment.Involvementof trainingpersonnelin
thetechnologydevelopmentprocesscanalsohelptoensurenavigationsystemfea¥e developmentisaccomplishedwith
appropriateconsiderationgiventoultimatend-userexperience,requirementsandneeds.
I
I
Page57
Draftsa1!Jpleexercisescenario
Identifier EfQ~.eut;n~¥Jgatt9U$uPPort'~YJl\t.-~U~r
M~JtM~~ementand~2undingavoidatice
Trainingobjective i.a./ e.g.
. Useof integratedFL-sonarinformationforroutemonitoringand
groundingavoidance
· UseofIntegratedNavigationSystemforsafe,efficientand
environmentallyftiendlyshipping. Configurationofalertsettings
. Routemonitoringusingallavailablemeap.s
Simulatortool
Standardofcompetence Navigationalwatchofficer,Master,chiefmate(managementlevel)
Configuration -speed=18Ids)'"
Duration
Area
Long, >45min
rCoasti.irarea~~~-~-
Environment/ Traffic Moderatenvironmentalconditions(lowstates)andtrafficsituation(low
density)
.,
; '~Pass;~gervessel(i.a.equipped
system)isnavigatinginacoastal
anumberofcoUJ;Sec~ges,~. .
· CommuDicationwithcshore-basedcompanycontrolandVTS stations.PassageincludeSseveralrudder/enginemaneuver.Navigationalwammgsaboutsunkencontainershipanddriftingcontainers
in theconcernedseaarea. Changeto'alternativeroute
.Enginebroblems tobediscussedwithengineers
.. on under keel clearancepower, speedand fuel
shallowwater
tiot!:assessmentj respecttocollisionandgroundingavoidance
dem.~twopropellers,bowthrUster
llowingtheplannedrouteincluding\
Event-descriptiol)
Table2:Draftframeworkfor asuggestedsimulationscenario
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
VesselgroundingsandcollisionswithHtoNcananddocauseuntoldsuffering,lossoflife andproperty,oftenresultingin
devastatingenvironmentaldamage.Costsincurredasaresultmustincludepropertyandliabilitiesarisingftomtheaccident
itselfaswellasthecleanup.Suchcostsescalateasvesselsincreaseinsizeandcargocapacity,especiallyforcargosthat
includetoxicchemicals.Largerpassengervesselswithgreatercarryingcapacitycreatevengreaterrisk.Theeffectsofsuch
accidentsareamplifiedinareasthatareremotewheresearchandrescueandsalvageffortsareproblematicatbest.
FL-sonarcanprovideameanstodirectlydetectHtoNthatarenotpresentonnavigationchartsaswellassupplement
existingmethodstoeffectgreaterurgencytoadversecircumstancesandheightensituationalwareness.Thetechnical
capabilitiesexisttomakeasubstantialdifferencenow.Theestablishmentofcarriagerequirementsa wellasfusioninto
INS stillneedstotakeplace.Thecostsinvolvedareminimal,especiallyin lightoftheconsequencesofnothavingFL-sonar
availablefornavigationaluse.ThesalvagecostofCostaConcordiamountstoover$2billionUS.[2l]Thisamountby
itselfwouldcoverthecoststopurchaseandinstallFL-sonarequipmenton75%of theworld'smerchantfleetgreaterthan
25,000grosstons.[22] .
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